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Abstract / Summary: 
The three syntheses of time are Deleuze's response to Kant's belief that time is 
synthesized by the unity of the "I think. " Deleuze believes that there is a prior 
synthesis of time in the unconscious. He calls this a "passive" synthesis of time. My 
thesis will seek to clarify Deleuze's theory of the three syntheses of time by 
providing the background from which he derived his concepts. In chapter one I argue 
that the system of "signs" presented in Proust and Signs is the precursor to Deleuze's 
three syntheses of time. I conclude that Worldly Signs correspond to synthesis of 
habit, Signs of Love correspond to the synthesis of memory, and Signs of Art 
correspond to the synthesis of the future. In chapter two I argue that the system of 
"series" presented in the second half of The Logic of Sense illustrates Deleuze's 
conceptions of "resonance" and "forced movement" that are critical to understanding 
the three syntheses of time. I conclude that Deleuze's conception of connective, 
conjunctive and disjunctive series are derived from Freud's reading of libidinal 
stages in his Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality. In chapter three I argue that 
chapter two of Difference and Repetition is based upon concepts derived from 
Freud's Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. I conclude that the concepts of the Id, 
Ego and Superego each correspond to a synthesis of time and that these agencies are 
primarily based upon neurological processes. In chapter four I argue that the static 
repetitions are the means by which the three syntheses of time manifest themselves in 
our actions. I conclude that the Superego presents and forbids actions that constitute 
a "pure event" and that the psyche reacts by repetitive behaviors that correspond to 
the three static dimensions of time: the before, the during, and the after. 
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Key to abbreviations used in this thesis: 
For the works of Gilles Deleuze: 
[DR] = Difference and Repetition 
[LS] = The Logic of Sense 
[PS] = Proust and Signs The Complete Text 
[NP] = Nietzsche and Philosophy 
[CC] = Coldness and Cruelty 
For the works of Sigmund Freud: 
[I Freud] = Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unpublished Drafts. 
[7Freud] = On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality and Other Works 
[I I Freud] = On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis 
For the works of Friedrich Nietzsche: 
[WP] = The Will to Power 
[Z] = Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a Bookfor None andAll 
For the work of Harold Rosenberg: 
[TN] = The Tradition of the New 
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Introduction: 
This thesis is about the three syntheses of time as they are presented in the 
work of Gilles Deleuze. What are the three syntheses of time? The three syntheses of 
time are not reducible to our conscious sense of time. It is true that we have a sense 
of time that is divided into a sense of the past, present, and future. But the problem of 
the three syntheses of time does not address the conscious phenomena of our sense of 
time; rather, it addresses the unconscious and preconscious conditions that produce 
our sense of time. For example, our sense of duration within the passage of time is 
dependent upon our biological needs and expectations. Each organ in the body may 
have its own duration that is determined by its own contractions of need and 
satisfactions. Deleuze calls this a "passive" synthesis of time because we are not 
directly conscious of these processes that condition our sense of time. Another 
example of a passive synthesis is to be found in our sense of the past. When Deleuze 
refers to the "pure" past he is not referr ing to a process of memory; rather, he is 
referring to an entire dimension of time that is prior to any content. Once again this is 
a "passive" synthesis because our general sense of the past is determined by a form of 
libidinal investment as we shall see. The "passive" synthesis of the future is even 
more problematic: our sense of the future cannot be reduced to a form of expectation. 
Expectation is a conscious and active form of the future. Deleuze investigates the 
"passive" synthesis of the future that is not reducible to the conscious expectation of 
an event. This "passive" synthesis of the future can be found in the concept of the 
"problem. " A problem, as Deleuze uses the term, is a divergent event that centers on 
a complex image of action. To put it simply, the passive synthesis of the future is the 
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play of a divergent series of actions that is constantly at work in the unconscious. In 
the pages that follow all of this will be explained in detail. For now what is important 
to keep in mind is that the three syntheses of time are not reducible to our conscious 
sense of time. 
It is incumbent upon the writer of this thesis to give the reader a sense of the 
purpose and style of the work he is about to read. To this end the following warnings 
and guidelines may be helpful. This is not a work that intends to re-produce or re- 
present the concepts of the author it intends to study. Instead, this thesis is a 
meditation upon problems. As such, it need not directly concern itself with what the 
author of the original text (Gilles Deleuze) actually had in mind when he wrote about 
the three syntheses of time. But neither does it intend to depart from, or be critical of, 
Deleuze's position. Because this thesis is not a meditation on any one philosopher or 
school of thought it will cut across disciplines and divergent types of philosophies. 
For example, this thesis is just as much about the works of Freud, Proust and 
Nietzsche as it is about Deleuze. Because I am in pursuit of a philosophical 
"problem" I am not concerned with what any of these philosophers may have thought 
about themselves and their own positions. In short, I leave all questions of ideology, 
background and philosophical persuasion aside for the duration of this thesis. To put 
it another way, I de-center the philosopher in favor of the potentialities of the 
concepts themselves and their ability to take on new meanings when juxtaposed with 
problems and concepts of another philosopher. This is nothing less than Deleuze does 
in his own work. As such I am following the precedent laid out in Deleuze's 
conception of ideas as "problems" rather than the normal conception of philosophical 
"concepts" as the intended expression of a philosopher. Here is the procedure that I 
will follow in my thesis: Each section will ask a question. This question will lead to 
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various concepts found in the works of different thinkers. What will unify them into a 
coherent whole is the persistence of the question being asked. In reading this thesis it 
is very important to keep in mind the question being asked. If the reader fails to do 
this then there will be no comprehension of the series of problems being dealt with. It 
is also very important that the reader remain focused upon the immediate problem 
being dealt with and not try to find a totalizing thesis that would sum up Deleuze's 
position. This is always a danger: philosophers often seek to find a formula that 
would describe the total philosophy of a thinker. Deleuze's work is difficult to 
classify because Deleuze only works upon a multiplicity of small problems and small 
questions. There is not "one" overriding problem or question that would sum up the 
three syntheses of time. The three syntheses of time have no "meaning"; therefore it 
is impossible to state the meaning of something that is not about meaning. Instead, 
the three syntheses of time are about "functioning. " Because of this, this thesis will be 
about how the three syntheses of time function and not about what they mean. Here 
is yet another warning to the reader: do not look for "meaning" in this thesis; instead 
read it as one would read a mechanical instruction booklet; see how it functions. In 
order to do this when reading this thesis one must keep questions of function in the 
foremost of one's thoughts such as: "What makes us experience time as duration? " or 
"What makes us believe that there is a past? " or "How are we aware of the future? " 
The main function of this thesis is to make the reader aware of these questions and 
the problems that animate them. 
Now let us consider Deleuze's texts themselves. The actual phrase "three 
syntheses of time" is named for the first time in Difference and Repetition and more 
specifically in chapter two of this book: "Repetition for-itself" But it is my 
contention that a foreshadowing of this official "three syntheses of time" is to be 
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found in his work written four years previously, namely Proust and Signs. In the first 
chapter of this thesis I will show how the system of signs in Proust and Signs implies 
three syntheses of time. This is, perhaps, the easiest chapter of my thesis to read 
because the concepts that are drawn from the work of Proust are straight- forward and 
easy to understand even if one has not read Proust's work. This first chapter will 
focus upon three types of signs: worldly signs, signs of love and signs of art. I will 
show how each of these types of signs helps to illuminate a relation to time. Worldly 
signs relate to our sense of time passing. Signs of love refer to our sense of the past 
or lost time, and signs of art relate to the future or time regained. This first chapter is 
intended to give the reader a general sense of the three syntheses of time and their 
various modes of operation. The second chapter, however, is more difficult: it begins 
to delve into the details of synthesis. This second chapter of my thesis deals with the 
second half of Deleuze's book The Logic ofSense. The important secondary referent 
for this chapter is Freud, and more specifically, his Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality in which he puts forward his theory of libidinal stages or series: pre-genital, 
oedipal, and post-oedipal. The connection and disconnection between these stages 
will be extremely important to our passive syntheses of time. By this time we will 
have seen that Deleuze discovers the three syntheses of time in the work of Proust. 
Now in this second chapter we will discover how Deleuze deepens this 
understanding of the three syntheses using the work of Freud. Essentially this second 
chapter will deal with the "disguises" and "displacements" that take place through 
time and in the unconscious. Again, I must warn the reader that the transition from 
the first chapter to the second chapter of this thesis is abrupt and requires a shift in 
thinking. What must be kept in mind when reading the second chapter of this thesis is 
the conception of a "stage" or a "series" and how one stage in our libidinal evolution 
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interacts with and transforms itself into another stage. We must ask ourselves: "what 
effect does this overlapping and resonance of stages have on our sense of time? " This 
is the overriding question of the second chapter. The third chapter of my thesis is 
even more difficult. It deals with chapter two of Difference and Repetition in 
connection with Freud's book Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. The theme of this 
third chapter is "energetics" or the neurological transformation in the brain and the 
organism that constitutes the "passive" nature of synthesis. The importance of this 
chapter is to give the reader the sense that the three syntheses of time has nothing to 
do with the purely "spiritual" or conscious sense of time, but rather, it has more to do 
with the physical and neurological transformations in the brain. Deleuze, himself, 
refers to Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology in his book Difference and 
Repetition. It is my belief that the concepts of "larval selves" and "passive synthesis" 
are partially derived from this important work by Freud. This third chapter is the 
most difficult chapter because it begins on the edge of philosophy and neurology. 
However, it is one of the most important aspects of my thesis because it shows that 
the concepts that Deleuze uses are not abstract metaphysical entities; but rather, they 
are concrete physical activities in the brain. Deleuze sometimes tells us that the 
unconscious is mechanical. We must take this literally: the third chapter of my thesis 
opens up the possibility of this reading of the unconscious as a machine. In order to 
understand this third chapter it is necessary that the reader think in terms of causality: 
"A causes B that leads to U or "if A happens then B must result. " The chapter begins 
with simple organisms and traces a growing series of complexities that lead from one 
passive synthesis of time to another. This third chapter will show the "genesis" of the 
synthesis of time rather than a static and pregiven matrix of time inherent in 
consciousness. When the reader reaches chapter four he will notice another shift in 
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style and form. Chapter four is not arranged in the format of the previous chapters in 
which there are three sections, each section devoted to a synthesis of time. Chapter 
four is about the "static" genesis of time as it is presented in chapter two of 
Difference and Repetition. The static genesis of time is deeply involved in Deleuze's 
theory of the "pure event. " This last chapter is also divided into three parts- The first 
part deals with Freud and the concept of the event. Two things are of particular 
importance in this section: first, Freud's conception of the unconscious archetype 
(phylogenesis) and the three modes of repetition (before, during and after). Each of 
these repetitions is the manner in which the unconscious repeats in relation to a 
problematic "event. " It is very important that the reader does not confuse these three 
"repetitions" with the three syntheses of time. If these three repetitions must be 
placed in a synthesis of time, then they belong to the third synthesis of time that 
ldcomprehends" the previous two. The second section of chapter four deals with the 
cyclic conceptions of time. The three cyclic conceptions of history also demonstrate 
the three modes of repetition of before, during and after. The first: expiation of faults 
by karmic repetition. The second: dramatic repetition of roles in history from the 
point of view of analogy. The third: the repetition of chance itself This exposition on 
cyclic history is immediately followed by a close reading of a chapter from Harold 
Rosenberg's book The Tradition of the New of which Deleuze makes extensive use 
of in Difference and Repetition. It is in this reading of Rosenberg that the example of 
character change of Hamlet in the play by Shakespeare illustrates the passage through 
the three stages of repetition: before, during and after. The third section of chapter 
four turns to Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra in order to illustrate the three 
repetitions again in relation to the "pure event" of the eternal return. In Difference 
and Repetition Deleuze states that two of the three repetitions that he spoke of are 
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present in this work by Nietzsche. In this section I will show how Zarathustra passes 
from denial of the eternal return to acceptance and also examine Deleuze's premise 
that there is an unfinished third part to the eternal return. This is immediately 
followed by another exposition of the eternal return as it is presented in Deleuze's 
book Nietzsche and Philosophy. It is in this last part that I will examine the eternal 
return as an "ethical" and "selective" doctrine. I will also explain why Deleuze calls 
the eternal return a return of "difference. " None of this fourth chapter is incidental to 
my thesis. The "static" synthesis of time is still part of the three syntheses of time. It 
is the manner in which the three syntheses are "comprehended" or how they make 
themselves felt in our repetitive activities. This last chapter allows us to question the 
manifestations of the syntheses of time in our fears, our vices, and in our hopes. In 
this way, the last chapter is a "practical" application of the syntheses of time. The 
danger the reader must avoid, however, is to reduce the three repetitions to the three 
syntheses or to completely disconnect them so that they appear incidental to the 
whole thesis of three syntheses of time. One must, therefore, think of the three 
"repetitions" as the otherface of the three syntheses of time. This is the other face 
that is manifested in action. To repeat the warning to the reader given above: it is 
very important that each chapter be read as a new approach to the three synthesis of 
time. Imagine this thesis as a story told from multiple perspectives. The first "story" 
is about signs, the second is about series, and the third is about energetics. If the 
reader expects one chapter to expand upon another then he may be disappointed. 
Each chapter must be a new start. However, this does not mean that each "story" or 
chapter may not resonate with another. In fact there will be repetitions of themes, and 
each chapter will approach a theme from a different perspective. On the whole, the 
13 
use of different strategies or perspective is intended to give a more complete picture 
of Deleuze's theory of the three syntheses of time. 
Before we can begin to examine the details of the three syntheses of time we 
must first ask ourselves: what is its importance? Why should we spend our time 
thinking about the three syntheses of time? What does it do? What is the problem it 
addresses? The thesis itself will deal with the details and the workings of the three 
syntheses, but before we delve into them I will set aside part of my introduction to 
address the question of the "importance" of the three syntheses of time. 
What tradition of philosophy is Deleuze attacking or working against when he 
postulates the three syntheses of time? Although there are many examples of 
"abstract" synthesis in traditional philosophy, in Difference and Repetition Deleuze 
names Kant as his adversary: "It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, 
which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation. Here 
synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the 1, 
while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. " [DR 87] Kant 
believed that the syntheses of time depended wholly on the active syntheses of the 
abstract logical subject of thought. For every representation we could have, there is 
an "I think" that can accompany it and relate it to one and the same subject. By doing 
this Kant made the synthesis of time wholly dependent on the activity of the subject. 
He even went so far as to say that if the subject disappears then time and space will 
disappear too: "... if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective 
constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects 
in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as 
phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. "' This means, in short, that 
only those subjects that are capable of active representation of the "I think" are able 
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to synthesize the manifold appearances of time into a whole. Does the ameba say "I 
thinky' or have any power of synthesis? If we think of all the various species of life 
and reserve the power of synthesis of time only to those who are capable of abstract 
representation, we then encounter an absurdity. For Deleuze this Kantian synthesis of 
time is an abstract synthesis of time. He does not deny that Kant has discovered a 
valid synthesis of time. However, Deleuze does not rest content with making active 
synthesis the only basis of the synthesis of time. Instead he seeks out the possibility 
of a passive synthesis that takes place both on an organic level and an unconscious 
level. In this way he will free synthesis from "representation" and the subject. 
Deleuze does not deny that there is an active synthesis. He only believes that 
it comes afterwards. In Proust and Signs Deleuze demarcates two distinct ideas 
about the order of intelligence. A traditional view of the faculty of intelligence states 
that it comes before: "There is one aspect... of logos, by means of which the 
Intelligence always comes before, by which the whole is already present, the law 
already known before what it applies to: this is the dialectical trick by which we 
discover only what we already have given ourselves, by which we derive from things 
only what we have already put there. " [PS 105-106] This is what Deleuze calls the 
"totalizing impulse" [PS 105] by which we try to represent to ourselves all of our 
knowledge as if it formed a pregiven unity. Kant is guilty of this when he tells us that 
space and time is already given as a whole: "Different times are merely parts of one 
and the same time. Y92 For Kant time is a "necessary representation 0 and this is 
undoubtedly valid according to his argument, but we must ask ourselves: is time only 
a representation? As "representation" time is given as a whole, but in its synthesis 
time is not given as a whole. This leads to Deleuze's second conception of the faculty 
of intelligence; he says of Proust: "He counters the logical or conjoined use of all our 
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faculties--preceded by the intelligence that brings them all together in the fiction of a 
'total soul'--by a nonlogical and disjunct use, which shows that we never command 
all our faculties at once and their intelligence always comes after. " [PS 106] Given 
this second vision of the use of the intelligence, the possibility of a passive synthesis 
becomes evident. In short, every "representation" of time or space that we have must 
be produced by a prior passive synthesis of time and space. Therefore, even though 
we conceive time as a whole in our representational consciousness, this does not 
mean that time is a "whole" outside of representation. In fact, the "power of sickness, 
age, and forgetting, afFwm the fragments as disjunct" [PS 129] according to Deleuze. 
It is in those states that the powers of "representation" fall apart and time appears as 
fragmented and disjointed. This testifies to the necessity of a passive synthesis prior 
to the activity of the intellect. For this reason Deleuze's three syntheses of time are an 
attempt to construct a new "Trancendental Aesthetic" that, according to Deleuze, 
"appears more profound to us than that of Kant. " [DR 98] Deleuze names two 
reasons for reconfiguring the transcendental aesthetic: Kant rules out "the possibility 
of composing space step by step" [DR 98], and he deprives "this passive self of all 
power of synthesis (synthesis being reserved for activity). " [DR 98] Therefore, the 
focus of Deleuze's three syntheses of time will be to restore the power of synthesis to 
the passive or unconscious selves and to restore the possibility of composing time 
step by step. It is because of this that Deleuze's new transcendental aesthetic must 
pass into the unconscious. 
If Kant began the era of "representational" or active synthesis then Freud 
began the era of passive or unconscious synthesis. After Freud it becomes possible to 
speak of the unconscious as an autonomous faculty that was unavailable to Kant. 
Because of this Deleuze makes extensive use of Freud in his construction of a new 
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transcendental aesthetic of passive synthesis. Although Freud himself was not 
primarily concerned with the philosophical problem of time, there are aspects of his 
work that lend themselves to an analysis of time. Deleuze selects three main aspects 
that form the basis of his three syntheses. First there is the theory of displacement 
and disguise in Freud. Freud discovered that memories or fantasies masked one 
another and displaced certain elements across time. Concepts like "deferred action" 
fall into this category of displacement and disguise. For Deleuze this forms the basis 
for his theory of the second synthesis of time. The remarkable aspect of this theory of 
disguise and displacement is that it accounts for memory but treats memory as an 
effect of a preconscious or unconscious process and not the voluntary exercise of an 
active faculty. As such, the passive synthesis of memory is prior to the active or 
conscious activity of remembering. Second, in Freud we find a complex theory of 
neurology. In The Projectfor a Scientific Psychology Freud lays out a systematic 
account of how quantities of excitation pass through neurons and are synthesized into 
perceptions. It is this aspect of Freud that Deleuze relies upon to formulate thefirst 
synthesis of time. In the work of Deleuze such concepts as the "larval subject"') and 
the contraction of habits are also to be found in the work of Freud. All of these 
neurological syntheses are unconscious or non-conscious activities in the brain. As 
such they are to be considered a passive synthesis of the present or the means by 
which "duration" is synthesized by the organism. Third, in Freud we discover the 
theory of phylogenesis. Although Deleuze does not agree with Freud about the origin 
of these unconscious archetypes he does see them as essential to his own theory of 
the "pure event. " For Deleuze these archetypal events are "problematic" insofar as 
they have no clear sub ect or object. Being ambiguous, these problematic events are j 
the means by which the future is synthesized. To put it simply, the synthesis of the 
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future is the simultaneous affirmation of all possible outcomes. The pure event, being 
an expression of all possible divergent series of outcomes, brings the dimension of 
the future under the realm of unconscious "problems. " Because these events are 
unconscious or preconscious they too must be considered a thirdpassive synthesis of 
time. It is from this third passive synthesis of time, as a relation of the ego to a 
problematic event, that our preconscious sense of time arises. It is at this point that 
Deleuze talks about the "three repetitions" [DR 91] of a pure static order of time. The 
"static order of time" is different from the three syntheses of time. This static order 
only concerns the presentation of the third synthesis of time in the preconscious. 
Consider an archetypal event that we find in the work of Freud: "to kill the father. " 
The ego is placed in time, not by the order of real events, but by its relation to these 
pure "timeless" archetypal events. In the case of the tragedy of Oedipus, there is a 
point in the play before the realization of the act of "killing the father, " a point of 
realization of the act or the during, and a point of self-destruction after the act. 
Deleuze extends the third synthesis of time into the static repetition of time to show 
that our concept of before, during and after in time are products of passive synthesis 
and not a priori forms of the understanding. The passive nature of these three static 
repetitions can be found in the work of Freud. In chapter four of this thesis I extract 
from the work of Freud the three repetitions of before, during and after. These are: 
the repetition of the neurotic, the repetition of the child who plays destructive games, 
and the repetition of the superego that seeks to negate object-cathexis. These forces 
of repetition are what Freud referred to as "demonic" forces because they fall outside 
the will or volition of the subject. As such, they expose the priority of passive or 
involuntary synthesis over the active syntheses of the faculties of representation. For 
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all the reasons above Freud is an important part of this thesis on the three syntheses 
of time. 
Proust is also an important point of reference in this thesis. In chapter one I 
deal with Deleuze's Proust and Signs. It is in this work that the three syntheses of 
time are discovered although the terminology "three syntheses of time" does not 
appear in this book. Instead, in this book, Deleuze deals with "signs" and their 
temporal character. There are three basic types of signs that each correspond to a 
synthesis of time: worldly signs, signs of love, and signs of art. Each type of sign has 
a temporal characteristic: time wasted, time lost, and time regained. What does this 
have to do with passive synthesis? A sign is not a symbol or a sign that has 
intelligible meaning. The intellect does not interpret these "signs" of which Deleuze 
speaks. Signs are primarily the involuntary emissions of signals. Their interpretation 
is involuntary and unconscious. In the work of Proust a pain is the "result" of an 
unconscious interpretation of signs. The episode of the boot in the work of Proust is 
the result of an emission of signs that awaken the memory of the hero's dead 
grandmother. At no point is the hero of the novel consciously aware of these signs. 
He is only aware of their effect by sensations of pleasure and pain. The synthesis of 
time in Proust's great novel is a wholly passive and involuntary activity of the 
faculties. Proust testifies to the priority of the involuntary syntheses of time over the 
activity of the intellect: their "truth" is signified by their involuntary nature. Proust 
provides an important element to Deleuze's quest to construct a new transcendental 
aesthetic. His work testifies to the function of "signs" in the synthesis of our temporal 
existence. Proust investigates, in a literary form, the nature of duration, the pure past 
and the process of death reaching into the future. The introduction of Proust into this 
thesis, I hope, will give the reader a general sense of the three syntheses of time 
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presented in a non-technical manner. This is why the first chapter is devoted to 
Proust. It is necessary to recognize the effect of the three syntheses of time in 
practical situations before we delve into the unconscious mechanics of Freud. It is 
my hope that the first chapter will provide a concrete example of temporal synthesis 
so that the later discussion of unconscious processes will have a proper context. 
No presentation of the three syntheses of time would be complete without 
mention of Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. I end my thesis with this 
important concept because it is the summation and ethical end of Deleuze's three 
syntheses of time. This "ethical" doctrine of eternal return is essential to Deleuze's 
reading of the Event. Deleuze conceives of three possible relations to the event: 
experiencing it as "too much for me" or becoming-equal or becoming equal to the 
unequal. In his analysis of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Deleuze documents these three 
approaches to the "event" of the eternal return. The last chapter of this thesis ends 
with an examination of the extreme consequences of "becoming equal to the 
unequal. " Implicated in this last "extreme" affirmation of the eternal return are the 
concept of the "overman" and the disappearance of the subject. Why is this 
important? Because, the total affirmation of the eternal return would imply the total 
distraction of the "active" faculties of judgment and the affirmation of the passive 
syntheses of time in-themselves. This is Deleuze's fmal condemnation of 
"representational" philosophy. The destruction of the active faculties of judgment 
would imply an extreme sensitivity to signs as Deleuze describes in Proust and 
Signs: "Though endowed with an extreme sensibility and a prodigious memory, the 
narrator has no organs insofar as he is deprived of any voluntary and organized use of 
such faculties. " [PS 182] The active faculties ofjudgment and voluntary control are 
essentially organized by "resentment" according to Deleuze. This is because they 
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cannot affirm "chaos" as the fundamental law of the universe. They seek to impose 
order and "justice" upon every passive and involuntary activity of the organism. In 
short, they organize the body and the world according to a transcendent principle of 
the unity of the self. This is the completion of Deleuze's alternative "transcendental 
aesthetic" that sought to establish two things: to return the power of synthesis to the 
passive self and to give 'lime" itself the power of synthesis. The doctrine of the 
eternal return does these two things. This is why it deserves a special place in this 
thesis. 
What does this thesis attempt to do? The primary aim is to show how the 
three syntheses of time actually work. This has not been done before. All of the 
secondary literature on Deleuze devotes very little attention to the three syntheses of 
time. None of them give a systematic account of the workings and interconnections 
of the three syntheses. At best they paraphrase Deleuze's own words without adding 
anything new to his account. This thesis seeks to add something new to the account 
of the three syntheses. The difficulty in understanding Deleuze's conception of the 
three syntheses is that he assumes a great deal of background information is already 
understood by the reader. There is a pressing need for a sense of context to be applied 
to Deleuze's own presentation. What this thesis seeks to do is to return to the main 
sources that inspired Deleuze's conception of synthesis and to link it up with 
Deleuze's own words so that the reader may see the whole picture. Also, this thesis 
attempts to be as systematic as possible when dealing with a subject matter of this 
complexity. For this reason the thesis is divided into parts that do not repeat one main 
thesis; but rather, progress from one aspect of the three syntheses to another. In this 
way I hope to cover all the main components of a complex theory. In the end, I hope 
that the reader will get a sense of the workings of the three passive syntheses of time 
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and their viability as an alternative to the "transcendental aesthetic" of Kant. 
However, at no point in my thesis do I argue directly against Kant's aesthetic. This 
thesis is meant to provide a positive alternative and not to refute any other 
philosophy. The argument will seek to demonstrate the conceptual rigor of the three 
syntheses of time so that it may be adopted as a doctrine and applied to practical 
ends. Its value as a doctrine is to be decided by its applicability and not some abstract 
logical proof As such, all conceptual refutation of Deleuze's doctrine is placed to 
one side for the moment so that the readers may get an adequate sense of the 
components of the doctrine and may then decide for themselves. My task will be 
successful only if this thesis leaves the readers with a better understanding of the 
three syntheses of time than they had before they read it. Of course this short work is 
unable to draw out all of the consequences of this doctrine. There are still many 
questions that are raised by this thesis that will remain unsolved. However, it is my 
hope that it will be the most complete text available on this important subject. 
Chapter 1: The Syntheses of Signs 
At first sight Deleuze's discussion of signs in his book Proust and Signs would 
seem to have little to do with the three syntheses of time that he explicates in 
Difference and Repetition. However, there is a secret link between these two books. 
This link becomes evident when we take seriously Deleuze's statement: "To each 
kind of sign there doubtless corresponds a privileged line of time. " [PS 24] There are 
three types of signs and three types of time. Although not explicitly stated, it seems 
as though these are prototypes for the three syntheses of time. In what follows I will 
show the correspondences between these two works. This will show that the three 
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syntheses of time are drawn from the work of Proust and that it is the main source of 
inspiration for Deleuze's analysis of time. 
a) Worldly signs 
1.1 What is a sign? A sign is not something that refers to an object or a meaning. 
When Deleuze refers to signs he is not speaking of the artificial signs of language but 
rather of natural signs. This becomes evident when we consider Deleuze's example 
of signs: "One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, 
a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. " [PS 4] Above all a sign is 
a form sensation that acts as a signal to the organism. Because Deleuze is concerned 
with the passive synthesis of sensations he treats signs as a part of a nervous system 
that acts independently of reflective thought. For example, if the organism has a 
need, the only way it can know if that need is satisfied is if the organism receives a 
signal telling it that certain conditions have been met. After a meal one receives a 
sign that one is full. A sign is the means by which the organism "interprets" its 
environment. When we read Deleuze we must keep in mind that when he speaks of 
interpretation of signs he is using this term to designate the passive synthesis of 
sensations and not the active synthesis of intelligence. In order to think in terms of 
passive synthesis we must put to the side our assumptions about the faculty of 
intelligence as being the center of interpretation and focus instead upon the means by 
which the nervous system itself interprets. First, consider Deleuze's explanation of 
need: "Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic form of 
expectation. " [DR 73] Need on this level is not unlike the mouth that expects food, or 
the beloved's body that anticipates a caress. At this level "need" is the means by 
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which the organism reaches out to its environment and questions its surroundings. 
The sign, put simply, is the answer to the question that the organism puts to its 
surroundings. Either there is a signal of satisfaction or there is a negative response of 
dissatisfaction. By negotiating with the environment the organism leams, by means 
of signs, to anticipate and predict responses. In short, it builds up perceptual habits. 
These habits, in turn, inform our faculty of intelligence. But because this faculty of 
forming habits comes first, it is more primary than the faculty of intelligence. When 
the intelligence comes into play the passive synthesis has already conditioned the 
sign and filtered it through the guise of habit. This is why Deleuze says: "Each 
contraction, each passive synthesis, constitutes a sign which is interpreted or 
deployed in active syntheses. " [DR 73] In short, signs are caught up in the activity of 
expectation and habit in the nervous system before they even reach the intelligence. 
By the time they have reached the intelligence all the activity of learning has already 
been set down in the neural pathways. The intelligence is just the pale reflection of 
an unconscious process of interpretation of signs. 
1.2 For Deleuze duration is not a simple given. Duration is the product of a 
passive synthesis of time. This synthesis is built upon organic need. It is from the 
very rhythm of our bodies that we become aware of the duration of existence. This is 
what Deleuze calls the fundamental form of repetition: 
The repetition of need, and of everything which depends upon it, expresses 
the time which belongs to the synthesis of time, the intratemporal character of 
that synthesis. Repetition is essentially inscribed in need, since need rests 
upon an instance which essentially involves repetition: which forms the for- 
itself of repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration. [DR 77] 
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Duration is not an effect of the active synthesis of intelligence; but rather, it is the 
passive longings and needs of an organism. Our conscious desires are the reflection 
of a more fundamental dimension of organic need. Our longings and anticipations 
that make time seem to pass much slower than it does are the result of the delay 
involved in the transmission of signs. Once again, Deleuze draws this lesson about 
duration partially from the work of Proust. Proust sees duration as essentially 
problematic. This is because, at the moments in which we are most aware of 
duration, we are also most aware of our unsatisfied needs. When he speaks of the 
succession of moments that form the hours of his waiting, Proust's hero experiences 
them as painful: 
Those inaccessible and excruciating hours during which she was about to 
enjoy unknown pleasures - now, through an unhoped-for breach, we are 
entering them; now, one of the moments which, in succession, would have 
composed those hours, a moment as real as the others, perhaps even more 
important to us, because our mistress is more involved in it, we can picture to 
ourselves, we possess it, we are taking part in it, we have created it ahnost: 
the moment in which he will tell her we are here, downstairs. 
It is important to note that Proust says that we have composed those hours and that 
we have created the moment. This is why Deleuze tells us that signs are a temporal 
apprenticeship, because the expectation of signs teaches us to wait and to contract 
moments together. Whereas it has become almost a phenomenological clichd to say 
that the present and the past and the future are all extended into one another, this 
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account leaves out the important role of signs in the production of duration. No one 
has a "natural" disposition to experience time as a foundational experience; some 
pathological conditions prevent some people from living within a normal duration. It 
is the ability to form habits in the organism that makes this possible. There are as 
many durations as there are organic needs. One part may have a different degree of 
contraction than another. By the time that the various durations and rhythms of the 
organism make themselves felt in consciousness we confuse them with the duration 
of the changing of the external world. This, however, is not a mistake. Signs are not 
in the body. They are in the world; however, it is the various contractions of the 
organism that interpret these signs. The active faculty of intelligence is only aware of 
the signs and not the process by which they become synthesized in the unconscious. 
1.3 When Deleuze speaks of "worldly signs" in Proust and Signs he is referring 
to the habitual use of responses and clichdd remarks that fill up the conversations in 
everyday life. Deleuze remarks upon this habitual use of mimicry: 'Nothing funny is 
said at the Verdurins', and Mme Verdurin does not laugh; but Cottard makes a sign 
that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign that she is laughing, 
and her sign is so perfectly emitted that A Verdurin, not to be outdone, seeks in his 
turn for an appropriate mimicry. " [PS 6] At first sight this seems strange because the 
characters are not really communicating with one another. But if we critically 
appraise the majority of our conversations we will find that most of the time we are 
not really conveying information. This form of social politeness that masks the 
vacuity of conversation is not incidental. It is an essential part of signaling that is 
endemic to expressions of friendship. However vacuous these scenes of mimicry 
seem, they take up a great deal of the space in Proust's novel. According to Deleuze 
they represent the apprenticeship into "wasted time" or, in other terms, duration. 
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However, there is a certain pleasure associated with wasting time in this way. Proust 
describes this idle chatter: "... idle chatter, which would have absorbed nothing of the 
nervous pleasure, the fleeting emotion of the experience, and which would have been 
reminiscent in this respect of the impression of lassitude and regret that follow the 
first warm days of spring. "5 These society people seek each other out in order to be 
"elegant" and charming. It is the lightness of conversations in which nothing is 
communicated, in which roles are played and expectations instantly met. But not 
communicating is not an objection to worldly signs. Signs are not meant to convey 
information. Their role is to have a direct, pleasurable or unpleasant, effect upon the 
nervous system itself In an interview Deleuze stated that he liked this aspect of 
Proust: "This is why he has always liked and still likes Proust so much, for the 
society life [mondanite], the social relations [rapports mondains]. This is the fantastic 
emission of signs, for example, what's known as a 'gaffe. ' This is a non- 
comprehension of a sign, signs that people don't understand. Society life exists as a 
milieu of the proliferation of empty signs, but it's also the speed of their emission, 
,, 6 the nature of their emission. This form of elegant conversation is pleasant because 
it contracts the present into a simple lassitude. Nothing unexpected enters into the 
exchange of signs, the responses are predictable, and therefore the anxiety about the 
future is laid to rest. This use of signs is meant to negate the unpleasant aspects of 
duration by speeding along the transitions of signs so that the present can be reduced 
to its minimum. This is why we form habits of speaking: to minimize the uncertainty 
of signs and the tension of organic expectation. 
1.4 Our habits of thinking are a direct result of our habits of speaking. Deleuze 
discovers in the work of Proust both a critique of friendship and a critique of 
philosophy: "According to Proust, friends are like well-disposed minds that are 
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explicitly in agreement as to the signification of things, words, and ideas; but the 
philosopher too is a thinker who presupposes in himself the benevolence of thought, 
who attributes to thought the natural love of truth and to truth the explicit 
determination of what is naturally worked out by thought. " [PS 30] Philosophy is, 
then, the natural extension of friendship: one goes from the agreement between two 
people to the presupposition of a universal agreement signified by "truth. " The values 
derived from this idea of a universal friendship, however, only attain a possible value 
and not a necessary one. This is because it presupposes the identity of reason to be a 
universal attribute and the benevolence of all people who engage in discourse. "In all 
its forms, intelligence attains by itself, and makes us attain, only those abstract and 
conventional truths that have merely a possible value. " [PS 30] They are only 
possible because there is always the possibility of the malevolent thinker who says 
that 2+2=5. Like polite conversation, an unexpected sign that brings displeasure to 
the harmonious accord of like-minded people can always disrupt agreement. We 
shall see that this form of "truth" is not endorsed by Deleuze or Proust. In the section 
on "signs of love" we will see that there is another form of truth that is generated by 
discord. For now it is enough to oppose it to this placid form of truth. 
1.5 For Deleuze a sign is always a sign of the present. The organism only knows 
the presence or absence of sensation. The active faculty of the intelligence can 
conceive of a future and a past, but the passive synthesis in the unconscious can only 
experience signs that indicate a present fact. However, this present fact may indicate 
a past state enduring in the present. For example, the scar: "A scar is the sign not of a 
past wound but of 'the present fact of having been wounded': we can say that it is the 
contemplation of the wound, that it contracts all the instants which separate us from it 
into the living present. " [DR 77] In short, the passive synthesis only deals with 
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sensations that are signs of the present. The scar may hurt, and all that the passive 
syntheses register is the present fact. The active synthesis carried out in the faculty of 
the intellect may attribute a past and a future to this sign. In the example of the scar. 
the scar carries the past into the present by the physical persistence of the wound. 
However, the sign knows nothing of the history of the scar, only its duration 
extending into the present. Deleuze derives this theory of the sign from the stoics. 
The stoic argument is as follows: A sign is always a sign of a thing; if the thing is not 
present then the sign is not present. A past thing is not present; therefore it cannot be 
indicated by a sign; the same with a future thing. Sextus Empiricus makes the 
following argument: "For some people make a mistake and want a present thing to be 
a sign of a past thing, as for instance, 'If this man has a scar, this man has had a 
wound. ' For 'He has a scar' is something present, since it is evident, but his having 
had a wound is past, since there is no longer a wound. [ ... ] the wound has already 
happened and is past, but 'This man has a wound', which is a proposition, is present, 
,, 7 though it is said about something which has happened. The stoics were forced into 
this logical position because their propositional "truth" requires that some state of 
affairs subsists in the present. This is necessary because a truth cannot be verified 
directly in the present unless there is a present fact. The organism only knows the 
present facts that it can sense directly. Therefore, at the level of passive synthesis, 
only the most immediate states of affairs are registered. Further, this means that 
within the first synthesis of time every trace of previous events is subsumed within 
the present state of affairs. Therefore, traces of events that are long past will have an 
effect on the present without there being any memory of that past event. Further, 
there is no passage of time at this level; it is as if there is a total amnesia at every 
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instant. The first synthesis of time is a machine that registers the present state of 
affairs without any retention of previous events. 
1.6 Deleuze calls the work of Proust an "apprenticeship to signs. " [PS 4] By this 
he means that we learn by an encounter with signs. But what kind of learning are we 
talking about here? In the case of learning through signs, the outcome is not 
necessarily knowledge. We must conceive of leaming with signs as something that 
takes place on an unconscious level. To illustrate this Deleuze gives us this example: 
A well known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposed to find 
food in boxes of one particular colour amidst others of various colours: there 
comes a paradoxical period during which the number of 'errors' diminishes 
even though the monkey does not yet possess the 'knowledge' or 'truth' of a 
solution in each case: propitious moment in which the philosopher-monkey 
opens up to truth, himself producing the true, but only to the extent that he 
begins to penetrate the coloured thickness of a problem. [DR 164-165] 
It is this paradoxical moment in which we are learning without having explicit 
knowledge that fascinates Deleuze. The colors and the appearance of food in this 
example act as signs that, through an act of repetition, form a paradoxical form of 
learning. The signs are subliminal insofar as they are not objects of knowledge; but 
rather, problems that require repetition of trial and error to sort out. Signs have a 
temporal character because they are not given in a single instance. They require the 
repetition of learning in order to form habits. Proust's great novel has the structure of 
a long series of repetitions of signs that fonn the basis of a "research" into time. The 
hero of the novel contemplates these strange recurrences in his life in order to 
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discover their message, or meaning. He learns by drawing off a theme or archetype 
that is repeated in each era of his life. The exploration of time is also the exploration 
of the unconscious. "As a result, 'leaming' always takes place in and through the 
unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature 
and mind. " [DR 165] Unlike the theory of learning in which "knowledge" is the 
correspondence between an image in the mind and an object in nature, Deleuze's 
theory of learning places signs at the frontier between the mind and nature, so that 
one engenders the other. The mind is just a sensitivity to signs that are neither inside 
nor outside but within the transversal space in-between. Deleuze calls this space the 
problematic field: "To learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our 
bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic 
field. " [DR 165] The problematic field, in this case, is the inertia of the water, the 
resistance of the waves and the attempt to coordinate the movements of the body to 
fit these elements. A feedback loop is formed and the signs of the waves are learned 
by the response of the body. Given this theory of signs we see why these signs must 
always be in the present: one never swims in a past or future wave. If this model of 
learning fits well with the works of Proust it is because his novels follow the logic of 
learning through a sensitivity to signs. The signs in Proust are the encounters with 
society people, the trials of love, the question of the work of art that he wished to 
create. There is a gradual unfolding of problems and solutions that follow the logic of 
apprenticeship. This is why it is a work of signs. 
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1.1 Signs are the interpretations 1.3 Worldly signs are habits of 1.5 Signs only register the present 
of organic needs. speaking that reduce the present state of affairs without any 
to a minimum. retention of past events. 
1.2 Duration is an effect of the 1.4 These signs give rise to the 1.6 Learning is the encounter 
delay in the transmission of signs. illusion of universal truth based with signs through the 
upon friendship. unconscious. 
b) Signs of Love 
2.1 With the introduction of signs of love we encounter a transition from the first 
synthesis of time to the second synthesis of time. This transition takes place because 
of the nature of these signs. That is, the signs of love are deceptive: "They are 
deceptive signs that can be addressed to us only by concealing what they express: the 
origin of unknown worlds, of unknown actions and thoughts that give them a 
meaning. " [PS 9] This new form of sign does not invalidate the rule that "all signs 
are signs of the present. " This is because the signs of love are encountered in the 
present, and yet, they activate the mind in such a way that it seeks their meaning in 
the past. The example that illustrates this in the work of Proust is that ofjealousy. 
Consider this quote from Proust that describes the action ofjealousy: 
And whatever point in it he tried to touch in his memories, it was the whole of 
that season, during which the Verdurins had dined so often on the island in 
the Bois, that hurt him. Hurt him so badly that gradually the curiosity which 
his jealousy kePt Provoking in him was neutralized by his fear of the new 
torments he would inflict on himself by satisfýýing it. 
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Jealousy is a form of involuntary memory that is provoked by signs that are 
deceptive. 9 They are deceptive because there is a contradiction between them. In 
order to be deceptive signs must contain a mixture of truth and falsehood in such a 
way that the two do not logically cohere. A perfect lie would not excite the 
intelligence. These signs are simulacra insofar as they resemble the truth while at the 
same time they hide it: 
Swann immediately recognized this statement as one of those fragments of 
true facts which liars, when caught unprepared, console themselves by 
introducing into the composition of the falsehood they are inventing, 
believing they can accommodate it there and steal away its resemblance to the 
Truth. 'o 
Because the passive synthesis is unable to reconcile the contradiction in signs, the 
active synthesis of the intelligence is activated. This is the faculty for determining the 
truth of signs. This is where the contradiction that we saw above plays its part: there 
is a pleasure associated with the search for truth that directly contradicts the pleasures 
of love. The pleasures of love depend upon the complete presence of the beloved, 
whereas the pleasures of the search for truth place the beloved in a possible world 
that excludes us. What is hidden is the past of the beloved. Here we have reached the 
essence of signs of love: they are traces of past events subsisting in the present. 
These traces refer to a dimension of time that is wholly distinct from the present: the 
a priori past That is, not a past that we could ever have lived through, but a past that 
the beloved may have had before we met her. As such, it is an imaginary dimension 
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of the past and not a factual dimension of past-presents. This is what Deleuze refers 
to as the "pure past. " This is the essential element in the second synthesis of time. 
2.2 The second synthesis of time is activated by the disappointment in the 
objective nature of signs. Deleuze tells us that the present as an objective plurality of 
signs is often tinged with this fundamental disappointment: "Disappointment is a 
fundamental moment of the search or of apprenticeship: in each realm of signs, we 
are disappointed when the object does not give us the secret we were expecting. " [PS 
34] We have seen that on the level of organic need the nervous system learns by 
expecting certain outcomes. But because of the chaotic nature of the environment the 
needs of the organism cannot be immediately met. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the example of the nursing child given in Difference and Repetition: 
On the one hand, the child goes beyond the bound excitations towards the 
supposition or the intentionality of an object, such as the mother, as the goal 
of an effort, the end to be actively reached 'in reality' and in relation to which 
success and failure may be measured. But on the other hand and at the same 
time, the child constructs for itself another object, a quite different kind of 
object which is a virtual object or centre and which then governs and 
compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity: it puts several 
fingers in its mouth, wraps the other arm around this virtual centre, and 
appraises the whole situation from the point of view of this virtual mother. 
[DR 991 
The virtual object compensates the child for the disappointment of real action. It 
provides a buffer against the shocks and discords of reality. But more than that, it 
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also provides the child with a point of view that is not in the immediate present. The 
child is able to revive past situations of satisfaction and transpose them upon the 
present dissatisfying failure. This is a radical temporal shift in the psyche of the 
child: from the present of the first synthesis to a different synthesis of the past. This 
transposition of the virtual dimension of the past upon the present also provides 
memory with the ability to embellish events with an aura or a significance that they 
did not have at the time. Deleuze notices a pattern in the work of Proust of a 
disappointment in the hero of the novel when he is undergoing an experience for the 
first time: "There are few things that are not disappointing the first time they are 
seen. For the first time is the time of inexperience; we are not yet capable of 
distinguishing the sign from the object, and the object interposes and confuses the 
signs. Disappointment on the first hearing Vinteuil, on first meeting Bergotte, on first 
seeing the Balbec church. " [PS 34] The first encounter only presents us with a 
problem of confused signs that do not yet have a coherence. This is why the virtual 
dimension is so important: it gives order to the present by the imposition of 
fragrnents of memory (and fantasy) onto the chaos of first encounters. However, 
there is a paradox: there is a delay in this superimposition of the virtual dimension; 
that is, it only comes after the event. This effect of delayed reaction can best be seen 
in the example of the trip to the theatre to see the actress Berma: "A touch of genius 
in the acting of La Berma is revealed to us by the reviews a week after we have seen 
her on stage, or by the cheers from the back stalls. "' 1 The difficulty that Proust's 
hero has in perceiving the genius of the actress was caused by the misplaced notion 
that genius and beauty can be found in the objects themselves. As Deleuze points out: 
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Those signs we had not been able to relish or to interpret so long as we linked 
them to Berma's person - perhaps their meaning was to be sought elsewhere: 
in associations that were neither in Phedre nor in Berma. Thus Bergotte 
teaches the hero that a certain gesture of Berma's evokes that of an archaic 
statuette the actress could never have seen, but which Racine himself had 
never certainly thought of either. [PS 35] 
The compensations for the disappointing nature of objects can be found in the 
subjective compensation of the association of ideas. This is why the hero only gains 
insight into the event after it is over: "My interest in La Berma's acting, being no 
longer subject to the compression and constraints of reality, had gone on growing 
since the end of the performance. " 12 Normally, the chain of associations is blocked 
by our attention to the signs that we are perceiving in the present. It is necessary to 
wait for the moment to pass before that now former moment can gain significance. 
That now former moment then takes on a reality that it did not have at the time of our 
first encountering it. This is why Deleuze believes that the past is more than an 
accumulation of past moments. Memory transforms the past more than it conserves 
it. This is why the past is more virtual than actual: the aura of memory is different in 
kind from perception in the present. This is why Proust discovers the contradiction of 
trying to find in reality what is virtual: "... what a contradiction it is to search in 
reality for memory's pictures, which would never have the charm that comes to them 
from memory itself and from not being perceived by the senses. " 13 This means that 
memory contains elements that were never perceived in the past, purely virtual 
elements that cannot be reduced to past perceptions. As we shall see, the effect of the 
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pure past (that was never present) is produced by the mechanism of the association of 
ideas. 
2.3 In the first synthesis of signs (the worldly signs) we encountered signs that 
were bathed in the sensibility of encounters. But Deleuze tells us that signs are more 
profound than the objects we encounter them in: "It is because the sign is doubtless 
more profound than the object emitting it, but it is still attached to that object, it is 
still half sheathed in it. " [PS 36] The first synthesis only gave us half of the nature of 
the sign (as an encounter) the other half is the subjective series of associations. The 
sign is both in the mind and in nature and in neither of them. The sign has an actual 
side and a virtual side: the first is the encounter with the sign in perception, the 
second is the association of that sign with other signs in the mind. As Deleuze says: 
"We proceed from one to the other; we leap from one to the other; we overcome the 
disappointment of the object by a compensation of the subject. " [PS 36] This 
movement is essential to the signs of love: love is directed, not to the actual woman 
before us, but rather to the virtual woman of subjective association. Proust illustrates 
this fact of love in his narrative of Swann's love for Odette in which Swann 
associates Odette with a painting by Botticelli: 
He looked at her; a fragment of the fresco appeared in her face and in her 
body and from then on he would always try to find it in her again, whether he 
was with Odette, or was only thinking of her, and even though he probably 
valued the Florentine masterpiece only because he found it again in her, 
nevertheless that resemblance conferred a certain beauty on her too, made her 
14 
more precious. 
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We cannot say that the beauty is in the painting or in Odette; rather, we say that it is 
in-between them, in the effect of resonance that is produced by their association. 
Therefore we can conclude that the virtual element is not in the objective recall of a 
memory but in the effect of signs that are associated across time. The intellect can 
find objective resemblances between objects but this intellectual act lacks the 
resonant effect of love. The association of ideas that Deleuze is working with in his 
work on Proust is that of the heart and not of the head. This is why we must 
distinguish love from jealousy: love follows the passive synthesis that makes the past 
resonate with the present, while jealousy follows the active and constrained use of 
the intellect that makes the past disjointed with the present. The jealous lover 
associates the beloved with various imagined past scenarios and is unable to make a 
connection between them. The other lover associates the beloved with images in the 
past and makes a transversal connection between them. These two modes of love 
represent two different approaches to the virtual past: one of accord the other of 
discord. The first forms associations of ideas and the second breaks them. 
2.4 In the work of Proust we encounter only a narcissistic form of love. Deleuze 
defmes this form of love by the following: "to love without being loved, because love 
implicates the seizure of the possible worlds in the beloved, worlds that expel me as 
much as they draw me in and that culminate in the unknowable homosexual 
world... " [PS 142] The great secret of this form of narcissistic love is the existence 
of "possible worlds" that draw us in and expel us. In order to understand this strange 
form of love we must turn to Freud's description of narcissism: 
For it seems very evident that another person's narcissism has a great 
attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are 
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in search of object-love. [. .. ] The great charm of narcissistic women has, 
however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover's dissatisfaction, of his 
doubts of the woman's love, or his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its 
roots in this incongruity between the types of object-choice. [I I Freud 82-83] 
The heroes of Proust's novel only fall in love with narcissistic women because of the 
sense of mystery that they envelop. The women they fall in love with are vain, stupid 
and self-serving. And yet, they are the perfect vehicles of the fantasies of the lover. 
Only in them is it possible to dream of other possible worlds that are not reducible to 
the here and now. The problem ofpossible worlds is the key to understanding of the 
motive for the association of ideas. It is also the key to understanding why we seek 
resonances within the past. The key that Freud provides to this puzzle is to be found 
in instinctual renunciation. In the theory of narcissism our first love as infants is 
always ourselves. However, later we learn to give up this self-love and direct our 
love towards others. But there is always a core longing to return to this narcissistic 
state. So, we project this longing into our object-choice or our beloved. This longing 
is called Eros. This is why Deleuze gives it the role as a motivator of memory: "ft is 
always Eros, the nournenon, who allows us to penetrate this pure past in itself, this 
virginal repetition which is Mnemosyne. " [DR 85] The narcissistic woman takes the 
place of the narcissistically invested object: the phallus. This happens according to 
Deleuze because "it has the paradoxical property of changing its place, not being 
possessed by those who have a 'penis', yet beingpossessed by those who do not have 
one, as the theme of castration shows. " [DR 103] In short, this means that men who 
have renounced their narcissism (castration) substitute narcissistic women for their 
loss. Now, what is interesting is what Deleuze does with this psychoanalytical 
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insight. He applies it to the second synthesis of time and discovers the link between 
the castration complex and the constitution of a pure past. He links sexual drives to 
memory, thereby making the force that drives the association of ideas erotic: "The 
symbolic phallus signifies no less the erotic mode of the pure past than the 
immemorial of sexuality. The symbol is the always-disp laced fragment, standing for 
a past which was never present: the object = x. " [DR 103] To put it simply, we follow 
the chain of associations in search of the missing phallus or the lost sense of 
wholeness to be found in narcissism. This "always-displaced fragment" is the 
possible world that the beloved expresses. What links the associations of ideas in the 
work of Proust is a sublimated sexuality that drives the imagination. Proust tells us 
that: "Our curiosity about the woman we love, the roots of which lie far beyond our 
reasoning mind, reaches far beyond her character. " 15 It extends into worlds that we 
can never be a part of because of our renunciation of our own narcissism. This 
inspires the ambivalent attitude that Proust's hero has towards his beloved. Deleuze 
speaks of an original Hermaphrodite: "The original Hermaphrodite continuously 
produces the two divergent series. " [PS 80] For Freud narcissistic love is essentially 
homosexual. The lover of narcissistic woman loves "what he himself was" [I I Freud 
84] in the women he chooses and is therefore displacing his own homosexuality onto 
the beloved. This is the motivation for jealousy in Proust's novel: the lover suspects 
the beloved is committing the "original sin" [PS 140] that he himself is repressing. 
"Homosexuality is the truth of love. " [PS 81] The whole dynamic of the possible 
worlds of the beloved conceals this essential secret. 
2.5 It would be too easy to conceive of the "possible world" as an origin of the 
series. This mistake is tempting because it presents itself as an originary dimension 
of the pure past. But this illusion of an original term in the series is the effect of the 
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series itself. Deleuze calls this necessary illusion the originary phantasm: "the 
phantasm returns easily to its own origin and, as an 'originary phantasm, ' it 
integrates effortlessly the origin of the phantasm (that is, a question, the origin of 
birth, of sexuality, of the difference of the sexes, or of death ... ). This is because it is 
inseparable from the displacement, an unfolding, and a development within which it 
carries along its own origin. " [LS 217] We could take any one of the phantasms that 
haunt repetition, the mother, the phallus, and the castration complex... but we would 
not be unmasking an original term in the series. These phantasms are the result of the 
resonance between multiple terms in the series. If the phantasm carries its origin 
along with it, this is because it acts as a lure that draws us into an infinite temporal 
regression. According to Deleuze not even our mothers are our first loves because the 
temporal series is not limited to our personal history: "by loving his mother the hero 
of In Search of Lost Time repeats Swann's love for Odette. The parental characters 
are not the ultimate terms of the individual subject but middle terms of an 
intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to another for 
different subjects... " [DR 105-106] In psychoanalysis there is a tendency to treat the 
love of the mother as the original archetype for all later loves. This is because 
psychoanalysis conceives of time as an objectively distributed series of events on a 
line of time. However, for Deleuze, the unconscious has no conception of a linear 
form of time; instead the unconscious has no first event that acts as an origin. 
Fantasies, myths, stories that one has read or heard have as much reality as the events 
one has experienced. It is for this reason that Proust inserts the narrative of Swann 
into the largely first person narrative of the hero of the novel. He treats this memory 
of another person as if it were a personal memory: "I had learned, about a love affair 
Swann had had before I was bom, with that precision of detail which is sometimes 
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easier to obtain for the lives of people who died centuries ago than for the lives of our 
best friends... " 16 The theme of Swann's love appears again and again in the novel. 
Each time disguised in a different jealousy: the jealousy of the hero, the jealousy of 
Saint-Loup, the jealousy of Charlus for Morel, etc. Each repetition forms a complex 
theme that acts as the law of the disguise. It is as if all these people shared the same 
memories, or as Proust says: "All these memories added to one another now formed a 
single mass... and then those that were only memories belonging to another person 
,, 17 from whom I had learned them... When we make the effort to remember we 
untangle this "mass" of memory and deploy it on a line of time, but we should not 
confuse the means by which we conceive time with the manner in which it is stored 
in the unconscious. The notion of "origins" is a secondary revision of memory by the 
conscious mind and not a deep structure of the unconscious. 
2.6 We have seen how the subjective association of ideas determines a series of 
memories. However, this is not the end of the story of the second synthesis. There is 
a further objective foundation for this subjective chain of associations: the Idea or the 
Theme. From a series of associative links it is possible to extract a generality or a 
repetitive theme that runs through all of them. We do not choose this theme; but 
rather, it chooses us. Our desires and actions follow a pattern that is laid out by 
themes of which we are unconscious. Even Freud's method of free-association 
discovered that free associations are not always completely free. The subject of the 
conjunction of images and ideas is determined by archetypes that act as a superior 
viewpoint upon our repetitions. It is within this unconscious locus that Deleuze 
places the essence of love: 
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But, in love, the difference has passed into the unconscious: it becomes in a 
sense generic or specific and determines a repetition whose terms are no 
longer to be distinguished except by infinitesimal differences and subtle 
contrasts. In short, essence has assumed the generality of a Theme or an Idea, 
which serves as a law for the series of our loves. [PS 75] 
The repetitions of the loves in Proust's work testify to the sorrows of jealousy and 
betrayal. During the moments when the hero is undergoing the trials and tribulations 
of love he is saddened by the painful duration of time. However, when he is free of 
the constraints of love he is able to look back and discover the "idea" that is 
incarnated in that repetition and in it he discovers a newfound joy. This is the 
objective element that coordinates the series. This is also, according to Proust, the 
means by which time can be redeemed: 
Ideas are substitutes for sorrows; the moment they change into ideas they lose 
a part of their power to hurt our hearts and, for a brief moment, the 
transformation even releases some joy. Substitutes only in the order of time, 
though, because it seems that the primary element is actually the idea, and the 
sorrow merely the mode in which certain ideas first enter our minds. '8 
It is a mistake, on the part of Freud, to believe in the universal theme of the Oedipus 
complex. The theme is not a pre-given nucleus of our psychological states. It is 
selected by our choice of associations. According to Deleuze the subjective chain of 
associations selects the objective theme that will govern it: "It is indeed the Idea that 
determines the series of our subjective states, but also it is the accidents of our 
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subjective relations that determine the choice of the Idea. " [PS 76] In Flroustýs novel 
the initiator of the series of loves is not the relationship to the mother (although the 
novel begins with this), but rather, it is the story of Swann's love that is activated by 
the associative chain. Deleuze compares this "choice" of the Idea to Leibnizian 
possibilities that lay dormant until they were selected to be actualized: 
Swann is the great unconscious initiator, the point of departure for the series; 
but how can we help regretting the themes sacrificed, the essences eliminated, 
like the Leibnizian possibilities that do not pass into existence and would 
have given rise to other series in other circumstances and other conditions? 
[PS 75-76] 
This selection of themes from the accidental combinations in the series of loves 
shows that the theme does not detertnine our choice of loves. The series of choices 
are not disguises of some fundamental theme that is being repeated; rather, it is the 
repetition that determines the phantasms that haunt the preconscious mind. Deleuze 
recognizes that repetition is full of contingency and that if Albertine had not been 
selected then the theme of the novel would have been modified: "Albertine therefore 
enters the series of loves but only because she is selected from a group, with all the 
contmgency that corresponds to this selection. " [PS 77] If repetition follows a theme 
then this theme is projected onto the series afterwards. However, this does not make 
the theme any less real. It is real without beingpresent, ideal without being abstract. 
It is not reducible to the subjective chain of association because it breaks with the 
subjective chain. This is why the pure past that is conserved in itself is not reducible 
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to the subjective. Deleuze distinguishes between the objective and subjective 
conditions for resonance: 
But if the resonance has both objective and subjective conditions, what it 
produces is of an altogether different nature: the Essence, the spiritual 
Equivalent, the Combray that was never seen and that breaks with the 
subjective chain. This is why producing is different from discovering and 
creating and why the entire Search turns successively from the observation of 
things and from the sub ective imagination. [PS 154] j 
This shows that the pure past as a virtual dimension of time is not reducible to the 
subjective imagination. The psychological association of two moments in time is 
produced by the imagination, but the pure past that mediates these two moments is 
discovered as an impersonal reality. 
2.1 The signs of love are 2.3 The effect of resonance is 2.5 The phantasm is not an 
deceptive and activate the mind produced by the association of original memory but a complex 
to seek their meaning in the images that is driven by Eros theme that links memories. 
past. and broken by Thanatos. 
2.2 The virtual past 2.4 The effect of possible worlds 2.6 The "theme" that 
compensates for the chaos of is caused by projected determines the series of loves is 
the present. This past gives narcissism. Homosexuality is selected by chance. The theme 
meaning to the present only the secret of lost worlds. is the objective element of 
afterwards. association. 
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C) Signs of Art 
3.1 We have discovered the beginning of the signs of art in the resonant effect of 
memory. The idea of an objective "theme" of our repetitions is the beginning of art. 
In the work of Proust these themes are discovered through the series of loves that all 
repeat the narrative of Swann's love with minor variations. Proust made the great 
discovery that these themes can become the essence of a work of art. As Deleuze tells 
us: "The real theme of a work is therefore not the subject the words designate, but the 
unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the words, but also the 
colors and sounds, assume their meaning and their life. " [PS 47] Proust discovers in 
the last volume of his work the essential element of the work of art in a form of 
idealism of themes. From the apprenticeship of observing patterns of behavior the 
hero of the novel is able to extract a general idea from the various substitutions of his 
past loves: 
These substitutions add something disinterested, something more general, to 
the work, something which at the same time is an austere lesson that it is not 
to individuals that we must attach ourselves, that it is not individuals who 
really exist and are capable of being expressed, but ideas. 19 
The subject matter for the Search for Lost Time is not the people, places or things in 
it, but rather, the themes that are repeated in each section and the ideas they express. 
3.2 However, this vision of the work of art as expressing 'ideas' comes 
dangerously close to the fon-n of Platonism of which many readers have accused 
Proust. Deleuze is very careful to distinguish Proustian ideas from Platonic ones. 
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Deleuze tells us that the ideas are the effect of difference and repetition and not their 
cause: 44a One and a Whole that would not be the principle but, on the contrary, *the 
effect' of the multiplicity and of its disconnected parts. " [PS 163] The key difference 
between Platonic ideas and Proustian ideas is that the Proustian ideas come afier the 
series of repetitions that they explicate. Deleuze gives the example of Balzac's great 
work that unfolds in a series that explores the unity of its fragments. It is a mistake to 
think that this unity was preordained in the mind of Balzac: "For it is the same 
mistake, the same incomprehension of Balzac's genius, that makes us suppose he had 
a vague logical idea of the unity of the Human Comedy beforehand or even that this 
unity is organically constituted as the work advances. Actually, the unity results and 
is discovered by Balzac as an effect of his books. " [PS 164] Proust himself is very 
clear about this; works that have a transcendent design that is envisioned by the artist 
before or during the writing of the work are weaker and less enduring than those that 
take upon themselves a vital unity that the author did not foresee: 
This unity was an afterthought, but not artificial. Otherwise it would have 
crumbled into dust, like so many systematic constructions by mediocre 
writers who, by lavish use of titles and subtitles, try to make it look as if they 
have followed a single, transcendent design. Not artificial, perhaps all the 
more real for being an afterthought, born in a moment of enthusiasm when 
it 
is discovered between parts which only need to come together, a unity which 
was unaware of itself, and which therefore is vital and not bom of 
logic, 
which has not ruled out variety or put a damper on execution. 
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Two things make this unity strikingly different from Platonic unity: first, the unity is 
not bom of logic because the unity is to be found in the "style" of the work that is 
grasped by an aesthetic sense and not a logical one; and second, the unity that results 
does not reduce the variety of differences within the work to one overriding concept. 
Above all the unity is more real for being an afterthought; that is, the unity is 
discovered and not created in the mind of the reader. This is the decisive point at 
which the third synthesis of time differs from the second synthesis of time that we 
discovered in the resonance of series. The subjective associations that the hero of the 
novel made between the present event and past events were wholly contingent and 
needed to be created by him. The themes that are repeated are not the subjective 
creations of the imagination: they are the fully objective means by which repetition 
explicates itself We may choose the content of our daydreams but we are chosen by 
the themes that map out our destiny. Deleuze recognizes that the repetitions that 
make up our life are not the mere creations of the imagination but rather an objective 
force that individualizes our fate: "We shall not ask who chooses. Certainly no self, 
because we ourselves are chosen, because a certain self is chosen each time that 'we' 
choose a person to love, a suffering to experience, and each time this self is no less 
surprised to live or to relive, and to answer the call, whatever the delay. " [PS 127- 
128] It is this objectivity of the theme or unifýring idea that is controversial. Most 
people would say that when we notice a "style" in an author or a repetition of 
occurrences in a series we are merely extracting a generality from the series of 
singularities. It seems as if we are using our intelligence to analyze a work of art and 
inventing the theme in our individual imaginations. But Deleuze denies this. He 
compares a work of art to a Leibnizian monad: "As Leibniz says, they have neither 
doors nor windows: the viewpoint being the difference itself, viewpoints towards a 
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world supposedly the same are as different as the most remote worlds. [ ... ] Essence 
does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressed as the essence not 
of the subject but of Being, or the region of Being that is revealed to the subject. "" [PS 
41-42 & 43] Therefore the illusion that "style" is an illusion in the imagination is 
false for Deleuze. Style is a point of view upon the world the same way that the 
monad. is a "point of view on the world"; that is, by expressing a clear and distinct 
region of difference that is explicated through the work of art. This point of view is 
not identical to the point of view of the author; rather, it is the point of view that the 
author tries to attain, his ideal and not his reality. 
3.3 If signs of art can be distinguished from signs of love and worldly signs it is 
because these signs of art can communicate something to the reader that the others 
cannot. The worldly signs were steeped in habitual patterns of conversation, and the 
signs of love were silent and divorced from the beloved as one world is from another. 
But if the signs of art can bridge this gap between people it is because of its violent 
effect on our habitual manner of seeing the world. Proust shows us that the use of the 
work of art is not to give the reader something immediately recognizable, but 
something different: 
This labour of the artist, this attempt to see something different beneath the 
material, beneath experience, beneath words, is the exact inverse of what is 
accomplished within us from minute to minute, as we live our lives heedless 
of ourselves, by vanity, passion, intellect and habit, when they overlay our 
true impressions, so as to hide them from us completely, with the repertoire of 
words, and the practical airns, which we wrongly call life. 
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The signs of art are essentially violent; that is, they do violence to our habitual 
manner of perceiving the world. After viewing a Monet or a Turner we then leave the 
museum only to encounter the landscape and the sky again but this time in a different 
way than we have ever viewed it before. This is because something new has been 
added to our perception and our manner of perceiving is forever altered by our 
confrontation with signs of art. When Proust speaks of the fictional painter Elstir in 
his novel he gives him the genius of being able to transform the world. Here are his 
words on the subject: 
If one tries to define what it is that the art lovers mean by the adjective, it can 
generally be seen to apply to some unfamiliar image of a familiar thing, an 
image that is different from the ones we are in the habit of noticing, unusual 
yet true, and which for that reason seems doubly striking, since it surprises us 
and shakes us out of our habits, while at the same time it turns us in on 
ourselves by recalling an impression. 22 
What is even more important than the ability of art to communicate this difference in 
perception is its ability to act as a mediator between worlds. This is why Deleuze 
says, "there is no intersubjectivity except an artistic one. " [PS 42] Of course we 
cannot see into the mind of another person. This is not what art is about. Art is not 
identical with the point of view of the artist. If it were it would be uninteresting; 
rather, it is a world unto itself According to Proust great artists like Rembrandt or 
Vermeer are names for "styles" or modes of perceiving the world more than they are 
subjective reports about the "feelings" or "ideas" of the artist. As such they are 
eternal and completely independent of the artist that created them. The most 
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important effect of art is that it allows the present to pass into the future by 
modifying our perception. In short, we pass from the present world to a new world 
that is modified by the signs of art. The present passes away because there are always 
new and multiple worlds for us to pass into. Proust best expresses the objectivity and 
eternal nature of art in the following passage: 
Thanks to art, instead of seeing only a single world, our own, we see it 
multiplied, and have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original 
artists, all the more different one from another than those which revolve in 
infinity and which, centuries after the fire from which their rays emanated has 
gone out, whether it was called Rembrandt or Vermeer, still send us their 
special light. 
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We can now see why the signs of art belong to the third synthesis of time. It satisfies 
three criteria that Deleuze attributes to the third synthesis: 
1) It constitutes the autonomy of the product, the independence ofthe work. [DR 
90] 
2) It is itself the new, complete novelty. [DR 90] 
3) It is by itself the third time in the series, the future as such. [DR 90] 
In short, the signs of art are independent from the artist who creates them. They 
express a completely novel viewpoint upon the world, and they open up the future by 
creating possible worlds for us to enter. 
3.4 Signs of art cannot be "eternal" if they are mere creations of an artist. Deleuze 
employs a whole ontology of art to explain why signs of art relate to Being and not to 
the imagination. He tells us "it is expressed as the essence not of the subject but of 
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Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject. " [PS 431 Deleuze uses 
a Neoplatonic word to describe this ontology of art and time: complication. In order 
to understand this form of "complicated" time it is necessary that we put to the side 
our notions of time as a series of events that follow one another on a line of time. 
Instead we must imagine all possible events taking place at one unique moment 
outside of chronology. A complicated state of time is the unity of all time in an 
undeveloped state. Deleuze says of this state: "it does not yet have the distinct 
dimensions according to which it can unfold, nor even the separate series in which it 
is distributed according to different rhythms. " [PS 451 Deleuze also uses the word 
"explication" to describe the means by which this complicated state differentiated 
and unfolded to generate the series of time we can experience. The complicated state 
is "eternal" insofar as it subsists adjacent to chronological time. It is not changeless, 
but rather the source of all change. For Deleuze time is organized "according to 
degrees of immanent complications and following an order of descending 
explications. " [PS 45] Signs of art "explicate" time by developing a perpetual 
recreation of the primordial elements of nature. But it also "implicates" time by 
producing accords between divergent events and things. In fact, art explicates the 
world by implicating divergent elements. To put it simply, the work of art does the 
same thing that dreams do: it creates new combinations by combining disparate 
images and thereby expands perception. This process of combining and expanding is 
what Deleuze calls pure thought: "But, like sleep, art is beyond memory; it appeals to 
pure thought as a faculty of essences. " [PS 46] Whereas memory is ruled by the 
subjective associations of ideas, art appeals to this ontological base of complication. 
Because of this, art is not the creation of the subject but the discovery of a region of 
Being by the artist. The signs of art synthesize time, not by recomposing past 
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instances of life, but by drawing upon an original complicated state of time. This is 
why art has nothing to do with the resonances of involuntary memory. Art unfolds 
time itseýf by recreating the world at each moment. 
3.5 Style is essentially metaphor. But what Deleuze and Proust mean by 
metaphor is different from its normal interpretation: "metaphor is essentially 
metamorphosis and indicates how two objects exchange their determinations, 
exchange even the names that designate them, in the new medium that confers the 
common quality upon them. " [PS 48] Proust gives the example of the paintings by 
Elstir: "One of the metaphors which recurred most often in the sea-pictures which 
surrounded him then was one which compares the land to the sea, blurring all 
5. )24 distinction between them . What Proust calls metaphor Deleuze also calls 
"implication". He gives the following definition of this term: " 'Implication' is what 
we called the state of intensive series in so far as these communicate through their 
differences and resonate in forming fields of individuation. " [DR 280-281] In the 
example from Proust above we see that in the painting the land and the sea 
communicate through their difference, thereby forming a new individual that is 
neither land nor sea. The key function of implication is to make differences 
problematic once again so that an "unstable opposition" between the two will disturb 
our habits of perceiving either the land or the sea. In turn this enfolding of contraries 
reproduces the complicated state of original time. When Deleuze speaks of essence 
he is referring to this complicated form of time, and style or metaphor is the means 
by which the explicated objects in time lose their individuality and make the return 
journey to their intrinsic beginnings. "This is because style, in order to spiritualize 
substance and render it adequate to essence, reproduces the unstable opposition, the 
original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial elements that 
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constitute essence itself" [PS 48] What the artist does, to put it simply, is to 
introduce the quality of dreams into the waking world of things. We notice that in 
dreams time seems to stop and when dream effects are introduced into art they 
produce a similar effect upon us. According to Proust this procedure protects the 
metaphor from the contingencies of time: "Indeed, just as in life, it begins at the 
moment when, by bringing together a quality shared by two sensations, he draws out 
their common essence by uniting them with each other, in order to protect them from 
the contingencies of time, in a metaphor. ). )25 This effect is important for the following 
reason: the implication of elements returns them to a problematic state, and it is from 
this unstable opposition that time is forced to explicate itself again. In a paradoxical 
twist, the movement of time depends on these centers ofenvelopment to conserve the 
problem and continues the temporal series: "The centres of envelopment still testify 
to the persistence of the values of implication in the movement which explicates and 
solves them. " [DR 281] In short, the present passes because of the ambiguities that 
always haunt the present; i. e., those paradoxes of becoming that we found in the 
painting of the land becoming sea. 
3.6 Where do the powers of difference and repetition come from? The artist 
spends his whole life perfecting his craft, repeating themes and striving towards an 
ideal that is never met. Like "Monet's first water lily which repeats all the others" 
[DR 1] the only thing the artist can do is to repeat, while differing in infinitesimal 
ways, his life's work. "About the work of a great artist, we say: it's the same thing, 
on a different level. " [PS 49] Proust speaks of artistic creation as a kind of worship, a 
quest of perfection: 
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I realized that, in a certain ideal pattern, the few outlines and arabesques of 
which could be seen to recur in his work over and over again, in a certain 
model of beauty, he had once seen something almost divine, since all of his 
time, the whole intellectual effort of which he was capable, in short the whole 
of his life, was devoted to the task of seeing those outlines more clearly and 
reproducing them more accurately. This ideal had become a form of worship, 
of such solemnity, and so demanding, that he could never be content ... 
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This is the progressive power of difference and repetition that Deleuze finds so 
important to the synthesis of time. But this power would never begin without the 
sublimation that the ideal inspires in the artist. Once again Freud's theory of 
narcissism plays an important role in inspiring repetition. Freud describes this ideal 
as a displaced narcissism: "The subjects narcissism makes its appearance displaced 
on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every 
perfection that is of value. " [I lFreud 88] This obsessional form of thought that the 
artist expresses is at the very heart of repetition. This obsession is described by 
Deleuze as a fatal affection: 
It is all in this same movement that there is a reflux of Eros on to the ego, that 
the ego takes upon itself the disguises and displacements which characterize 
the objects in order to construct its own fatal affection, that the libido loses all 
mnemic content and Time loses its circular shape in order to assume a 
merciless and straight form, and that the death instinct appears, 
indistinguishable from that pure form, the clesexualized energy of that 
narcissistic libido. [DR 113] 
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By the "death instinct" Deleuze is referring to the repetition compulsion that inspires 
the obsessional repetitions of an artist. Sublimation is clesexualized libido that has 
turned the sexual energy of the libido back onto the ego itself, thus making the ego 
follow a line of repetitions without end. In short, the death instinct splits the ego 
between itself and its ideal towards which it forever strives. This guarantees a 
continual production of differences from out of that split in the ego. It is within this 
continua repetition that the artist lives his life until he exhausts himself in his old 
age. In old age, and the exhaustion of his powers, the artist loses the ability to find 
continual novelty in repetition; he ends by lapsing into the comfort of ready-made 
images. Or as Proust says there is a point "when his creative genius would begin to 
dissipate, gradually giving way to idolatry, mere worship of the forms which had 
once nourished it and to the beguiling temptations of inertia. 9927 It is only at this point 
that the repetitions fail to be productive and instead become mechanical. Or as 
Deleuze puts it: "repetitions that have become mechanical because they are external, 
frozen differences that revert to a substance that they can no longer make light and 
spiritual. " [PS 49-50] It is the Idea that fuels productive repetition. 
3.1 The subject matter of the 3.3 The signs of art 3.5 The artist reproduces 
work of art is "themes" and not communicate "violently" by "complication" by implicating 
people. changing perceptions. This diverse elements. This 
allows us to pass into the future. envelopment animates 
"becoming. " 
3.2 Proustian ideas are different 3.4 Art appeals to the 3.6 The progressive force of 
from Platonic ideas because ontological base of repetition is motivated by the 
they come afterwards. They are "complication. " It explicates a "ideal" of the artist. This "death 
"points of view" produced by region of Being. instinct" brings difference to 
style. repetition. 
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Chapter 2: The Syntheses of Series 
In this chapter we will be investigating what Deleuze calls "series. " The main 
sources for the argument of this section can be found in Deleuze's The Logic of 
Sense, in particular series 32 and 34. It is in these chapters that Deleuze lays out his 
theory of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series. It is also here that he 
distinguishes between depth, physical surfaces, sexual surfaces and metaphysical 
surfaces. But more important he gives a coherent theory of resonance and forced 
movement that takes place between these surfaces. It will be made clear that these 
three series and the effects they have on each other will be essential to a deeper 
understanding of what Deleuze means by the three syntheses of time. It is also in this 
section that we will investigate the important role the theories of Freud will play in 
Deleuze's construction of series and syntheses. The series and their interaction 
directly mirror the processes of sublimation and fixation that can be found in the 
work of Freud. All in all, it will become clear that time is an effect of a dynamic 
process of resonance and forced movement operating between different series of 
psychical structures. 
a) The connective series 
1.1 The story of connective series begins with the birth of the child. In its 
primitive state of development the infant is almost completely disorganized. Neural 
connections are still forming in the brain; the infant is still trying to coordinate its 
movements. About the only thing that is completely developed at birth is the ability 
to feed and to excrete. Freud calls these basic functions the drives of self- 
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preservation. In the beginning the mouth and the anus function to preserve the life of 
the infant. However, because of the complete dependence of the infant upon external 
sources of nourishment, needs will not always be satisfied in a timely fashion. When 
this happens an excess of intensity builds up in these zones. Here is where the 
emergence of another sort of relationship with reality emerges. We have all noticed 
the phenomenon of thumb sucking in small children. It is at the moment that the 
small child finds satisfaction in the thumb rather than the breast that the organism has 
switched from dependence on external stimuli to an "auto-erotic" relationship. Freud 
tells us that this is the birth of the erotogenic zone: 
The child does not make use of an extraneous body for his sucking, but 
prefers a part of his own skin because it is more convenient, because it makes 
him independent of the external world, which he is not yet able to control, 
and because in that way he provides himself, as it were, with a second 
erotogenic zone, though one of an inferior kind. [7Freud 98] 
For Deleuze this is an important step. The child has gone beyond the immediate real 
objects in order to activate a virtual object: "the child constructs for himself another 
object, a quite different kind of object which is a virtual object or centre and which 
then governs and compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity... " 
[DR 99] The virtual object is also the partial object discovered by Klein. There has 
been a lot of confusion about the nature of partial objects. For our purposes we will 
define it in the following way: it is an image of an action that will satisfy a drive in 
an auto-erotic manner. The child who sucks his thumb 
is notjust sucking that thumb; 
he is also providing the drive with an image of a satisfying 
breastfeeding that took 
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place in the past and transposing it upon the present situation. The virtual/partial 
object allows the child to evade the present by conflating the present situation with a 
past one that was more satisfying. On a micro level this is the very beginning of 
sexuality. An important shift has taken place: the drives of self-preservation have 
been co-opted by the sexual drives. Drives of self-preservation depend upon real 
objects of satisfaction, whereas sexual drives only depend upon virtual objects. A 
zone of the body moves from one drive to the other when it acquires a memory for 
itself and begins to replay satisfying scenarios rather than waiting for real 
satisfaction. 
1.2 It may seem strange at first to say that a zone of the body has a "memory. " 
But this is easily rectified if we consider what form this memory takes. Each zone 
has a degree of intensity. Normally the zone only needs enough intensity or energy to 
keep it functioning. However, as we have seen, the continual dissatisfaction of needs 
caused the zone to become invested with more intensity that it could use for normal 
purposes. This is important to Deleuze's theory of the zone: "Consider, for example, 
objects of sucking or images of the oral zone. Each one becomes coextensive to the 
entire range of the partial surface and traverses it, as it explores its orifice and field of 
intensity, from the maximum to the minimum and vice versa. " [LS 225] The drives 
of self-preservation have a narrow range of intensity. These drives follow the range 
between the need of hunger to the satisfaction of feeding. On the other hand, the 
sexual drives exceed this narrow range: the repetition of satisfaction becomes 
detached from any actual need of the organism and instead repeats its activity 
because ofa drive to attain pleasure itself When repetition becomes detached from 
need it instead focuses on the reduction of the excess tension in the system. 
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Therefore the difference between the drives of self-preservation and the drives of 
sexuality is one of a difference in amplitude according to Freud: 
But apart from these sources there are present in the organism contrivances 
which brings it about that in the case of a great number of internal processes 
sexual excitation arises as a concomitant effect, as soon as the intensity of 
those processes passes beyond certain quantitative limits. [7Freud 124] 
Another great difference between the repetition of need in the drives of self- 
preservation and the repetition of pleasure in the sexual drives is that the sexual 
drives leave a trace whereas the drives of preservation do not. The newly developed 
partial sexual drives do two things: they seek to mitigate the unpleasure of 
expectation by an imaginary compensation and they register a habitual pattern in the 
neural-system in the form of a habit-memory. For Freud, every intensity has a 
source and an aim. The source of intensity in the erotogenic zone is the tension 
created by the expectation of a satisfaction that comes always too late. The difference 
between the self-preservative drive and the sexual ones is the difference in aim. The 
aim of the preservative drive is to satisfy an organic need. The aim of the sexual 
drive is to satisfy a pleasure. An object can only satisfy the first while the second can 
be satisfied with an image. According to Freud this is how a zone is produced: "At its 
origin it attaches itself to one of the vital somatic functions; it has as yet no sexual 
object, and is thus auto-erotic; and its sexual aim is dominated by an erologenetic 
zone-,, [7Freud 99] This attachment of an auto-erotic drive to a somatic function is so 
important to Deleuze because it marks the first transition from the depth of the 
organic to the surface of images: "It is with sexuality, that is to say, with the release 
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of the sexual drives, that the series begins-because the serial form is a surface 
organization. " [LS 2241 Deleuze derives his terms "surface" and "depth" from a 
Stoic distinction between things that have bodies and things that do not. The drives of 
self-preservation belong to the "depths" because they depend upon an incorporation 
of objects for their satisfaction. The drives of sexuality belong to the "surface" 
because they repeat a series of images that provide a substitutive satisfaction. 
1.3 The sexual surfaces and the images that populate them should not be 
confused with the faculty of the imagination and the images that are encountered in 
consciousness. The images in the conscious imagination reproduce images that were 
perceived by the senses. At this primitive level, the partial zones do not have any 
perceptual conception of complete objects that act as an aim of desire. It has often 
been thought that the infant imagines a picture of the mother's breast when sucking 
its thumb. This conception of imagination treats the partial object as if it were a 
whole object. A partial object is radically different than a real object. For whole 
objects there are parts that are subtractable from the whole and act as wholes of a 
part. However, according to Deleuze a partial object is not part of a whole: 
"Whatever the reality in which the virtual object is incorporated, it does not become 
integrated: it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the 
half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real 
continues to lack. " [DR 10 1] If we are to gain a better understanding of what kinds of 
images partial or virtual objects represent, then it would be better to think of them as 
m ovem ent-ffn ages or movement-memories. The partial objects refer to actions and 
not forms and outlines that make up visual images. The best example of this can be 
found in an early work of Freud concerning the perceptions of other human beings: 
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Then the perceptual complexes proceeding from this fellow human-being will 
in part be new and non-com parab le-h is features, for instance, in the visual 
sphere; but other visual perceptions--e. g. those of the movements of his 
hands-will coincide in the subject with memories of quite similar visual 
impressions of his own, of his own body, memories which are associated with 
memories of movements experienced by himself. [I Freud 331] 
It must be kept in mind that, at this stage, the infant has no conception of a whole 
other person. The locus of the other person is, instead, made up of memories of 
actions such as feeding, or bathing, or cleaning, or stroking, any of the actions that 
the infant undergoes without understanding their source. The source of 
misunderstanding about partial objects is our own retrospective projection of our 
current mode of perception back upon the infant. When we, as adults, think of 
satisfying objects we think of body parts that act in the erotic imagination. The 
infant, however, has little understanding of objects and afar greater intuition of 
actions. When he sucks his thumb, it is not the breast as an object he recalls; but 
rather, the action that brought satisfaction in the past. It is quite natural that the first 
form of memory that the infant develops is a habit-memory. The survival of the child 
depends more on being able to repeat actions than it does on recognizing objects. 
This also follows from the scientific discovery that the first year of life is mostly 
devoted to coordinating movements and forming habits. 
1.4 Habits give birth to a series of pleasures each connected to a partial zone that 
is homogeneous with itself Of the three major zones (anal, oral, urethral) each has its 
own rhythm of succession and contraction. That is, each has an image of action that 
conditions its synthesis of pleasures. And because each zone pursues its own 
62 
synthesis there is no global sense of duration. If we are to conceptualize the time 
specific to partial objects and their synthesis we must look for it in dreams. Deleuze 
tells us that in dreams we return to that state of fragmentary consciousness: 
The persons we dream of lose their total character and are treated as partial 
objects, either because a part of them is isolated by our dream or because they 
function altogether as such objects. Now this was precisely what the worldly 
raw material offered us: the possibility of isolating, as in a frivolous dream, a 
movement of the shoulders in one person and a movement of the neck in 
another, not in order to totalize them, but to partition them one from another. 
[PS 150-151] 
In dreams we are no longer confronted with whole-persons but only those 
fragmentary movements that are combined in them. This is because dreaming is a 
regression to a primitive state of sexuality in which each zone partitions the person 
of whom we dream into its zones of interest. What does this have to do with the 
series? In dreams our sense of duration is distorted. It is not completely eliminated, 
but rather it does not extend into the past and future: it remains fragmented. This is 
because each zone determines its own duration based on its own rhythm of 
contraction. What we encounter in dreams is a chaos of conflicting durations, and 
rhythms that do not add up to a coherent passage of time. It is not that there is an 
absence of presence in dreams, but rather a confused sense of order. This confused 
sense of passage is due to the absence of the whole object known as the Other. 
Deleuze gives the function of transition of object and ideas to the Other: 
63 
The first effect of Others is that around each object that I perceive or each 
idea that I think there is an organization of a marginal world, a mantle or 
background, where other objects and other ideas may come forth in 
accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passage from one to 
another. [LS 305] 
In dreams we experience the synthesis of time that we call thepresent but without the 
sense of transition of passage from one moment to the next that we experience in 
waking. The difference between these two experiences of the present can be found in 
the integrations of the partial zones. In dreams we experience only the local 
integrations of larval egos or partial zones that determine a living present. According 
to Deleuze this is the form of time that we fmd in the Id: "The Id is populated by 
local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present 
there where the binding integrations are carried out. " [DR 97] fn the Id there is an 
eternal present without passage from one present to the next; instead, they all subsist 
in a complicated state of co-presence. It is only with the global integration of 
sexuality that whole persons can be recognized and the present takes on a sense of 
succession from one moment to the next. According to Deleuze this global 
integration is carried out by the active and unified ego: "The passive egos were 
already integrations, but only local integrations, as mathematicians say; whereas the 
active self is an attempt at global integration. " [DR 98] The difference between the 
passive egos and the active one is that the passive egos are wholly auto-erotic and 
have no aim outside themselves, whereas the active ego takes the Other as the aim of 
its desires. 
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1.5 The final stage of the pre-genital series and the first stage of the following 
series comes with the coordination activity of the phallus. The function of the phallus 
at this stage is to bring all the competing instincts and the images they form into one 
coordinated surface. Deleuze calls this integration the line of the surface: "This line, 
emanating from the genital zone, is the line which ties together all the erogenous 
zones, thus ensuring their connection or 'interfacing' (doublure), and bringing all the 
partial surfaces together into one and the same surface on the body of the child. " [LS 
20 1] The phallus, in this case, is not just another partial object among others; rather, 
it is the unity of the whole series of virtual objects. The question now arises: how 
does the phallus unify the series of virtual objects? Deleuze gives the following 
answer: "He is able to give this extension to the concept of the phallus (such that it 
subsumes all the virtual objects) because the concept effectively comprises the 
preceding characteristics: testifying to its own absence and to itself as past, being 
essentially displaced in relation to itself, being found only as lost, being possessed of 
an always fragmentary identity which loses its identity in the double... " [DR 103] 
The short answer to this question is that the "lost" character of the phallus is 
explained by repression. Genital sexuality represses pre-genital sexuality and the 
narcissism of auto-eroticism is suppressed by the sexuality of "object-choice. " Freud 
summarizes this process: 
The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly auto-erotic; it now finds a 
sexual object. Its activity has hitherto been derived from a number of separate 
instincts and erotogenic zones, which, independently of one another, have 
pursued a certain sort of pleasure as their sole sexual aim. Now, however, a 
new sexual aim appears, and all the component instincts combine to attain it, 
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while the erotogenic zones become subordinated to the primacy of the genital 
zone. [7Freud 1271 
If the phallus is split into two parts, as Deleuze claims, is it because the new found 
genital sexuality does two things: a) it determines a choice of a real object as a new 
aim of sexuality and b) it represses the narcissistic auto-erotic drives. The auto-erotic 
drives, from the side of post-pubescent sexuality, appear as a "paradise lost" of 
complete unity before the repression of the phallus. Of course this is a retrospective 
effect of the phallus: there is no real primordial unity, only the appearance of one 
from the side of separation. Deleuze compares this illusion of lost unity to the unity 
of Platonism: "... the Good is reached only as the object of a reminiscence, uncovered 
as essentially veiled; the One gives only what it does not have, since it is superior to 
what it gives, withdrawn into its heights; and as Plato said of the idea, 'it flees or it 
perishes ...... [LS 191-192] Thus, the unity of the past is determined by a 
transcendent unity of withdrawal and repression. The consequence this has for the 
synthesis of time is dramatic: at the same time we are given a present that passes we 
are also given a pure past that never was past. That is, the new found genital 
sexuality allows the "global ego" to be activated and the libido becomes attached to a 
series of objects in the "real" world; however, at the same time the repressed pre- 
genital series takes on the appearance of a past unity that was lost. 
1.6 Deleuze says of the pure past, "It is the in-itself of time as the fmal ground of 
the passage of time. " [DR 82] We have just seen how the phallus causes the effect of 
a pure past that never was present. Now we will see how this same phallus causes the 
present to pass. The phallus, as we have seen, activates the "active ego" that invests 
in real objects in the world. This ego in tum "samples" the extemal world in a series 
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of cathexes according to Freud: "The ego periodically sends out small amounts of 
cathexes into the perceptual system, by means of which it samples the external 
stimuli; and then after every such tentative advance it draws back again. " [I I Freud 
44 1] However, the ego is never a complete agency unto itself It operates in a field of 
tension between the Id and the super-ego. The passage of time is dependent upon a 
passage of cycles of judgment. This "judgment" should not be thought of as the 
conscious judgments we make through language. These judgments operate on the 
level of desire between Eros and Thanatos. In Freud's paper on negation he describes 
this polarity of judgment: "The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the 
opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. 
Affirmation - as a substitute for uniting - belongs to Eros; negation - the successor 
to expulsion - belongs to the instinct of destruction. " [I I Freud 441 ] The Id acts as an 
attractor of objects; it was separated from the ego by the repression of the pre-genital 
sexuality and now acts as the source of Eros. The Super-ego acts as a repulser of 
objects; it is the agency of repression that separated the ego from the id. In each 
encounter the "active ego" has with the objects of its investment it either reacts with 
the desire to draw that object in or it reacts by repulsing that object away. In either 
case the repressed series (of the pure past) forms a preconscious judgment as to the 
desirability of that object. In this way the passing present slides across the repressed 
series of the pure past. When an object is recognized, as we say in our everyday 
language, there is a resonance between the repressed series of the past and the 
passing series of objects in perception. This is the effect of Eros. As Freud says, it is 
a positive judgment, and time seems to stop for a brief moment. However, the 
superego will always reassert itself and withdraw the libidinal investment in that 
object allowing the present to pass. Several phenomena are indicative of this 
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veritable speed of time's passage: lovers experience the seeming slowness of time as 
it actually passes quickly in romantic situations, and those who are bored experience 
the drawing out of duration that seems to prolong in waiting for something to happen. 
We will take up this distinction between resonance and forced movement later in 
another section. 
1.1 The virtual object is 1.3 The "partial" objects are 1.5 The "repressed" pre-genital 
attached to the self-preservative movement-images that have no series becomes the pure past at 
drive by "auto-eroticism. " This form. This is the basis of habit- the same time that the phallus 
replaces an imaginary memory. causes the ego to relate to whole 
satisfaction for a "real" objects that make the present 
satisfaction. pass. 
1.2 When a "zone" exceeds a 1.4 Each zone has its own 1.6 The "active" ego now 
certain intensity it becomes duration. We experience this in samples the external world. 
"auto-erotic. " This splits the dreams. The coherence of Attraction and repulsion are 
aim of the zone between surface passage is due to the "whole" determined by the pre-genital 
images and objects of the object. drives. The speed of passage is 
depths. thus determined. 
b) The conjunctive series. 
2.1 Freud tells us that object-choice takes place in two waves or two series: 
It may be regarded as typical of the choice of an object that the process is 
diphasic, that is, that it occurs in two waves. The first of these begins between 
the ages of two and five, and is brought to a halt or to a retreat by the latency 
period; it is characterized by the infantile nature of the sexual aims. The 
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second wave sets in with puberty and determines the final outcome of sexual 
life. [7Freud 119] 
These two series are separated by a period of time called "latency" which is a period 
of extreme repression. The repressed period allows the first series to be pushed back 
into time; in fact, into a time before memory. The first series is subject to what Freud 
calls infantile amnesia. The effect of this is that the first series, of pre-genital 
sexuality, is completely wiped out of memory at the same time it becomes the basis 
for memory. However, we should not think that the first series is completely 
destroyed: instead it is partially sublimated. According to Freud: "The resultants of 
infantile object-choice are carried over into the later period. They either persist as 
such or are revived at the actual time of puberty. But as a consequence of the 
repression which has developed between the two phases they prove unutilizable. " 
[7Freud 119] Under the influence of the phallus the pre-genital series is carried over 
into the second series in puberty and transformed into an Oedipal phantasy. This is 
why Deleuze tells us that the Oedipal series is based upon a repressed series from 
which it extracts its images: "Moreover, this or these Oedipal series enter into 
relation with the pregenital series, with the images which correspond to them, and 
even with groups and persons wherefrom these images were extracted. " [LS 226] 
This process, whereby one series resonates with another, is called fixation. The 
choice of the mother as an external object-choice is predetermined by a previous 
internal object-choice that predates the formation of the ego. We should not confuse 
the relationship between the "internal" object-choice with a resemblance to an 
44 external" object-choice. The internal object is not an image in the sense that an 
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external object is an image. Rather, according to Freud, the pre-genital series is an 
intensity that becomes attached to the caregiver: 
A child's intercourse with anyone responsible for his care affords him an 
unending source of sexual excitation and satisfaction from his erotogenic 
zones. [ ... ]A mother would probably be horrified if she were made aware 
that her marks of affection were rousing her child's sexual instinct and 
preparing for its later intensity. [7Freud 145-146] 
Of course no one remembers the pre-genital excitation that took place during care- 
giving but the intensity of that first series becomes the basis for the resonant effect 
that appears in the second series. The attachment to the mother in the Oedipal series 
is foreshadowed by the intensity experienced in the pre-genital series. 
2.2 The conjunctive synthesis is different from the previous connective synthesis 
insofar as the conjunctive synthesis is the connection between divergent series that 
are separated by infantile amnesia. Freud makes a strong connection between 
hysterical amnesia that is associated with trauma and infantile amnesia that effects us 
all: 
Hysterical amnesia, which occurs at the bidding of repression, is only 
explicable by the fact that the subject is already in possession of a store of 
memory-traces which have been withdrawn from conscious disposal, and 
which are now, by an associative link, attracting to themselves the material 
which the forces of repression are engaged in repelling from consciousness. It 
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may be said that without infantile amnesia there would be no hysterical 
amnesia. [7Freud 91 ] 
Here we see Freud approaching the repressed memories as a store of traces in the 
unconscious that both attract the present series of conscious ideas and repel them by 
the forces of repression. The trauma of hysterical amnesia is not a special case of 
infantile amnesia but only a case where the tension between the intensity of attraction 
is stronger than the counter-force of repression. Hysterical amnesia gives the 
appearance of some "event" that happened in the past that cannot be made present 
through recall. However, as we have discovered, the previous series of excitations do 
not have the structure that can be called an "event. " The pre-genital series only 
contains excitations of zones. Freud tells us that the excitations in one of these pre- 
genital zones is responsible for the effect of deferred action: "Deferred action of this 
kind occurs as well in connection with memories of excitations of the abandoned 
sexual zones. " [lFreud 269] He stresses the word "abandoned" because these 
excitations cannot be translated into post-genital sexuality and are therefore 
repressed. Instead of a memory of a previous "event" the hysterical person is faced 
with a "screen memory. " Freud defines screen-memory as follows: 
One is thus forced by various considerations to suspect that in the so-called 
earliest childhood memories we possess not the genuine memory-trace but a 
later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the 
influences of a variety of later psychical forceS. 28 
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There has been a lot of confusion about the notion of deferred action in Freud. This is 
because Freud held two different views on this phenomenon. The first was that 
hysterical amnesia was caused by an actual scene of seduction in childhood. 
However, he later gave up this idea of actual traumatic events for the theory of the 
psychical reality of traumatic fantasies. In the following passage from a letter Freud 
explains why he gave up the theory of actual traumatic seductions: 
Then came surprise at the fact that in every case the father, not excluding my 
own, had to be blamed as a pervert-the realization of the unexpected 
frequency of hysteria, in which the same determinant is invariably 
established, though such a widespread extent of perversity towards children 
is, after all, not very probable. [I Freud 259] 
This admission makes the proposition that the "cure" for hysterical amnesia is to 
remember the repressed event. If there is no first event then the "event" itself must 
not be either in the first series or in the second series; but rather, it must take place 
between them. 
2.3 For Deleuze the comprehension of the event is the effect of resonance itself. 
"In our terminology, it is therefore not a question of events properly speaking, but 
rather of two series of independent images, whereby the Event is disengaged only 
through resonance of the series in the phantasm. " [LS 226] It is the difference in 
kind between these two types of images that determines the resonance between the 
series. Freud tells us that memories are stored differently for the infant than for the 
adult mind: "Visual memory accordingly preserves the type of infantile memory. , 29 
Not only are "visual" memories stored, but also the memories of sensation and 
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intensities. As such, these images must remain unconscious because they lack the 
criteria that would allow them to become conscious. According to Deleuze, 
"sexuality does not have the conditions which would render possible its being 
maintained in consciousness (namely, the possibility of being denoted, manifested, 
and signified by linguistic elements corresponding to it). " [LS 244] In short, the 
infant's mind stores only qualitative memories, and because it does not have a 
language, these memories do not carry over to the second series. The difference is 
one of organization of memory. Deleuze tells us that verbal representations belong to 
the incorporeal surface effects, and object representations belong to the sexual depths 
of bodies: "Verbal representation must be carefully distinguished from 'object 
representation, ' because it concerns an incorporeal event and not a body, an action, a 
passion, or a quality of bodies. " [LS 245] If there is a repression of infantile images it 
is because it is incompatible with the linguistic structures of consciousness. But this 
difference is also the means by which the two series resonate. If recollection of 
memory in the adult series is determined by designation, signification, and 
manifestation, then the repressed infantile series must act as a generalized "sense" 
that pervades language as an allusion. The attempt of the conscious mind is to 
neutralize "sense" as much as possible so that language can maintain its pragmatic 
(rather than poetic) uses. Deleuze indicates this in the following quote: 
This is why when another surface is developed with different effects which at 
last found denotations, manifestations, and significations as ordered linguistic 
units, elements like phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes seem to turn up 
on this new plane, but seem to lose their sexual resonance. This sexual 
resonance is repressed or neutralized, while the basic series are swept aside 
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by the new series of amplitude. Sexuality exists only as an allusion, as vapor 
or dust, showing a path along which language has passed, but which it 
continues to jolt and to erase like so many extremely disturbing childhood 
memories. [LS 242] 
With regard to the last part of the above quote, the disturbing childhood memories, 
Freud has mapped out disturbances of language in his book The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life. This work exposes the resonance of pre-genital sexuality in the 
everyday slips of the tongue. The fact is that these phenomena are not accidental; 
rather, they reveal the strange "emotions" that some people feel when uttering a 
phrase that is not explainable by the content of the sentence. Deleuze's book, The 
Logic of Sense, is primarily about the effect of language known as sense that is not 
reducible to the meaning of words. "Sense" is the effect of resonance of the repressed 
depths of pre-genital sexuality upon the surface effect of language. In an extreme 
form of this phenomena, known as "hysteria", the person in question undergoes a 
revival of a "memory" that is supposed to date back to early childhood. In this case 
the "memory" in question is activated by a linguistic and propositional structure that 
attempts to translate qualitative "object representations" into a narrative structure of 
an event. The "event" in question is a product of the translation between the two 
fonns of representation. What the hysterical person understands is not a distorted 
form of an original event, but the linguistic and narrative reconstruction of a 
qualitative object-memory. This is what Freud calls a screen-memory. An example of 
a screen-memory can be found in the work of Proust in the episode of the madeleine: 
"Undoubtedly what is fluttering this way deep inside me must be the image, the 
visual memory which is attached to this taste and is trying to follow me .,, 
30 Even 
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Proust recognizes that "visual memory" or the qualitative essence of things is stored 
deep in the unconscious and repressed regions of the psyche. This is why reactivation 
of involuntary memory always follows from an association of "qualitative" images 
rather than associations of linguistic units that appeal to the faculty of the intellect. 
The qualitative image only becomes a screen-memory when it becomes attached to a 
name: Combray. It is this screen-memory of Combray that Deleuze calls the pure 
past: 
Combray as it is in itseýf, as a fragment of the pure past, in its double 
irreducibility to the present that it has been (perception) and to the present 
present in which it might reappear or be reconstituted (voluntary memory). 
This Combray in itself is defmed by its own essential difference, that 
4qualitative difference' which, according to Proust, does not exist 'on the 
surface of the earth', but only at a particular depth. [DR 122] 
It is here that Deleuze makes it clear that the form of screen-memory which we have 
been examining is not the recollection of a real event (a past perception or a recalled 
event) but rather, it is a qualitative difference (the pre-genital "object- 
representation') that subsists only in the depth constituted by the repressed series of 
infantile memories. 
2.4 Of the screen-memories, or phantasms as Deleuze calls thern, none are more 
evident in the life of the psyche than the Oedipal series. In the second half of The 
Logic of Sense Deleuze makes great use of the Oedipus complex as a series that is 
typical of the phantasm. He draws a comparison between the first series of pre- 
genital sexuality and the pubescent series of the Oedipus complex: "... these Oedipal 
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series enter into relation with the pregenital series, with the images which correspond 
to them, and even with groups and persons wherefrom these images are extracted. " 
[LS 226] The question arises: how are the pre-genital series converted into the 
phantasms of the Oedipal series? We have seen that the pre-genital series comes 
under repression by the institution of language, but what is the source of this 
language? For Deleuze, language is inspired by the "voice from above. " To put it 
simply, the infant experiences the voices around him as a voice from above that is 
pre-signi ng. Deleuze equates the voice with the formation of the superego in the 
following quote: 
Freud himself stressed the acoustic origin of the superego. For the child, the 
first approach to language consists in grasping it as the model of that which 
preexists, as referring to the entire domain of what is already there, and to the 
familial voice which conveys tradition, it affects the child as a bearer of a 
name and demands his insertion even before the child begins to understand. 
[LS 193] 
The child does not understand the significance of the voices of adults that it hears but 
it understands the scolding nature and rewarding nature of the voice. It is this 
opposition of loving and hating voice that leaves a mark on the infant. It is this 
"mark" that inspires the repression of "object representations" in favor of verbal 
representations. But more than this, the voice that is experienced in the infantile 
series is translated into the adult series as the phantasms of the "mother" and the 
"father" in the Oedipal series. In this case the "father" image resonates with the 
scolding voice from above, and the "mother" image with the loving voice from 
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above. The two images form the component parts of the superego: the part that one 
identifies with as an "ego-ideal" and the part that forbids that constitutes the proper 
form of the superego. The ego-ideal attracts the drives of the depths by prompting the 
image of a healed and unified surface in which the destructive drives of the depths 
are neutralized. However, in order to bring about this unification the superego must 
repress the pre-genital zones that fragment the surface. It is at this point that the 
illusion of narcissism that we examined above comes into play. The "phallus" 
becomes the privileged object that the phantasms of the Oedipal series revolve 
around. The phallus becomes the ideal of re-unification: it seeks to make the 
transcendent unity of the ego-ideal immanent and the fragmented series of pre-genital 
zones unified. Deleuze addresses this problem of the phallus: 
And when it deten-nines parental images, it is again by dissociating its own 
aspects, by distributing them as alternatives which supply the alternating 
terms of the Oedipal series, and by arranging them around the image of the 
mother (wounded and to be healed), and the image of the father (withdrawn 
and to be made present). Only the phallus would then be left as the agent of 
convergence and coordination; the problem is that it itself gets involved in 
Oedipal dissociations. [LS 227] 
The phantasms of the Oedipus complex are already involved in an ongoing 
Castration complex. In the pre-genital series this phantasm is represented by the 
withdrawal of the breast or the excretion of feces. This is where the phallus gets its 
qualities of being both a presence and a lack, being both present and absent and 
going from one series to the other without shifting its place. It can do this because, as 
77 
a representative of the primary narcissism of the child it subsists in the pure past that 
has its unity by its transcendent and withdrawn nature, and as a problem in the 
present Oedipal series it can represent the lack the child feels in relation to the 
parental images. 
2.5 The whole problem with the second series of resonance is that it is an 
incomplete sublimation of the pre-genital drives. It creates a traurnatism in the 
phantasm because the "comprehension" of the series remains incomplete. There are 
two things dangerously wrong with the second synthesis of time: a) it sets up a 
feeling of nostalgia for a lost unity that never existed and b) it seals off the psyche in 
a repeating loop that prevents any progress being made (a repetition of the same). 
According to Deleuze the whole "intermediary" surface of sexuality is complicated 
with symptoms and failures of comprehension: 
Melanie Klein remarks that between symptoms and sublimations there must 
be an intermediary series corresponding to cases of less successful 
sublimation. But the whole of sexuality, in its own right, is a 'less successful' 
sublimation: it is intermediary between the symptoms of corporeal depth and 
the sublimations of the incorporeal surface; and in this intermediary state it is 
organized in series on its own intermediary surface. [LS 224] 
This is why Deleuze disparages sexuality in his work. Eros as the force of resonance 
in the second synthesis of time is beset by failures typified in the Oedipus complex. 
For Deleuze the phantasm of the sexual surface is a failed vision of the event. The 
ý16 pure event" belongs to the third synthesis of time that we will examine later. This 
third synthesis of time brings about a repetition that is a repetition "of difference" 
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and is progressive and creative in its productions. This must be contrasted with the 
repetition of Eros and sexuality that repeats the "same" and entraps the thinker in 
repetitive games of guilt and castration. Deleuze's contempt for this form of thought 
about sexuality can be seen in the following passage: 
The risk is obviously that the phantasm falls back on the poorest thought, on a 
puerile and redundant diurnal reverie 'about' sexuality, each time that it 
misses its mark and falls short, that is, each time it falls back in the 'in- 
between' of the two surfaces. [LS 220] 
It is true that Deleuze is already anti-Oedipal in The Logic of Sense. However, he 
does affwm the Oedipal and the second synthesis of time of which it is a part to be a 
stage in transition to the third synthesis of time. The remarkable accomplishment in 
this work is that Deleuze has succeeded in overturning the common assumptions 
about Freudianism: that is, the idea that the Oedipus complex is a "nuclear complex" 
that lies at the heart of each person. Instead Deleuze shows how it is an effect of the 
resonance of the divergent series of the pre-genital and pubescent sexualities. 
Further, he shows how the cure for this "neurosis" does not consist in remembering 
some original event; but rather, progressing to a new synthesis of the radical 
sublimation of "desexualization" that we will discover in the third synthesis of time. 
Whereas the Freudian project was to stop repetition through remembering, the 
Deleuzian project is to extend repetition beyond remembering: 
We are not, therefore, healed by simple anamnesis, any more than we are 
made ill by amnesia. Here as elsewhere, becoming conscious counts for little. 
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[... ] If repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it 
also frees us, testifying in both cases to its 'demonic' power. All cure is a 
voyage to the bottom of repetition. [DR 19] 
In essence, Deleuze departs from Freud in his re-evaluation of the Death instinct as a 
repetition compulsion. Whereas Freud only saw it as a problematic condition 
attached to neurosis, Deleuze sees it as a possible means of escape from the 
regressive repetitions of neurotic and erotic fixations. 
2.6 Deleuze names transference as the mechanism by which one is set free from 
the Oedipus complex: "The more theatrical and dramatic operation by which healing 
takes place - or does not take place - has a name: transference. Now transference is 
still repetition: above all repetition. " [DR 19] In a note to this sentence Deleuze 
recommends the work of Ferenczi and Rank: "Those who are interested most 
profoundly upon the therapeutic and libratory aspect of repetition as it appears in 
transference were Ferenczi and Rank... " [DR 307] In their short work, The 
Development of Psychoanalysis, they set out to explain the technique of 
psychoanalysis, not as an education of the patient, but of a weaning of the patient 
away from his or her libidinal attachments. In their own words: 
The essential thing in the analytical intervention, however, does not consist 
either in the verification of the 'Oedipus Complex', or in the simple repetition 
of the Oedipus situation in the relation to the analyst, but rather in setting 
free 
and detachment of the infantile libido from its fixation on its first objects. 
31 
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Essentially, in the analytic practice the patient becomes attached to the analyst. This 
process is called "positive transference. " In this phase the neurotic will repeat his 
Oedipal fantasies in the therapeutic session. In these sessions the psychoanalyst will 
have, projected onto him, all the libidinal and erotic attachments that the neurotic 
patient has not resolved. Here is the crucial role of the analyst: not to interpret or 
confirm the neurotic'sfantasies, but to disappoint them. There comes a point in every 
analysis when the love the patient feels for the analyst turns to hate: this is "negative 
transference. " The difference between positive and negative transference is the 
difference between Eros and the Death Instinct. One seeks resonances between the 
analyst and libidinal attachments in the pre-genital series. The other breaks with 
libidinal attachments, and the result is that, for the first time, the patient comprehends 
the "truth" of his attachment to the analyst. He was just replaying a pattern of a 
demand for love from his own internal Other, his own superego, that could never be 
satisfied in reality. Ferenczi and Rank explain this in the following quote: 
For this phase the problem is to get the patient, with the help of the love for 
the analyst, to give up this love. [ ... ] After the patient has become convinced 
that he cannot obtain the love of the analyst in reality-and that such is the 
case he only admits in the very last phase of the cure-he recognizes, 
consciously as well as emotionally, the impossibility of fulfilling the demands 
of his infantile libido and contents himself with the other things which life 
offers. It is remarkable with what haste the libido, as it frees itself from the 
cure, seeks out new interests in life. We see the process of sublimation which 
in ordinary life requires years of education, take place before our eyes 
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towards the end of the cure in the shortest space of time... 
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Before one can give up one's Oedipus complex one must first regress to the first 
series; that is, to set up a resonance between the pre-genital series and the present 
series of transference. This is why the second series of time, the pure past, is an 
important step in the path to progressive repetition. In the work of Proust, the hero 
must fall in love with Albertine, re-play all the games of deception and separations, 
and then resolve himself to finally break with Albertine. In Proust's work we see the 
whole series of positive and negative transference at work in the opposition of love 
and jealousy. It is only at the moment that the Oedipal series of resonance is broken 
in The Search that the hero fmds his libidinal energies free to create the work of art. 
But before the final break, the hero must pass into the pure past, and examine the 
resonances that it produces and experience the pain of unfulfilled wishes. Deleuze 
reinterprets Freud's theory of "remembering" as a voyage to the bottom of repetition, 
and of bringing the erotic connection to the past to a crisis point. For Deleuze it is 
necessary to install oneself directly into the pure past to make a living connection 
and to experience the full range of frustration and disappointment that this resonance 
causes: 
Freud noted from the beginning that in order to stop repeating it was not 
enough to remember in the abstract (without affect), nor to form a concept in 
general, nor even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity: it was 
necessary to seek out the memory there where it was, to install oneself 
directly in the past in order to accomplish a living connection between the 
knowledge and the resistance, the representation and the blockage. [DR 18- 
19] 
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This installing oneself directly in the past that Deleuze recommends is identical to 
what Proust called involuntary memory and Ferenczi and Rank called positive 
transference. Deleuze tells us that this movement into the past in itself is only the 
initial movement of a pendular structure: "It has a pendular structure: the basic series 
traversed by the movement of the object = x, the resonance, and the forced 
movement of an amplitude greater than the initial movement. " [LS 239] In short, the 
second synthesis of time and the resonance of its initial movement, is only the 
precursor to the forced movement of the third synthesis of time. 
2.1 The intensities of the 2.3 The "comprehension" of the 2.5 The Oedipus complex is a 
repressed pre-genital series event is an effect of qualitative "less successful sublimation" 
resonate with the post-genital excitations from one series that is only an effect of 
series. This is how two being "translated" into verbal resonance and not a "nucleus. " 
divergent series are conjoined. representations in another The way beyond Oedipus is not 
series. The qualitative series is remembering but 
the "sense" of language. "desexualization. " 
2.2 "Traumatic" events are not 2.4 The parental images in the 2.6 The way beyond Oedipus is 
real events but rather a result of Oedipus complex are extracted an "erotic" regression into the 
the translation of repressed from the "voice from above. " pure past followed by a "crisis" 
excitations into a fantasy called These two images form the two that breaks with the erotic 
44screen memory. " functions of the phallus: synthesis of the past. This is 
presence and lack. called "transference. " 
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c) The disjunctive series. 
3.1 Whereas the series of resonance between the partial zones and the sexual 
surface was a less successful sublimation, theforced movement between the original 
depths and the metaphysical surface is described by Deleuze as being more extreme: 
"But the forced movement which represents desexualization is Thanatos and 
ýcompulsion'; it operates between the two extremes of the original depth and the 
metaphysical surface, the destructive cannibalistic drives of depth and the speculative 
death instinct. " [LS 239] Both Freud and Deleuze call this new amplitude or range 
between series "sublimation. " The first major difference between sublimation and the 
Oedipus complex is that the Oedipus complex represses unutilizable pre-genital 
zones, and this repression results in the amnesia and resonance of that series. 
According to Freud, in sublimation the pre-genital zones are no longer repressed, or 
at least no longer useless: 
We know of a far more expedient process of development, called 
'sublimation', in which the energy of the infantile wishful impulses is not cut 
off but remains ready for use-the unserviceable aim of the various impulses 
being replaced by one that is higher, and perhaps no longer sexual. " 
Resonance was caused by the screen-memories that were invested with the energy of 
the pre-genital zone. Now those zones are desexualized and turned into energy that 
can be used for creative thought. Deleuze describes this new movement as greater 
than that of resonance because the series of Oedipal wishes directly impeded 
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intellectual capacity. According to Freud, this impediment to thought is brought 
about by the great libidinal energy that is absorbed in maintaining a fixation: 
A certain psychical inertia, a sluggishness of the libido, which is unwilling to 
abandon its fixations, cannot be welcome to us; the patient's capacity for 
sublimating his instincts plays a large part and so does his capacity for rising 
above the crude life of the instincts; so, too, does the relative power of his 
intellectual functions. 34 
But what are these intellectual functions that Freud is speaking of? When Freud is 
speaking of sublimation and its intellectual functions he seems to be referring to 
particularly creative endeavors of the mind and not to the mundane tasks of thought. 
It is in the creative aspect of thought that we see the functional necessity for a 
transition from fixation to creation. Because the fixations of the Oedipus complex 
eventually expose the psyche to great conflicts, the imaginative capacity of the mind 
must be expanded in order to solve these conflicts in a creative way. Because the 
psyche cannot solve the conflict in "reality" it seeks to recreate, or counter-actualize, 
the real world in an image of an intellectual one. According to Freud, it is the 
attempt to avoid the frustrations of psychical conflicts that leads the psyche to 
sublimate: 
The task here is that of shifting the instinctual aims in such a way that they 
cannot come up against frustration from the external world. In this, 
sublimation of the instincts lends its assistance. One gains the most if one can 
sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure from the sources of psychical and 
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intellectual work. When that is so, fate can do little against one. A satisfaction 
of this kind, such as an artist's joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, 
35 or a scientist's in solving problems or discovering truths... 
What the artist essentially does is to take the conflicting drives that we discovered in 
the pre-genital series and re-organize them so that they can be translated into 
linguistic or expressive phenomena in literature or art. Because of this translation of 
pre-genital sexuality, the aims that were incompatible with consciousness now enter 
consciousness in a desexualized form. In this way, the polymorphous-perverse 
phenomena of repressed sexuality finds expression, although disguised by the mask 
of language, in the artistic format. If these works of sublimation appear to express 
new truths, according to Freud, it is because they translate phantasies into new 
realities: 
An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality because he cannot 
come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction which it at first 
demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play in the life 
of phantasy. He finds his way back to reality, however, from this world of 
phantasy by making use of special gifts to mould his phantasies into truths of 
a new kind, which are valued by men as precious reflections of reality. 
[I I Freud 41-42] 
In The Logic of Sense Deleuze calls this process "counter-actualization. " In this 
process the actions in the depths of the body - what Deleuze 
describes as the 
destructive and cannibalistic instincts that manifest themselves in life as self- 
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destructive behavior - is given a literary or artistic form, in which the person who 
undergoes the destructive events is depersonalized, as if it was being acted out on a 
stage as a representation of the event. According to Deleuze, action takes place on 
two stages; one in which it is undergone in reality, and the other where it is mimed by 
the sublimated and artistic representation of the event: "... to be the mime of what 
effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the 
identification with distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of 
the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization. " 
[LS 16 1] We can see in this quote from Deleuze the same process that Freud talked 
about when he spoke of turning "phantasies into truths of a new kind" through the 
activity of sublimation. 
3.2 Does sublimation go far enough? In the work of Freud it seems as if 
sublimation only goes as far as making the end of the Oedipus complex possible. 
Freud's ideal for the termination of treatment is to turn the conflicts of sexual 
investment in an Oedipal complex into a sort of "affection" for the parents that is 
only partially sublimated: 
The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part 
desexualized and sublimated (a thing which happens with every 
transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and 
changed into impulses of affection. [7Freud 319] 
Freud's plan for the dissolution of the Oedipus complex involves a transformation 
from the child's fear of castration to an identification with the parental figure that 
carries out the threat. This is what is known as identification with the aggressor. It is 
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also the internalization of the prohibition; this means that repression is partially 
released from direct suppression of the instincts and the prohibition is internalized in 
the form of a superego. This is a compromise. The aggression that was turned against 
the child in the form of a threat can now, because of identification with the aggressor, 
be turned outwards towards an instinct ofmastery. The child who has undergone this 
form of sublimation now feels compelled to turn the repressive aggression outwards 
into constructive projects. While it is true that the libidinal energy that was used to 
repress the child is now turned towards productive ends, it still "compromises" with 
the Oedipus complex and carries it out in another form. The ideal for dissolution of 
the Oedipus complex is the drive to become a father of one's own children and repeat 
the cycle of repression on a new generation. So, the conflict with the father is turned 
into an affection and identification with the father so that the same pattern can be 
repeated in a new cycle. Freud favors sublimation because it is socially useful: it 
guarantees the continuation of culture through the drive to create new structures and 
to pass down values to new generations. It represents the value that the superego has 
for the maintenance of culture over the hedonistic impulses of the pre-genital 
instincts. But there is a problem with Freud's argument. The structures of the 
superego are built upon the perversions of the pre-genital series and are a 
continuation of them. In short, our virtues are built upon a foundation of vice 
according to Freud: "The multifariously perverse sexual disposition of childhood can 
accordingly be regarded as the source of a number of our virtues, in so far as through 
reaction-formation it stimulates their virtues. " [7Freud 164] Freud arbitrarily divides 
sublimations from perversions by their social usefulness. For example, he shows the 
sublimated vices from which ambition and thrift are derived: "Thus, obstinacy, thrift 
and orderliness arise from an exploitation of anal eroticism, while ambition is 
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determined by strong urethral-erotic disposition. " [7Freud 164] Further, Freud tells 
us that sublimation is, "employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses 
which have been recognized as being unutilizable. " [7Freud 164] The only difference 
between perversion and sublimation is the social usefulness of the outcome. Perhaps 
perversion is the truth of sublimation and not its opposite. For Deleuze perversion is 
the natural extension of sublitnation. All thought is based on a prior perversion that 
mo iva es it. 
3.3 In place of simple sublimation Deleuze proposes the more radical 
clesexualization of perversion. Deleuze tells us that the desexualization that 
sublimations inspire provide the ego with only two alternatives: 
Desexualization has two possible effects on the workings of the pleasure 
principle: either it introduces functional disturbances which affect the 
application of the principle, or else it promotes a sublimation of the instincts 
whereby pleasure is transcended in favor of gratifications of a different kind. 
[CC 116] 
In Freud's paper "On Narcissism" he explains why some people indulge in their 
desires without any shame while others take the same activities as shameful: "We can 
say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual 
ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. " [I I Freud 88] The person who has 
such an ideal can either submit to it and "better himself' through sublimation, or 
he 
can suffer self-disgust and depression. The person who sublimates projects an 
ideal 
onto the "metaphysical surface, " as Deleuze calls it, and each of 
his actions is 
measured by this counter-actualized ideal. But here 
is the problem that makes 
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Deleuze dissatisfied with this solution: the ego ideal that the superego sets up is 
completely subordinated to the repressive forces of society. This is why he asks the 
following question: 
Is there no other solution besides the functional disturbance of neurosis and 
the spiritual outlet of sublimation? Could there not be a third alternative 
which would be related not to the functional interdependence of the ego and 
the superego, but to the structural split between them? [CC 117] 
This alternative that Deleuze seeks would disengage the ego from a subordination to 
the ego ideal that enslaves it and forces it into conformity. If we are to truly break 
with the Oedipal cycle and not repeat the mistakes of our fathers it is necessary to 
delve into perversion. Perversion is defmed by "the splitting of the ego" as it is 
described by Freud and the same process that is called "the fracture in the I" by 
Deleuze. In order to understand why there is a splitting of the ego it is first necessary 
to replay the drama that initiated the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Freud 
describes the choice that the child has to make between following the Oedipus 
complex or facing castration in the following quote: 
So far he had had no occasion to doubt that women possessed a penis. But 
now his acceptance of the possibility of castration, his recognition that 
women were castrated, made an end of both possible ways of obtaining 
satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them entailed the loss of 
his penis - the masculine one as a resulting punishment and the feminine one 
as a precondition. If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus 
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complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his 
narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis of his 
parental objects. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: 
the child's ego tums away from the Oedipus complex. [7Freud 318] 
The child that is enthralled in this drama is forced to choose between an instinctual 
demand and a threat that is perceived in reality. The choice is love or death: the child 
who sublimates chooses life at the expense of love (the instinctual demand). But the 
perverse individual changes the rules of this drama. Freud presents us with a case 
where the child takes both options: 
It must now decide either to recognize the real danger, give way to it and 
renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or to disavow reality and make itself 
believe that there is no reason for fear, so that it may be able to retain the 
satisfaction. Thus there is a conflict between the demand of the instinct and 
the prohibition by reality. But in fact the child takes neither course, or rather 
he takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing. [II Freud 46 1] 
It is within this drama that the ego splits: one side is orientated towards reality and 
the other is orientated towards the instinct. Freud has divided the options that the 
psyche can take in this dilemma of castration: neurosis, psychosis, or perversion. 
Freud explains the distinction between neurosis and psychosis: "I arrived at the 
proposition that the essential difference between neurosis and psychosis was that in 
the former the ego, in the service of reality, suppresses a piece of the id, whereas in a 
psychosis it lets itself be induced by the id to detach itself from a piece of reality. " 
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[7Freud 355] The neurotic follows the path of "reality" in which the ego is turned 
outwards towards the series of real events that fail to satisfy him. The psychotic, on 
the other hand, finds only hallucinations that arise from the instincts and blocks out 
reality. The pervert does both at the same time: he operates on two planes, one 
directed towards reality and the other towards the instincts. Freud makes this clear in 
the following quote: 
On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects reality and 
refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath he 
recognizes the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a 
pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear. 
[I I Freud 461-462] 
It is in perversion that Deleuze finds the ideal solution to his theory of the two 
surfaces. What the pervert does is simple: half of the ego sets up an ideal plane of 
thought where castration is disavowed and another half of the ego recognizes the 
reality of castration. The disavowed half constitutes the metaphysical surface of 
thought and the other half constitutes the actions and passions of bodies. The pervert 
moves from one to the other by the process of disavowal. According to Deleuze: 
"The famous mechanism of 'denegation' (that's not what I wanted ... ), with all its 
importance with respect to the formation of thought, must be interpreted as 
expressing the passage from one surface to another. " [LS 208] On the metaphysical 
surface the action of castration is denied by making it "neutral" and not willed by any 
person. The ego ideal is replaced by the ideal ego, "in which the mother-image serves 
as a mirror to reflect and even produce the 'ideal ego' as a narcissistic ideal of 
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omnipotence... " [CC 129] In this idealization the traumatic drama of the castration 
complex is denied reality. At the same time the other half of the ego recognizes this 
same reality that is denied in the other. Deleuze tells us that this is possible because 
all action is divided in two by disavowal: 
it takes the totality of every possible action and divides it into two, projects 
it on to two screens, as it determines each side according to the necessary 
exigencies of each screen. On one hand, the entire image of action is 
projected on a physical surface, where the action itself appears as willed and 
is found determined in the forms of restoration and evocation; on the other, 
the entire result of the action is projected on a metaphysical surface, where 
the action itself appears as produced and not willed, determined by the forms 
of murder and castration. [LS 207-208] 
The split in the ego becomes the split between the superego and the ego. Whereas 
before the ego was subordinated to the superego as a determining factor, with the 
split in the ego the superego becomes the representative of the internal world that is 
in direct contact with the archetypes in the Id. Freud recognizes this dual relationship 
in the split between the ego and superego: "Whereas the ego is essentially the 
representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it 
as the representative of the internal world, of the id. " [I I Freud 376] We shall see that 
this split is extremely important for Deleuze's theory of the "pure event. " The world 
of the Id contains archetypes for all real events that pass in time. 
3.4 Why does Deleuze associate the "fractured P with the empty form of time? 
As we have just seen, the ego is split into two halves: one that is directed towards 
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reality and the other towards the metaphysical surface of pure thought. Or, to put it in 
Freudian terms, one part of the ego has become "narcissistic" and the other is 
directed towards investment in objects. According to Deleuze the first becomes the 
locus of the passive ego and the second as an activity of thought: "For while the 
passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be thought. This can occur only in 
the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissistic ego 
passively experiences on its own account. " [DR I 10] Let us be clear about our 
terminology. The "narcissistic" ego withdraws its attention away from objects in 
66reality" in order to replace them by presentations from the Id. The narcissistic part 
of the ego concerns itself only with what Deleuze calls "pure thought, " or the 
archetypical presentations of the instincts. Let us be clear, the "narcissistic" aspect of 
the ego is only the attempt of the ego to take itselfas a loved object. Whereas objects 
in the "real" world are subject to time, the ego-as-loved-object is not subject to time; 
rather it takes itself as a pure and empty form. According to Deleuze: "The 
narcissistic ego indeed appears in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: 
the narcissistic libido, the reflux of the libido into the ego, abstracts from all content. " 
[DR I 10] As we saw above, when the ego splits there is a desexualization of the 
libido; or, it ignores the reality of castration to set up, inside itself, a compensatory 
phantasy. If the ego is normally used to direct libido into the external world of 
objects, according to Freud, then the contrary movement represents a reversal of 
instinctual impulses: 
By this getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as 
the sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the 
ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the 
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service of the opposing instinctual impulses. It has to acquiesce in some of 
the other object-cathexes of the id; it has, so to speak, to participate in them. 
[I I Freud 386-387] 
When Deleuze refers to the "death instinct" he is primarily referring to this process 
by which the ego replaces object-cathexes for a cathexis of instinctual objects in the 
Id. When the ego turns away from external objects it focuses its attention towards 
pure events. These are not events that have happened to the ego in question but 
timeless events that seem to predate the ego. Consider the following statement by 
Deleuze: 
Totem and Taboo is the great theory of the event, and psychoanalysis in 
general is the science of events, on the condition that the event should not be 
treated as something whose sense is to be sought and disentangled. The event 
is sense itself, insofar as it is disengaged or distinguished from the states of 
affairs which produce it and in which it is actualized. [LS 211] 
The great theory of the totem meal, in which the children kill the father and eat him, 
is a pure event that was never actualized in states of affairs. However, Freud 
mistakenly continues to seek a foundation for the archetypes in the id by an appeal to 
phylogenesis: 
The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when 
they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many 
individuals in successive generations they transform themselves, so to say, 
95 
into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. 
[I I Freud 378] 
For Deleuze, for the "event" to be a pure event it must be completely free of any 
form of memory, even a phylogenetic one. The Freudian theory of the events in the 
id is too reminiscent of Plato's idea of reminisces, in which, forms that have been 
forgotten in a previous life are recovered in this life and recognized as true. In order 
to evade this platonic trap that Freud fell into, Deleuze provides another explanation 
for these events. 
3.5 Deleuze distinguishes the actions and passions that subsist in the id from the 
"result" that is projected on the metaphysical surface. But what is this distinction and 
where does it come from? In the pre-genital phase of sexuality the organism was 
divided into separate aims and instincts. Each instinct is designated by an action that 
it undertakes. We saw that in the oral zone the mouth had as its auto-erotic image the 
action and passion of sucking (breast feeding). Other zones have their own actions 
and instincts. However, in the Oedipal phase, none of these passions of the partial 
zones could be translated into post-genital sexuality. There was, therefore, a 
repression of the pre-genital zones. These zones in turn returned in the form of 
screen-memories in the Oedipal phase. But now with the dissolution of the Oedipus 
complex and the rise of the narcissistic ego the pre-genital zones are put into use 
once more. The reason that these zones were repressed in the Oedipal phase was that 
there was no means to translate them into language. Language is the means by which 
"object-representations" in the unconscious are linked to the "verbal-representations" 
in consciousness. But because the Oedipal phase was only concerned with objects its 
translations focused upon nouns, or more correctly "phonemes, morphemes, and 
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semantemes" [LS 247-248] that correspond to the partial objects. However, language 
is impossible without a means to connect the various partial fragments and provide 
them with a sense. This is where the metaphysical surface of pure thought becomes 
important. At this stage the actions and passions of the component instincts become 
the basis for the "infinitive verb. " What is unique about the infinitive fori-n of the 
verb is that it cannot be designated as an object or signified by any concept. Instead, 
the infinitive form of the verb provides the partial fragments (nouns, etc. ) with a 
means to connect with one another in a meaningful way. However, the infinitive 
form of the verb always remains silent as Deleuze explains: "The verb, however, is 
silent; and we must take literally the idea that Eros is sonorous and the death instinct 
is siience. In the verb, the secondary organization is brought about, and from this 
organization the entire ordering of language proceeds. " [LS 24 1] The infinitive verb 
is the means by which the pre-genital drives can express themselves in language by 
"translating" action into sense on the other surface. But let us be careful: the 
infinitive verb is not in consciousness. It is pre-conscious, or the pure surface of 
meaning that cannot be designated or signified by objects or words. Certainly we can 
say the infinitive verb "to eat" but the meaning of this infinitive form of the verb is 
not to be found in the objects we eat, nor in a concept of eating, nor by the act of 
demonstration of eating. The meaning of the "infinitive"' cannot be exhausted by any 
of these limited or thinkable examples. Instead, the sense of the infinitive verb is only 
to be found in the archetypes of pure events that come from the id. The infinitive 
verb forms the core of these events. According to Deleuze it is this aspect of the verb 
that makes it unique and symbolic for all possible actions or events: 
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In this case, the verb is inscribed on this surface-that is, the glorious event 
enters a symbolic relation with a state of affairs, rather than merging with it; 
the shining, noematic attribute, rather than being confused with a quality, 
sublimates it; the proud Result, rather than being confused with an action or 
passion, extracts an eternal truth from them. [LS 240] 
Instead of Freud's theory of phylogenesis, Deleuze explains pure events by 
sublimation; that is, by linking the partial drives with the verbal-representation on the 
metaphysical surface: "This is the verb which, in its univocity, conjugates devouring 
and thinking: it projects eating on the metaphysical surface and sketches out thinking 
on it. [ ... ] The verb is the 'verbal representation' in its entirety, as well as the highest 
affirmative power of disjunction (univocity, with respect to that which diverges). " 
[LS240 & 24 1] To put it simply, the impulse to action in the body is translated into a 
thought ahout action in the mind. For example: if we see a horse carrying a heavy 
weight and a man carrying a heavy weight, we can sense that heaviness and the 
power of lifting in our own bodies (any child knows this sympathy response), but this 
sense of sympathy in the body is translated into a power of thinking about this action 
by the thing that unites them for thought, namely the infinitive verb. Everybody has a 
sympathy response by which bodies affect one another. The infinitive verb allows 
this universal commonality of affects to be expressed by a single verb: for example, 
to-carry (in the case of the horse and the man). The event allows us to express the 
commonality of every action by one verb. This is the univocity of Being. 
3.6 How does the pure event express the unity of divergent series? in order to 
answer this question we must first clarify what divergent series are. Deleuze takes the 
following quote from Borges to illustrate divergent series: 
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In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he chooses one at the 
expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable Ts'ui Pen, he chooses - 
simultaneously - all of them. He thus creates various futures, various times 
which start others that will in their turn branch out and bifurcate in other 
times. This is the cause of the contradictions in the novel. 'Fang, let us say, 
has a secret. A stranger knocks at his door. Fang makes up his mind to kill 
him. Naturally there are various possible outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, 
the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die and so on and so 
on. In Ts'ui Pen's work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the 
point of departure for other bifurcations. [DR It 6] 
Each of these possible events has one thing in common: the verb to-kill. The subjects 
and objects in this story are incidental. There is a reversal at work here: the true 
subject of events are not the subjects or objects that undergo the transformation, but 
the transformation itself that is represented by the infinitive verb. A divergent series 
is, then, the contradictory outcomes that circulate around each verb. In the work of 
Leibniz we learn of the incompossible worlds that cannot communicate with each 
other because God has chosen to make only a completely logical world where there 
is no chance of two contradictory events happening at the same time. Deleuze 
reverses this: it is not God who chooses the event; it is the pure event that chooses 
itself This truth is rediscovered with the advent of Freud's theory of the unconscious. 
The unconscious does not contain coherent events but divergent events that 
crystallize around a verb that expresses them. 
The fascinating thing about the 
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infinitive form of the verb is that it is completely neutral. Deleuze explains this 
neutrality of the phantasm: 
This neutrality, that is to say, this movement by which singularities are 
emitted... belongs essentially to the phantasm. This is the case in A Child Is 
Being Beaten (or better, "A Father Is Seducing His Daughter, " following the 
example invoked by Laplanche and Pontalis). Thus, the individuality of the 
ego merges with the event of the phantasm itself, even if that which the event 
represents in the phantasm is understood as another individual, or rather as a 
series of other individuals through which the dissolved ego passes. [LS 213- 
214] 
Laplanche and Pontalis note that in original fantasy, or the phantasm, the subject is 
not always the object of the action or even one of the components of the event: "But 
the original fantasy, on the other hand, is characterized by the absence of 
subjectivization, and the subject is present in the scene: the child, for instance, is one 
character amongst many in the fantasy 'a child is beaten'. 506 In the phantasy the 
subject is dissolved because the action itself is the only constant feature of the 
phantasy. In it, sometimes the father is beating a friend, sometimes the father is being 
beaten, sometimes he is beating a brother or a sister, and sometimes it is the mother 
who is beating someone. This should not be interpreted as a mask for the "subject" 
being beaten. The subject is unimportant; only the action is essential to the phantasy. 
Laplanche and Pontalis recognize the structure of phantasy as having multiple 
entries: 
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'A father seduces a daughter' might perhaps be the summarized version of the 
seduction fantasy. The indication here of the primary process is not the 
absence of organization, as is sometimes suggested, but the peculiar character 
of the structure, in that it is a scenario with multiple entries, in which nothing 
shows whether the subject will immediately be located as daughter; it can as 
well be fixed asfather, or even in the term seduces. 37 
This scenario shows remarkable similarity to the story by Borges in which multiple 
possibilities are simultaneously affirmed. This is because the pure event is not a 
singular event, but an event that can be expressed in divergent outcomes. This is why 
Deleuze can claim that the pure event is difference itself The pure event, Deleuze 
tells us, unifies all contraries: "Nothing other than the Events subsist, the Event 
alone, Eventum tantum for all contraries, which communicates with itself through its 
own distance and resonates across all of its disjuncts. " [LS 176] The event is the 
symbol for the whole of time because it does not take place at any determined 
moment; rather, it haunts all moments and times. This is also why Deleuze tells us 
that!, "between the verb as it appears in language and the verb as it subsists in Being, 
we must conceive of an infmitive which is not yet caught up in the play of 
grammatical determinations-an infinitive independent not only of all persons but of 
all time, of every mood and every voice (active, passive, or reflective). " [LS 214] 
The third synthesis of time excludes all persons and all moments of time. It acts, 
instead, as a pure form of time that is not reducible to any ordered chronology. This 
is the truth of the "fractured L" Between the passive and narcissistic ego and the 
superego that presents us with the infinitive verb, there subsists, 
in-between them) the 
intuition of time: "It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: 
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fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the 
passive se that appears in time. " [DR 86] Put simply, the intuition of pure and 
empty time is generated in the tension between contraries found in the phantasm. 
Chronological time is perceived as a succession of chance actualizations that do not 
contradict each other. The pure intuition of time involves the phantasm in an 
essential way: it involves the affimnation of all divergent possibilities in the same 
event. Deleuze calls this the system of the future: "The system of the future, by 
contrast, must be called the divine game, since there is no pre-existing rule... Not 
restrictive or limiting affirmations, but affirmations coextensive with the questions 
posed and with the decisions from which they emanate... " [DR 116] To simplify 
this, there are two modes of the future: one in which we anticipate the wished for 
outcome of events, and the other in which there is no we, no I, and no anticipated 
event but only the phantasy that involves all the possible outcomes at once. It is 
impossible for the subject to make such an affirmation because our will always seeks 
out its preference. Instead, in the phantasy, the future is not considered to be a 
present-to-come, but as an unlimited becoming of the future. Deleuze tells us that 
there is also a future that is not a state -of-affairs to come, but an event that represents 
everything that can happen without any limitation: "But on the other hand, there is 
the future and the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, 
being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, 
neutral, neither general nor particular, eventum tantum... " [LS 15 1] We have seen the 
reality of this "Pure event" that Deleuze speaks of in the form of the phantasm that 
was discovered by Freud. 
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3.1 "Forced movement, " instead 3.3 Perversion sets up a 3.5 Instead of "phylogenesis" 
of repressing pre-genital zones, "metaphysical surface" by the "infinitive verb" becomes 
sublimates them and uses their splitting the ego, one side the nucleus for ý,,, erbal 
energies for creative endeavors. turned to external reality, the representation of pre-genital 
other turned to internal reality. excitations from the Id. It 
"Disavowal" suspends the "pure provides a "sense" for a] I 
event" that is extracted from the actions in a "univocal" manner. 
Id by the superego. 
3.2 "Sublimation" does not go 3.4 The "narcissistic ego" takes 3.6 The infinitive verb is 
far enough in destroying the itself as a loved object and neutral, therefore it can express 
"values" of Oedipus. thereby eliminates its temporal divergent events. It is also the 
"Perversion" goes further in content. It turns to timeless symbol for the whole of time, 
destroying these values and "events" extracted from the Id. simultaneously affirming all 
creating new ones. possible outcomes. 
Chapter 3: The Syntheses of Energetics 
In the second chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze introduces 
Freud's celebrated work called Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. It is in reference 
to this work that Deleuze says, "biophysical life is presented in the form of such an 
intensive field in which differences determinable as excitations, and differences of 
differences determinable as cleared paths, are distributed. " [DR 118] It is reference to 
this work by Freud that haunts the whole section of Difference and Repetition 
starting at page 96 where Deleuze says: "Biopsychical life implies a field of 
individuation... " [DR 96] The field of individuation that Deleuze speaks of is 
nothing other than the system of neurology that Freud presents in his Project. This 
chapter will examine the "field of individuation" in Freud's Project and will relate 
it 
kleuze's own project of passive synthesis. This will take three forms. First, the r to L^ý 
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field of individuation known as the Id will constitute the passive synthesis of habit or 
duration. Second, the synthesis of the Ego will constitute the passive synthesis of 
memory. Third and last, the phantasms of the Superego will constitute the passive 
synthesis of the future. This entire chapter will be about the process of individuation. 
Therefore, it will start with the most basic functions of the nervous system and show 
how they go beyond themselves towards the constitution of the objects of perception. 
This will be a journey from organic basis of the unconscious to the genesis of time 
for consciousness. It will end in a discussion of the transcendental basis for 
consciousness: the object = x. 
a) The Energetics of the Id. 
1.1 In Deleuze's book on Bergson he lists five aspects of subjectivity. He 
identifies the first two as belonging to the "objective" aspect of the subject: "Of the 
five aspects of subjectivity, the first two obviously belong to the objective line, since 
the first confines itself to abstracting from the object, and the second confines itself 
,, 38 to establishing a zone of indetennination. These first two aspects are objective 
because they concern only the passive synthesis of time. That is, they do not enter 
consciousness, nor do they rely on the will and intentionality of a subject. Let us 
consider what they do rely on: 
(1) need-subjectivity, the moment of negation (need makes a hole in the 
continuity of things and holds back everything that interests 
it about the 
object, letting the rest go by); (2) brain-subjectivity, the moment of 
interval or 
of indetermination (the brain gives us the means of "choosing" that which 
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corresponds to our needs in the object; introducing an interval between 
39 
received and executed movement... 
Let us consider the proposition that we evolved from simple organisms. If this is so 
then those simple functions are the first and primary functions of the organism. A 
simple organism reaches out into the world in order to discover an object that will 
nourish it. In order to do this it must be able to (1) distinguish what is food from what 
is not and (2) maintain the perception of the presence of that object long enough to 
assimilate it. If the various stimuli coming from the sensory organs are 
discontinuous, it is because the external world is changing from moment to moment. 
On the side of the organism, in order to identify and confirm the presence of the 
needed object, the data from the senses must be synthesized into a durational schema 
in which the object that is needed can be confirmed to be still there. This is the first 
developmental stage of our nervous system and therefore its most basic function. The 
passive synthesis of time that Deleuze speaks of is a very real process in the 
organism. 
1.2 While rocks just passively sit and erode with time, organisms actively 
maintain their unity by their contractions and their contemplations. Consider a simple 
organ like the eye. It is not designed to gather light and pass it on as information to 
the brain. Rather, in the theories of evolution it gains that function by a series of 
repetitions. These repetitions are determined by the needs of the organism to 
maintain itself The "urgency of life" [DR 78] determines the habits the eye will form 
in forming itself and not an intention to make sight possible. Once again, the 
difference between the rock and the organism is that the organism maintains its unity 
as a growing and evolving thing by contractions of external elements into itself and 
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the concomitant faculty of contemplating those elements that the organism needs. 
Deleuze asks the question: "What organism is not made of elements and cases of 
repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and 
sulphates, thereby intertwining all the habits of which it is composedT [DR 75] 
Some might accuse Deleuze of anthropornorphizing simple organisms by saying that 
they contemplate and contract habits. This is not at all the case. Passive synthesis is 
as old as Aristotle who noticed that all living things maintain a sense of purpose in 
their will to survive. Deleuze is not saying that living things have a will or an aim. He 
is merely pointing out that the mechanical repetitions of organisms, in a sense 
44choose" the way they will respond to stimuli. Unlike a rock that is tossed a number 
of times and always falls the same, an organism can adapt to situations and create a 
difference in the way it will respond. The eye developed as a "seeing" organism 
because of its adaptation to stimuli and the repetition of need of its greater organism. 
In order to hold itself together as a functioning organism it needs to "contemplate" 
the elements in the external world that it needs in order to maintain itself Again, 
rocks do not need to draw in substances to maintain themselves; therefore they do not 
contemplate. Only the organism that has needs to maintain its structure "needs" to 
absorb (and therefore contemplate) the elements its lacks. 
1.3 Freud tells us that pleasure is a state of reduction of tensions in which 
stimulus is reduced as far as possible: "This discharge represents the primary 
function of the nervous system. Here is room for the development of a secondary 
function. For among the paths of discharge those are preferred and retained which 
involve a cessation of the stimulus: flightfirom the stimulus. " [I Freud 296] Let us be 
clear as to what this means: the organism develops a tension (a contraction) 
in 
expectation of a need, and only when this need is met can the tension 
be 
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"discharged" and the organism can lapse into a sense of pleasure. Therefore, 
according to Freud, the organism learns strategies to deal with excess stimulus and 
"leams" to react to the external world by finding the best way to interact with it that 
will, at the same time, limit the tension that it demands on the organism. In this way 
the organism learns to meets its organic needs with the minimum of effort or strain. 
This is an ingenious plan that is motivated by the pleasure principle. But Deleuze 
does not agree with this: "Whether pleasure is itself a contraction or a tension, or 
whether it is always tied to a process of relaxation, is not a well-formed question 
Pleasure is a principle in so far as it is the emotion of a fulfilling contemplation 
which contracts in itself cases of relaxation and contraction. " [DR 741 In essence, 
Deleuze argues that pleasure is the principle that guides organic needs insofar as it 
maintains the organism by fulfilling its unity through time. Deleuze's argument is 
that "habits" of contracting come before the principle of pleasure that is supposed to 
motivate them. In short, this is a "chicken and the egg" question: how could the 
organism form itself in the first place if it did not already have an idea of the 
reduction of tensions in the beginning? Or: if pleasure is the reduction of tensions, 
why did the tension of the unity of the organism form in the first place? If the 
organism seeks "death" why was it ever born? Deleuze's answer is that there is an 
"Eros" of passive synthesis that finds pleasure in its own activity and not in the 
outcome of satisfaction. In short, the organism finds pleasure in whatever maintains 
its existence and, only secondarily, in what satisfies it. Why is this important? The 
search for pleasure concerns the future (in seeking reduction) and the past (in 
returning to a state of relaxation) but not the present. However, if Deleuze is correct, 
then the future and past of the organism is only a secondary effect of its immediate 
concern with maintaining itspresent unity. Therefore, according to Deleuze, the need 
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to "bind" the organism is pleasurable in itself and not as an "intention" to master 
excitations: "Binding synthesis cannot be explained by the intention or the effort to 
master an excitation, even though it may have that effect. " [DR 97] In short, pleasure 
is whatever allows the organism to maintain its larval unities, and unpleasure is that 
which disrupts this unity. An excess of excitation can disrupt and even destroy the 
organism; therefore (as a secondary effect) the organism must work to stave off 
exci ations. 
1.4 Freud, in his work Projectfor a Scientific Psychology, makes a remarkable 
study of the nervous system. In it he postulates the existence of a group of neurons 
that he symbolizes by the figure q/. The V neurons are those neurons that act as a 
sieve: that is, they have "doors" or barriers that can only transmit their signal to the 
next neuron if a degree of quantity of neural energy (Qý) is exceeded. In this way 
they can leave behind "traces" of past perceptions. Freud uses the word "facilitation" 
[Bahnung] to signify the traces left behind in the neural pathways. Now, the 
important thing about these pathways is that they do not maintain an identity of the 
previous perception that passed through. Rather, the effect of retention of past 
perceptions is caused by the pure differences in degrees of permeability between a 
multiplicity of neurons. In Freud's own words: 
If we were to suppose that all the V contact-barriers were equally well 
facilitated, or (what is the same thing) offered equal resistance, then the 
characteristics of memory would evidently not emerge. For, in relation to the 
passage of an excitation, memory is evidently one of the powers which 
determine and direct its pathway, and, if facilitation were everywhere equal, it 
would not be possible to see why one pathway should be preferred. 
We can 
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therefore say still more correctly that memory is represented by the 
differences in thefacilitations between the V neurones. [I Freud 300] 
The "facilitations" preserve past excitations in the form of a chain or a code that is 
the effect of the pure differences between the neurons in the same way that words are 
the effect of differences between letters. If all the "letters" or neurons were the 
"same" then there would be no retention or message to be retained. This difference is 
not ingrained into the neurons in one instant of excitation; but rather, across a whole 
multiplicity of instances: 'Tacilitation depends on the Qý which passes through the 
neuron in the excitatory process on the number of repetitions ofthe process. " [I Freud 
300] The differences become more pronounced and fixated after a great number of 
repetitions of similar excitations. When these "habits" or differences become fixated 
then there is a process called "binding" [Bindung] in which the charge of excitation 
passing through the neurons is trapped in the complex of V nerves. Freud tells us that 
the nervous system stores this energy in these pathways: 
Under the compulsion of the exigencies of life, the nervous system was 
obliged to lay up a store of Qý. This necessitated an increase in the number of 
its neurones and these had to be impermeable. It now avoids, partly at least, 
beingfilledwith Qý (cathexis), by setting upfacilitations. [IFreud 301] 
In short, the neurons themselves "decide" when to discharge their energy by the 
difference between facilitated neurons and un-facilitated neurons. For example: 
suppose the organism is seeking nourishment. In the past it encountered elements that 
lead to the "excitation" of satisfaction of the organic need. These experiences left a 
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trace on the neurons. Now when the organism encounters a similar set of 
circumstances it will "discharge" its energy only when the perception matches the 
pattern laid down in the neurons. It acquires this "habit" by repeating the excitation 
that fits the pattern, and the pattern is reinforced by each repetition. In this way it 
contracts each of the past instances into the present, one thereby forming an extended 
duration. The delay in recognition forms the tension of the organism in its 
expectation, and the facilitation forms the past of the organism by retention. This is 
why Deleuze says: "Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic 
form of expectation. The retained past appears in the form of cellular heredity. " [DR 
73] Because all this takes place on a passive level of the organism none of these 
processes are conscious. For example: when we hear the "tick-tock" of a clock we do 
not actively try to remember past instances when we heard a clock; instead, we 
involuntarily hear the two instances of "tick" and "tock" as a case or a set that we 
intuitively expect to follow one another. This is because "facilitations" in the brain 
laid down pathways that contract these two instances into one-another automatically. 
In this way our whole life is a contraction of habits: each of our habits of movement 
and action act upon the present by contracting chains of cases into an extended 
duration. When Hume tells us that we expect that the sun will rise tomorrow even 
though we have no knowledge of the future, we necessarily expect this by our 
"expectation" that the present pattern of existence will continue. We have seen that 
"facilitations" force us to expect the continuation of patterns by extending the past 
into the future around a continuous present. As Deleuze says of passive synthesis, "it 
constitutes our habit of living, our expectation that 'it' will continue, that one of the 
two elements will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetuation of our 
case. " [DR 74] This "habit" of forming cases gives the present a sense of urgency or 
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tension centered around the always present question: might things not turn out 
differently? The delay that we feel in the present is the persistent "problem" of 
existence: chance. We feel Pleasure when our expectations are fulfilled and a 
duration of tension or "waiting" that opens up the possibility that facilitations might 
not be met. In this way, our conscious experience of duration is based upon a prior 
passive contraction of facilitations in the nervous system. 
1.5 There is a common phenomenon that is encountered by most people when 
reading: one will be reading a phrase and, in the process, misread one of the words in 
the phrase because it was unexpected. This phenomenon can be explained by the 
theory of facilitation. We expect a certain pattern to reality, so that, when an 
unexpected combination arises, our expectation is so strong we will hallucinate the 
expected "case. " This may seem to be an exception, but in fact most of the time we 
hallucinate reality. When we walk into a room that we know well, the arrangement of 
things is hallucinated as being the same as it always was unless there is some 
immediate indication to the contrary. This leads us to the second effect of 
"facilitation": it structures perception into habitual patterns, or, it makes order and 
regularity out of chaos. This is explained as follows: In the V neurons excessive 
amounts of energy are stored up (in the blocked pathways) thereby generating a sense 
of tension. The tension cannot immediately find a means to "discharge" itself in a 
perception, so instead it hallucinates. It does this by sending the accumulated energy 
along the facilitated pathway without a perception. Freud explains this by appealing 
to the sense of urgency that is so strong that it activates a memory as if it were a 
perception: 
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Thus, as a result of the experience of satisfaction, a facilitation comes about 
between two mnemic and the nuclear neurons which are cathected in the state 
of urgency. No doubt, along with the discharge of satisfaction the Q? 7' flows 
out of the mnemic images as well. Now, when the state of urgency or wishing 
re-appears, the cathexis will also pass over onto the two memories and will 
activate them. [IFreud 319] 
Freud calls this a "wishful activation" [I Freud 319] of a mnemic image. It is this 
wishful activation that Freud will also call the "primary process. " The primary 
process, instead of waiting for an actual object to satisfy its need, will instead 
hallucinate that object. Freud tells us that these hallucinations are what cause us to 
dream: "It is an important fact the V primary processes, such as have been 
biologically suppressed in the course of V development, are daily presented to us 
during sleep. " [IFreud 336] However, they are not limited to dreams. In waking life 
these hallucinations fill-out the outlines of reality by supplementing what is 
perceived with what is remembered. For example: when we see the face of someone 
we know, we do not have to re-notice all the details of her face; instead, most of the 
details are hallucinated by the primary processes. This is why we don't always notice 
that someone we know has aged until it becomes too apparent. The fact that our 
perceptions are half reality and half dream show us that there is an interaction 
between real objects and what Deleuze calls "virtual objects. " Deleuze tells us that 
the virtual objects are not integrated into the real object but rather, "it remains 
planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the half which completes 
it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real continues to lack. " [DR 
101] However, if the virtual ob ect goes too far and tries to replace the real object j 
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then a real hallucination is present. Like a man who reaches for a hallucinated 
sandwich, it will lead to the shock of disappointment. Freud tells us as much: I do 
not doubt that in the first instance this wishful activation will produce the same thing 
as a perception-namely a hallucination. If reflex action is thereupon introduced, 
disappointment cannot fail to occur. " [IFreud 319] At the level of the y/ neurons all 
the objects of satisfaction are hallucinated. Deleuze tells us that, in the Id, the larval 
egos that form in the neurons of facilitation do not have real objects as their aim. 
Instead, they tell the brain what would count as a satisfying object. Every "binding" 
of neurons centers around a hallucinatory object: "This is why the satisfaction which 
flows from binding is necessarily a 'hallucinatory' satisfaction of the ego itself, even 
though hallucination here in no way contradicts the effectivity of the binding. " [DR 
97] In short, the binding process in the Id constitutes a "drive" that centers around a 
wished-for object: "Drives are nothing more than bound excitations. " [DR 97] These 
wished for objects are creations of passive synthesis that will later drive the active 
synthesis of the Ego in its search for an equivalent object in reality. 
1.6 Heretofore we have only dealt with external stimuli. However, there is 
another source of stimuli that is processed by the nervous system in a radically 
different way than external stimuli. Freud explains: 
With an increasing complexity of the interior of the organism, the nervous 
system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself--endogenous 
stimuli-which have equally to be discharged. These have their origin in the 
cells of the body and give rise to the major needs: hunger, respiration, 
sexuality. From these the organism cannot withdraw as it does from external 
stimuli; it cannot employ their Q for flight from the stimulus. They only cease 
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subject to particular conditions, which must be realized in the external world. 
[I Freud 2971 
Whereas external stimuli are intermittent, the source of endogenous excitation is 
constant and unavoidable. This raises several important questions for Freud. First if 
the source of excitation is constant then why is it felt only intermittently in moments 
of hunger, lust, or anxiety? Here is the problem: 
We cannot avoid the idea that there is an accumulation; and the intermittent 
character of their psychical effect necessitates the view that on their path of 
conduction to V they come up against resistances which are overcome only 
when there is an increase in quantity. [I Freud 316] 
The cells of the body may lack substances that it needs, but we do not become 
immediately aware of this because most of our internal needs remain unnoticeable 
until they reach a certain threshold. It is this threshold that interests Freud. Freud 
borrows a concept from Fechner: that an intensity will not become perceptible unless 
it reaches a certain threshold, and when it does, it will emerge in a state of confusion 
called "complication. " Here is the quote from Freud: "Thus quantity in (p is expressed 
by complication in v. By this means the Q is held back from yf, within certain limits 
at least. This is very reminiscent of conditions of Fechner's law, which might in this 
way be localized. " [lFreud 315] In philosophy this concept of complication has a 
long history, which I will not go into here, except to point out the Leibnizian idea of 
the sound of a wave. According to Leibniz the sound of the wave is made up of ali 
the little sounds of each drop of water. According to Deleuze, this is the admission 
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from Freud that the unconscious is differential: "The unconscious is differential., 
involving little perceptions, and as such it is different in kind from consciousness. " 
[DR 108] Freud pays "homage to the Leibnizian Fechner" [DR 1081 because the 
somatic sources of drives are pulsations from all the little cells of the body that are 
summed up in the pathways of the nervous system. Here is how: excitation builds up 
in the nervous system, thereby flooding all the pathways of the V neurons until one of 
the contact-barriers is permeated and the excitation is discharged. To put it simply, 
endogenous excitation looks for the point of least resistance in the nervous system. 
Freud tell us this in the following quote: 
Above a certain Q, however, they (the endogenous excitations) act as a 
stimulus continuously, and every increase of Q is perceived as an increase of 
the y/ stimulus. It follows, therefore, that there is a state in which the path of 
conduction has become permeable. Experience shows, further, that, after the 
V stimulus has been discharged, the path of conduction resumes its resistance 
once more. [IFreud 316] 
Like a balloon bursting, all of the previous buildup of energy is released through the 
pathway that is most permeable, and therefore, the mnemic image that 
is invested in 
that pathway is activated. If a virtual or partial object is activated by this 
discharge of 
energy it is because the mnemic image is the summation of the excitations that make 
up the image. This is why Deleuze tells us: "Partial objects are the elements of 
little 
perceptions. " [DR 108] When the mnemic pathway 
is permeated the instinctual 
energy becomes invested in that image. This process 
is called summation: "A process 
of this kind is termed summation. 
" [I Freud 316] This summation of excitation and its 
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investment in an image gives the psyche an aim or a will. Freud recognizes that this 
is the impulsion that drives the psyche to act: "Here V is at the mercy of Q, and it is 
thus that in the interior of the system there arises the impulsion which sustains all 
psychical activity. We know this power as the will-the derivative of the instincts. - 
[IFreud 317] Let us set up a simple example of this process: The cells of an infant's 
body send signals to the brain. These signals are summed up and invested in the 
mnemic image of the breast. Then the sensation of hunger becomes associated with 
the partial object, and the infant experiences the instinct to breast-feed. This instinct 
will haunt the psyche until a specific action is carried out in reality that will satisfy 
the organism and bring the levels of endogenous excitation down to a level where it 
will no longer permeate the mnemic pathways. Freud sees this as the natural 
conclusion or aim of the instinct: 
The removal of the stimulus is only made possible here by an intervention 
which for the time being gets rid of the release of Qý in the interior of the 
body; and this intervention calls for an alteration in the external world (supply 
of nourishment, proximity of the sexual object) which, as a specific action, 
can only be brought about in definite ways. [I Freud 317-318] 
Here we see the life-instincts (Eros) in action. The organism maintains its unity by 
incorporating those elements that it needs by the process of summation and 
instinctual drives. However, there is a problem with this. With the life instincts there 
is also a death instinct that operates by the same process. We have seen that, in 
summation, the endogenous excitations seek out the pathway that is most permeable 
and that it invests that mnemic image with its excitation. But what if the "most 
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permeable" pathway is connected with a painful mnemic image? Freud recognizes 
that the irruption of pain can cause permanent facilitations in the V neurons: 
We see in this a manifestation of the primary trend against a rising of Qý 
tension, and we infer that pain consists in the irruption of large Qs into V. 
The two trends are in that case a single one. Pain sets the (p as well as the yf 
system in motion, there is no obstacle to its conduction, it is the most 
imperative of all processes. Thus the y/ neurons seem permeable to it; it 
therefore consists in the action of Qs of a comparatively high order. [I Freud 
307] 
Let us consider the kind of pain that we are talking about. The excitations coming 
from the external world through ýp neurons have a shield that prevents the over 
excitation of the y/ neurons. However, the pain coming from the inside of the body, 
namely emotional pain, does not have this mechanism. This is why when Freud 
speaks of trauma it is usually associated with an excessive sexual excitation. Even 
the trauma of war that he investigated is invested with the endogenous excitations of 
the libido and not the external excitations of the real world. This means that all 
traumas are libidinal events and not events in the real world. As we have seen above, 
the instinct invests an image that is then enacted in the external world. This is no 
different for the death instinct than it is for the life instincts. The repetition 
compulsion is the means by which the internal excitation is relieved by taking a 
specific action in the real world. Painful actions are repeated because the mnemic 
image is only satisfied by a return of the same action. This raises the following 
question: If painful facilitations are stronger (more permeable) than pleasurable 
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facilitations, then why are not all our instincts death instincts? This question can only 
be answered by the mechanism of repression. Freud sums up the basic function of 
repression as follows: "The wishful state results in a positive attraction towards the 
object wished-for, or, more precisely, towards its mnemic image; the experience of 
pain leads to a repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image 
cathected. " [I Freud 322] In order to keep all of the repetitions inspired by instincts 
from being painful ones it is necessary that the pathways that are painful be drained 
of their excitation. In the next section we will see that it is the function of the Ego to 
affect this repression. 
1.1 There are completely 1.3 The "habit" of maintaining 1.5 "Facilitations" that 
passive or involuntary processes unity in the present comes spontaneously activate invade 
that select objects and maintain before the pleasure principle perception and fill-out the 
their presence in attention. that concerns the immediate outlines. Virtual objects seek to 
past and future. manifest themselves in 
perception in this way. 
1.2 Unlike inorganic matter, 1.4 Retention of habit is due to 1.6 Endogenous excitations 
organisms can develop creative coded differences in permeable exert a constant pressure on the 
responses to stimuli. Difference neurons. Duration is psyche that is only felt at a 
is drawn from repetitions called "contracted" between organic "threshold. " This summation of 
"contemplation. " need and cellular coding. excitation is called "instinct. " 
Painful facilitations (death 
instinct) are repressed by the 
Ego. 
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b) The Energetics of the Ego. 
2.1 First, it is important that the Ego be distinguished from consciousness. The 
ego is not the self. The Ego, as we speak of it here, is a bundle of neurons that effects 
a change in the direction of investment in the psyche. Therefore it is better to think of 
the Ego in terms of Freud's other name for it: side-cathexis. Freud tells us that the 
function of side-cathexis is to inhibit the flow of endogenous excitation in the neural 
system: "A side-cathexis thus acts as an inhibition ofthe course ofQý. " [I Freud 323] 
Why is this inhibition so important? We have seen that, in primary processes, energy 
naturally flows from one mnemic image to another without impediment. In dreams 
we experience the hyper-associational connection of mnemic images. It is also in 
dreams that we are most likely to encounter a traumatic repetition of painful images. 
This is because the fteely flowing energy of the instinct naturally invests itself in the 
most permeable pathways. Those pathways are always the most painful. In waking 
life these pathways are avoided because of the side-cathexis of the Ego that prevents 
these images from being activated. Freud tells us how the side-cathexis can inhibit 
these hostile mnemic images: 
Inhibition of this kind is, however, a decided advantage to q/. Let us suppose 
that a is a hostile mnemic image and ba key-neuron to unpleasure. Then, if a 
is awakened, primary unpleasure would be released, which would then 
perhaps be pointless and is so in any case if released to its full amount. With 
an inhibitory action from a the release of unpleasure will turn out very slight 
and the nervous system will be spared the development and discharge of 
without any damage. [I Freud 324] 
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The following illustration of this process may be helpful in visualizing this: suppose 
that Q energy flows from point a to point b where "b" is a hostile mnemic image. 
Now, if between point a and point b another pathway is interjected that will "draw 
off'the energy flowing from one point to the other, then the energy reaching point b 
will be far less than it would have been if there was no side-pathway between them . 
The energy that is drawn off from the circuit of neurons is stored in the side-cathexis 
in the same way as a transistor "traps" energy into an endless loop. It is as if the 
newly cathected. Ego acts as a battery that takes up energy that would be used by 
primary processes and redirects its aim. Freud describes this: 
This organization is called the 'ego'. It can easily be depicted if we consider 
the regularly repeated reception of endogenous Qý in certain neurons (of the 
nucleus) and the facilitating effect proceeding thence will produce a group of 
neurons which is constantly cathected and thus corresponds to the vehicle of 
the store required by the secondary function. [I Freud 323 ] 
What is highly significant about this storage of energy is that it, in turn, powers the 
neural system to send out signals to the muscular system to effect "real" actions upon 
the envirom-nent. It is this re-direction of instinctual aims towards the real world that 
Freud calls secondary processes. This enacts the dynamic between the two mutually 
exclusive functions of the nervous system: primary and secondary processes. The 
Ego is that mechanism that inhibits the first in favor of the second as Freud clearly 
states: "Therefore, if an ego exists, it must inhibit psychical primary processes. 
" 
120 
[IFreud 324] The Ego is, as we shall see, not consciousness but that which makes 
consciousness possible. 
2.2 The second step in this process is the 'lest of reality. " Before we can say what 
the test of reality is we must first say what it is not. First, Deleuze tells us: "It would 
be completely wrong to consider the positing of reality to be an effect induced by the 
external world... " [DR 98] This would assume that there is an object already in the 
world that has a stable identity and that the psyche merely has to take cognizance of 
this thing. To assume this would be to neglect the dictum that the external world is 
nothing to the psyche other than sensation and energy. Many psychologists have 
postulated the "mother" as the first whole-object for the infant. However, they 
assume the pre-establishment of a "reality" of the mother in the actual body of the 
mother. If this were the case the test of reality would not "create" the reality of the 
object but only discover it. Second, Deleuze tells us that it is wrong to see the 
positing of reality as, "the result of failures encountered by passive syntheses. " [DR 
98] Freud tells us that primary process (passive synthesis) introduces hallucinations 
in response to organic needs but when these hallucinations fail to satisfy the organic 
need, "disappointment cannot fail to occur. " [lFreud 319] For example, if I dream 
that I am eating a sandwich this dream cannot satisfy my hunger; therefore I will 
realize that I am dreaming, I will wake up and then I will actually eat a sandwich. 
This is a powerful argument. However, the unity of the object of satisfaction cannot 
be wholly explained by biological need. The failure of primary process determines 
the need for specific action but not for the nature of the thing acted upon. Third, 
Deleuze tells us that the test of reality does not take the form of "a negative 
judgement" [DR 98] or an existential judgment. Freud says of this form ofjudgment: 
"It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it 
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asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality. " [I lFreud 4391 
Judgment only applies to the empirical existence of the thing. However, as we will 
see later, the Freudian thing is not identical to the empirical object that we find in 
perception. In short, negation only applies to attributes, and the Freudian thing is not 
an attribute but a substantive. Fourth, Deleuze tells us: "It would be wrong to 
suppose that the reality principle is opposed to the pleasure principle, limiting it and 
imposing renunciations upon it. " [DR 98] In the above example of the dream of the 
sandwich, there was not so much a renunciation of the pleasure of dreaming the 
sandwich as a delay in the pleasure until specific action could be taken to eat a 
sandwich in reality. In primary process (dreams) the satisfaction or pleasure is 
"immediate" whereas in the active synthesis of reality the pleasure is delayed or 
anticipated in the future. The pleasure-principle is not "renounced" but extended 
according to Deleuze: "The renunciations of immediate pleasure are already implicit 
in the role of principle which pleasure assumes, in the role that the idea of pleasure 
assumes in relation to a past and a future. " [DR 98-99] Pleasure is delayed so that it 
can be resolved in a systematic manner or global manner rather than a partial and 
fragmentary manner. This leads us to the positive defmition of reality-testing for 
Deleuze. Deleuze tells us that, "the test of reality mobilises, drives and inspires all 
the activity of the ego... in moving beyond the binding in the direction of a 
6 substantive' which serves as a support for the connection. " [DR 98] By reading 
Freud carefully we find out that the test of reality is not a perception of the empirical 
object but rather the indication that a specific action has taken place. Freud calls this 
indication a discharge: 
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It is probably the (o neurons which furnish this indication: the indication of 
reality. In the case of every external perception a qualitative excitation occurs 
in oj, which in the first instance, however, has no significance for V. It must 
be added that the oj excitation leads to a) discharge, and the information of 
this, as of every discharge, reaches y/. The information of the dischargefrom 
(o is thus the indication ofquality of realityfor y/. [I Freud 32 5] 
This corresponds to what Deleuze has to say about recognized objects: "An object is 
recognized, however, when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or 
rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a 
form of identity in the object. " [DR 133] This means that there is no pre-existing 
.J- identity in the object and that the unity of the object is produced by an indication of 
"discharge" coming from each of the faculties. For example: if I see an apple and 
reach out to grab it and eat it, but when I touch the image there is no indication of 
pressure on the hands, then there is no indication of reality in the psyche, and the 
object is a hallucination. However, if I feel the apple and taste it, and the organism 
registers the satisfaction of hunger then there is a discharge. In short, we are 
conscious of the "object-like" nature of the thing by neural-feedback from the senses 
that follows a coherent pattern that can be logically comprehended by consciousness. 
However, the "intentionality" that we have towards the object is within the psyche 
itself; that is, both the "object" and its thing-like nature are products of an indication 
of "discharge" and not a pre-established unity in the "real" object itself 
2.3 We have just seen what an indication of reality is. Now we must carefully 
consider what the Freudian thing is. Deleuze makes an ingenious connection between 
the Freudian thing and Kant's conception of the object-in-general (or object = x). 
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First, let us consider how Freud uses the term "thing. " In the following quote Freud 
exposes his conception of a thing by using the example of a fellow human being: 
Thus the complex of the fellow human-being falls into two components, of 
which one makes an impression by its constant structure and stays together as 
a thing, while the other can be understood by the activity of memory-that is, 
can be traced back to information from the subject's own body. [I Freud 331] 
What we can derive from this quote is as follows: the thing is the structure of a 
substantive that is without attributes, while the attributes are the means by which we 
understand the object through mnemic traces in the psyche. For example, the 
attribute of "screaming" is determined in the fellow human being by memories of 
one9s own screaming: "Other perceptions of the object too-if, for instance, he 
screams-will awaken the memory of his (the subject's) own screaming and at the 
same time of his own experiences of pain. " [I Freud 331] The attributes of the object 
are based upon the sympathy value they have with our own body. However, the thing 
like nature of the object is not immediately reducible to our own memories. Rather, it 
is the locus or structure that brings these attributes together in one-and-the-same 
external object. Here is the most important aspect of the Freudian thing: whereas we 
encounter only the attributes of things in consciousness we never encounter the thing 
in itself as a structure in our perceptions. Therefore, the Freudian thing has a 
"transcendental" relation to consciousness. Here is where the similarity to Kant's 
conception of the transcendental idea becomes evident. First, let us consider what 
Deleuze has to say about this object = x: 
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The double series of the conditioned, that is, of the empirical consciousness 
and its objects, must therefore be founded on an originary instance which 
retains the pure form of objectivity (object =- x) and the pure form of 
consciousness, and that which constitutes the former on the basis of the latter. 
[LS 1051 
This "double series" is divided into an empirical half, that is the collection of 
attributes that we perceive, and a transcendental half, that is the structure of the 
object that stays together as a thing through all the changes in attributes. But what is 
this structure of the thing itselP It is completely indeterminate insofar as 
consciousness is concerned because it has no means tojudge the thing itself. Freud 
tells us that judgment "affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular 
attribute... " [I I Freud 439] If a thing-in-itself cannot be judged in consciousness it is 
because it is completely positive. According to Deleuze: "Kant shows how the idea 
of a sum total of all possibility excludes all but 'originary' predicates and in this way 
constitutes the completely determined concept of an individual Being... " [LS 345] 
This means that the thing in-itself or object =x contains all possible attributes 
because the activity ofjudgment has not yet deducted anything from it. And because 
it contains all the divergent and contradictory attributes it cannot be brought into 
consciousness. Like pure light that contains, intermixed, all the colors of the rainbow, 
it cannot be distinguished. This strange proposition about the content of perceptions 
comes directly from the Critique ofPure Reason: 
This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing in itself, 
regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an ens realissimum 
125 
is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that 
predicate of all possible contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs 
to being. It is therefore a transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the 
complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest material 
condition of its possibility-a condition on which must rest the cognition of 
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all objects with respect to their content . 
This means that the basis of the "content" of perception is radically different from the 
"attributes" of the perceived thing. So, when Deleuze uses the term "object = x" he is 
referring to this transcendental idea of a thing in-itself It is imperative that we 
maintain the radical difference between the transcendental thing and its empirical 
counterpart. According to Deleuze: "The error of all efforts to determine the 
transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image 
of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground. " [LS 105] This can 
easily be done if we pay heed to Kant's dictum that the faculty of reason provides the 
unity of a "thing" to perception: 
Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, 
not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience 
but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the 
understanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to collect into an 
absolute whole all the acts of the understanding. 
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The result of this remarkable discovery is that, for Kant, the external world is the 
product of a function of reason and not a natural unity of objects themselves. if we 
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refer back to Freud we will also see this insight at work. He tells us that the 
indication of quality (which is actually an indication of unity) makes us distinguish 
between memory and perception: 
For the difference is that the indication ofquality follows, if it comes from the 
outside, whatever the intensity of the cathexis, if it comes from V/, it does so 
only when there are large intensities. It is accordingly inhibition by the ego 
which makes possible a criterion for distinguishing between perception and 
memory. [IFreud 326] 
Along the lines of a primary and a secondary process there is also a split between the 
subjective world of mnemic images and perceptions. In short, there is a distinction 
between the internal world of thought (memory) and the external world of 
perceptions. This contrast has a remarkable effect on the psyche: at the same time 
that the external world becomes unified, so too does the internal world. Kant makes 
this distinction clear: 
I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other 
things external to me-among which my body also is reckoned. This is also 
an analytical proposition, for other things are exactly those which I think as 
different or distinguished from mysel 1 
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We have seen that, in the work of Freud, the Ego becomes unified by suppressing the 
primary process and directing its "attention" towards the real object. Because of this 
the Ego is not identical to consciousness; rather, the psyche becomes conscious 
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because the Ego affects a split between the internal and external world. In short, the 
think" of consciousness becomes possible because of the transcendental unity 
conferred upon the "external" object by the faculty of reason. Whereas thoughts are 
"predicates" of perceptions, the objects are the means by which these predicates are 
unified for the ego by being connected by the structure of objectivity. The "effect" of 
unity in the external object has a reflective "effect" upon consciousness: that of 
imposing unity upon the "I" that thinks: "By this 1, or He, or It, who or which thinks, 
nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is 
cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart 
from these, we cannot form the least conception. -A3 Next we will see that these two 
poles of "unity" produce a reciprocal effect upon each other. 
2.4 Along with the split between the "I" that does nothing but think and the 
"object" that does nothing but maintain a unity for predicates, there is, in the work of 
Freud, a corresponding split in the Ego itself In the following quote Freud describes 
this split: 
Just as the pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, 
and avoid unpleasure, so the reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is 
useful and guard itself against damage. [I I Freud 40-41 ] 
One Ego strives to unify the object of wishes and the other Ego strives to unify the 
object ofperceptions. Once again Deleuze finds a correspondence between Freud and 
Kant in the split between these two Egos: 
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Drives, which are defined only as bound excitation, now appear in 
differentiated form: as self-preservative drives following the active line of 
reality, as sexual drives in this new passive extension. If the first passive 
synthesis constitutes an 'aesthetic', the second may properly be defined as the 
equivalent of an 'analytic'. [DR 1091 
The extended passive synthesis concerns only the present; as such, it involves the 
synthesis of sensations that Kant referred to as "aesthetic. " However, the second 
extension of passive synthesis concerns the past and, in Deleuze's sense of the term, 
these fragments of the "pure past" must be equivalent to an a priori conception 
similar to what Kant called the "transcendental analytic. " This will become clear 
when we examine the relationship between what Freud calls "perceptual-identity" 
and "thought-identity. " In The Interpretation ofDreams Freud makes a distinction of 
two types or aims of thought: one that seeks to build up an image of a satisfying 
object in memory and the other that seeks to link this first image with an image that 
will satisfy this first image in perception. The first (perceptual-identity) is what 
Deleuze calls a "synthesis of reproduction" [DR 98] and the second (thought- 
identity) he calls a "synthesis of recognition. " [DR 98] The first synthesis is called 
"reproduction" because it reproduces an image of a satisfying object in memory. For 
example, the child who sucks its thumb reproduces a memory of a past satisfaction 
and attaches it to the present autoerotic activity of the imagination. This "perceptual- 
identity" becomes the a priori image that constitutes a region of the transcendental 
analytic. The virtual object is like a pure conception of the understanding in Kant 
insofar as they are predicates of possible judgments. Kant tells us that these a priori 
conceptions relate to undetermined objects: "But conceptions, as predicates of 
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possible judgments, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object. , 44 
For Deleuze these a priori conceptions belong to the past; not a past of "past 
perceptions" because then the conceptions would not be "analytic, " but rather, an 
auto-erotic "virtual" past. The second synthesis is called "recognition" because it 
links the a priori conception of a "perceptual-identity" or virtual object to an object 
in the present. If we were to examine this relationship in Freudian economic terms 
we could say the "binding" stabilizes the virtual object (perceptual- identity) and 
relates it to an external aim in reality by the inhibition of the Ego. Freud describes 
this transition from perceptual- identity to thought identity: 
The primary process endeavors to bring about a discharge of excitation in 
order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus accumulated, it may 
establish a 'perceptual identity' with the experience of satisfaction. The 
secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on 
another in its place - the establishment of a 'thought identity' with that 
experience. All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory 
of a satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an 
identical cathexis of the same memory which it is hoped to attain once more 
through an intermediate stage of motor experiences. 45 
The connection between the two is best expressed by the phrase: "when dreams come 
true. " Essentially the synthesis of recognition is the correspondence between an 
actual event and those of our dreams (primary processes). How is this accomplished? 
Freud tells us that the essential difference between the identity of primary process 
and secondary process is the difference in intensity of those ideas. When a wished- 
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for idea in perceptual- identity has some of its intensity "discharged" then its image 
becomes a thought-identity. Freud tells us: "Thinking must concern itself with the 
connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the intensities of those 
, 46 ideas. The virtual objects in primary process are so closely interlinked with other 
virtual objects that they are not distinguishable. However, when an image is selected 
from the series of virtual objects it becomes attached to an actual object and clearly 
distinguished from all the other images. According to Freud this is the main 
difference between primary and secondary process: 
But it is obvious that condensation of ideas, as well as intermediate and 
compromise structures, must obstruct the attainment of identity aimed at. 
Since they substitute one idea for another, they cause a deviation from the 
path which would have led on from the first idea. Processes of this kind are 
therefore scrupulously avoided in secondary thinking. 47 
When an idea is extracted from "the condensation of ideas" it appears in a less 
intense form of an actualized or recognized idea in perception. In short, the idea 
passes from the attributes that circulate in pleasure-ego to a definite attribute 
conferred onto a "substantive" object by the reality-ego. Or, to put it simply, an 
attribute that previously appeared only in thought is now found in a real perception. 
When this happens something remarkable occurs: the reality-ego is able to "think" 
attributes in terms of their connection in things rather than just in fragmentary part 
objects. This means that memory gains a second power that it did not have before: it 
can now recognize objects as persisting through time. This function fulfills the aim of 
reality-testing. Freud tell us that the airn of this reality-testing is to establish an object 
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that can persist in time: "The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, 
not tofind an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to 
refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there. " [I I Freud 440] This 
form of memory is radically different than the habit-memory that we found in the 
first synthesis of time. For the first time memory is extended to objects themselves 
rather than just to their attributes (or partial objects) as they were in the first passive 
synthesis. For the first time the reflective memory recognizes objects as the same 
through time because of the "object = x" that mediates between them. As we saw 
above, the object =x has no deteryninate predicates (or all predicates), therefore it 
has no discemable place in time. If I may use an analogy: it is like the word "it" that 
has no predicates and can take on all possible predicates. As such, this "it" can both 
exist in the past as an "it was" and in the present as an "it is. " As such, it can both be 
present and past at the same time. Deleuze tells us that this object =x is that which 
constantly circulates between the past and the present and makes recognition between 
two series possibie: 
Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two 
coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object 
(object = x). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in 
relation to itself, that it determines transformations of terms and modifications 
of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and 
therefore between the two presents. [DR 105] 
Both the real object and the virtual object are the support for connection. It is this 
"object = x" that is both the real object and the virtual object at the same time. Not a 
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"perceived" real object or a "remembered" virtual object, but a transcendental unity 
of the present and a transcendental unity of the past. For example: in the work of 
Proust the name of the place "Combray" is not the real place that it names, nor is it a 
place that one can remember; rather, it is the transcendental unity of a pure past. To 
put it simply, Combray is the pure -it" that can refer both to a totality of perception 
in the present and a totality of memory in the past. This is why Deleuze says of 
Combray: "And if the two series succeed one another, they nevertheless coexist in 
relation to Combray in itself as an object =x that causes them to resonate. " [DR 122] 
My analogy of the word "it" is confirmed by Deleuze in his use of the "there is" that 
remains indeterminate: "There is no doubt that there is an identity belonging to the 
precursor, and a resemblance between the series which it causes to communicate. 
This 'there is', however, remains perfectly indeterminate. " [DR 119] The object =x 
is a "floating signifier" that is, "in itself void of sense and thus susceptible of taking 
on any sense... " [LS 50] and thus it can appear both in the series of real objects in 
the present and in the series of virtual objects in the past without contradiction. In 
short, the Kantian transcendental idea provides the link between memory and 
perception and supports the synthesis of recognition. 
2.5 In philosophy the phenomenon of "intentionality" is often taken for granted. 
It is assumed that the subject, self, or ego "naturally" projects itself towards objects 
in the world as its aim. To the merit of Freud he does not simply state that the Ego 
seeks out object-cathexis. He also explains the process by which this happens. Freud 
begins his investigation into the nature of judgment (intentionality) from the 
standpoint of the difference between dream states and waking states. fn dream states 
(primary process) images are chaotic; that is, many contradictory predicates connect 
that could not co-exist in a waking state. Further, there is no set place or time in 
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dreams: one moment is not clearly distinguishable from another. One place is 
confused with another. What dream phenomena shows is that there is a lack of 
judgment in dreams. Judgment belongs to the waking state that Freud calls 
"secondary process. " Freud explains the difference between these two states in 
economic terms: 
Thusiudging is aV process which is only made possible by inhibition by the 
ego and is evoked by the dissimilarity between the wishful cathexis of a 
memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to it. It can be inferred from 
this that coincidence between the two cathexes becomes the biological signal 
for ending the act of thought and for allowing discharge to begin. [I Freud 
328] 
We have seen that in the neural system, according to Freud, mnemic traces in the 
form of "pathways" are activated by freely flowing energy that activates a 
multiplicity of contradictory images. What the Ego (side-cathexis) does is to "bind" 
this freely flowing energy so that a perceptual signal can be distinguished from a 
wishful signal. In effect, this form ofjudgment is derived from "negation. " Now, let 
us examine what Freud has to say about negation. First, negation is not the "will" of 
a subject but the effect of two types of instinct: 
The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the opposition of two 
groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation - as a 
substitute for uniting - belongs to Eros; negation - the successor to expulsion 
- belongs to the instinct of destruction. [I I Freud 441 ] 
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Second, negation frees the psyche from the pressure of repression and from a strict 
compulsion from the pleasure principle: 
But the performance of the function of judgment is not made possible until 
the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with the first 
measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and with it, from the 
compulsion of the pleasure principle. [I I Freud 44 1] 
Repression, as we have seen, is the effect of side-cathexis: the energy flowing 
between memory neurons is inhibited so that painful memories are not activated. 
Painful memories, according to Freud, leave behind permanent "facilitations" (a 
crack) and if left unimpeded, this crack in the neural system will cause a repetition 
compulsion that Freud associates with the death instinct. Now, the process of 
"binding" is the solution to this problem: how to avoid the devastating effects of 
destructive quantities of energy from destroying the nervous system? Freud's answer 
is what he calls the "fusion" of the instincts: "The libido has the task of making the 
destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task by diverting that instinct to a 
great extent outwards... towards objects in the external world. " [I I Freud 4 18] This is 
the beginning of "intentionality" or object-cathexis. The nervous system "binds" the 
excess energy from traumatic mnemic, pathways and this energy is then diverted 
towards objects. In fact, as Freud explains, the strength of the ego to bind excitations 
comes from the unpleasant amplitude of neural energy (Thanatos): 
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Indeed, if we suppose that the original Q1 release of unpleasure is taken up by 
the ego itself, we shall have in it itself the source of the expenditure which is 
required by the inhibiting side-cathexis from the ego. In that case, the 
stronger the unpleasure, the stronger the primary defense. [I Freud 324] 
In this way the destructive potential of excessive excitations in the neural system is 
diverted to help in the unification of side-cathexis. In short, the destructive instinct is 
placed at the service of the constructive instinct (Eros). Now, we have seen that pure 
Eros at work in the primary process that seeks to bring together all the contradictory 
mnemic images at once. The difference that side-cathexis makes to this process is as 
follows: the ego makes use of "destructive energy" to negate some of the 
contradictory images so that a stable and coherent image is produced. This "image" 
is then tested against "reality" and if the feedback loop of signals in the muscular 
system confirm this image it becomes the "intended" object. This would not be 
possible without two things happening first: the "destructive energy"' must be used 
against the system's natural tendency to move towards immediate satisfaction in a 
hallucinated image, thereby delaying the effect of the pleasure principle and the 
"destructive energy" must be turned towards the part of the nervous system that 
controls muscular discharge so that this energy is diverted towards the instinctfOr 
mastery. Instead of repressing the destructive instincts, they are sublimated andjused 
with the life instincts (Eros). "Intentionality" is the effect of this fusion of instincts 
and their sublimation. Now that we have determined the nature of intentionality we 
can return to Deleuze's conceptions of the object =x and the transcendental field 
with a greater sense of clarity. In The Logic of Sense Deleuze criticizes Sartre's 
notion of the transcendental field because it stops at consciousness: 
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This field can not be determined as that of a consciousness. Despite Sartre's 
attempt, we cannot retain consciousness as a milieu while at the same time we 
object to the form of the person and the point of view of individuation. [LS 
102] 
The argument that Sartre puts forth, reproduced here in an extremely simplified 
manner, is as follows: when we are engaged in action in the world, such as chasing a 
tram, we are not reflecting on the "I" that is engaged in this action. Only the pure 
field of intentionality appears without the self-consciousness of the person engaged in 
the action. Deleuze's criticism of this is that, while it eliminates the "I" from the field 
of consciousness, it still maintains consciousness as a ground of individuation of the 
world. Deleuze objects that, "even if we define this impersonal consciousness by 
means of pure intentional ities and retentions, [they] still presuppose centers of 
individuation. " [LS105] There is still the problem of the object =x or the 
undetermined object- in -general that cannot be grounded by consciousness itself 
because an object without pre&cates never appears in consciousness. To understand 
the nature of the object =x Deleuze turns to Leibniz's theory of incompossible 
worlds. Leibniz has a strange theory about incompossible worlds in which the same 
person in one world would exist in another world with different predicates. This 
means that there must be a "vague" object that is the same in each world despite 
some or all of the predicates that define him may be different. According to Deleuze: 
"There is thus a 'vague Adam, ' that is, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam =x common 
to several worlds, just as there is a Sextus =x or a Fang = x. In the end, there is 
something =x common to all worlds. " [LS H 4-115] The striking thing about these 
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"vague" objects is that they are indeterminate. They possess all possible predicates 
across all the possible worlds andyet remain the same object in each world. When 
this indeterminate object becomes individualized in only one world it becomes fixed 
to a set of predicates that define it for consciousness. This use of Leibniz is not so 
strange as it might seem. Of course the theory of possible worlds is metaphysical 
speculation, but if we return to Freud's theory of the unconscious we encounter 
something that is based upon observation. In dreams the object =x can take on 
incompossible predicates! I can dream of a man that is also a woman at the same time 
or someone who is both dead and alive at the same time. It is the test-of-reality that 
determines the object =x with fixated predicates only upon awakening. 
Individualization takes place only in conscious states but the object =x transcends 
consciousness. In dreams we encounter what Deleuze calls "singularities" that are not 
attached to any individuated whole-object. Instead of consciousness being the ground 
for individuation, the unconscious primary processes, as emissions of singularities, 
are the pre-conditions for individuation. According to Deleuze: "What is neither 
individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they 
occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto- 
unification through a nomadic distribution, radically distinct from fixed and 
sedentary distributions as conditions of the synthesis of consciousness. " [LS 102] 
The synthesis of consciousness that Deleuze speaks of here is due to the side-cathexis 
of the Ego that negates incompossible predicates from the object =x and stabilizes 
the perception of the object. Therefore, the objects that we perceive are individuated 
by negations, not of the reflective understanding, but by the unconscious process of 
inhibition of libidinal energy. 
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2.6 At the heart of "prim ary-process" is something that Deleuze calls "essence. " 
At the heart of "secondary-process" is what Deleuze calls the "object = x. " To prove 
this first point we need go no further than to look at the revealing comment that 
Deleuze makes in Proust and Signs: "Nonetheless, if we look for something in life 
that corresponds to the situation of the original essences, we shall not find it in this or 
that character, but rather in a certain profound state. This state of steep. " [PS 45] In 
the state of sleep we fmd the free play of "predicates" or "singularities" without 
definite ob ects. They subsist in a "complicated" state that Freud calls j 
"condensation. " According to Freud: "The construction of collective and composite 
figures is one of the chief methods by which condensation operates in dreams. "48 In 
short, in dreams there is no respect of person, place or thing. Qualities that would, in 
waking consciousness, be separated into different people or things, are in dreams 
confused in such a way that they do not cohere to an object. It is this state of affairs 
that both Deleuze and Proust call a "qualitative difference. " [PS 41 ] Because 
qualities belong to this state of complication in the psyche they are not objective, and 
yet they are not reducible to the subject. As Deleuze tells us: "It is not reducible to a 
psychological state, nor to a psychological subjectivity, nor even to some form of 
higher subjectivity. " [PS 43] These "qualities" are signs that operate between the 
psyche and the world. This can be seen in the work of Freud when he speaks of the 
effects that primary processes have on the mnemic images and the "sympathy-value" 
and "imitation-value" that they provoke: 
While one is perceiving the perception, one copies the movement oneself- 
that is, one innervates so strongly the motor image of one's own which is 
aroused towards coinciding with the perception, that the movement is carried 
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out. Hence one can speak of a perception having an imitation-value. Or the 
perception may arouse the mnemic image of a sensation of pain of one's own, 
so that one feels the corresponding unpleasure and repeats the appropriate 
defensive movement. Here we have the sympathy-value of a perception. In 
these two cases we must no doubt see the primary process in respect of 
judging, and we may assume that all secondary judging has come about 
through a mitigation of these purely associative processes. [IFreud333-334] 
For example: if we see someone cut by a knife in the arm we may feel a cringe of 
pain and may spontaneously grab our own arm. This is because wefeel the quality as 
a sign that operates between the psyche and the perception in the world. However, in 
dreams we encounter these signs detached from any external object and we react to 
them as if they were real. These signs are "predicates" or "singularities". In 
Deleuze's sense of the term a quality like "to be cut" is like a "motor image" insofar 
as it is neither in the object nor in the subject but describes the manner in which the 
world is individuated at that moment. We have just seen how qualities subsist in a 
complicated state in primary processes. Now we must determine how these qualities 
are explicated in objects. In secondary-processes the psyche turns its attention 
outwards and posits an object that is both real and the airn of its actions. As we have 
seen, it then selects predicates for this object based upon images found in wishful- 
cathexis (perceptual-identity). It is in this process that we find the object =x that 
serves as an objective support for the connection of qualities or singularities. To put it 
simply, the psyche looks for those attributes in the object that will fulfill its needs. 
First, this means that the psyche will seek to recognize attributes in the object that 
will link it to mnemic images. In short, what we perceive in the object is only the 
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signs or attributes that fulfill the expectations of wishful-cathexis. Freud 
distinguishes between the transcendental thing and the perceptual qualities in the 
object: 
As a consequence, the perceptual complexes are divided into a constant, non- 
understood, part-the thing-and a changing, understandable, one-the 
attribute or movement of the thing. Since the thing-complex recurs linked 
with a number of attribute-complexes, and these recur linked with a number 
of thing-complexes, a possibility arises of working out the pathways of 
thought leading from these two kinds of complex to the wished-for state of 
the thing... [IFreud 383-384] 
What is crucial in this passage is that the thing is not an object forjudgment; only the 
signs or attributes make up the perceptual qualities of the world before us. This is 
because the attributes or signs are the individuating factors of the object. The 
primary processes have no conception of "objects, " and our memory cannot store 
4go ects" or "ident ies" but only qualitative differences. When we perceive 
something, the qualitative differences that are stored in memory are linked with the 
perceptual signs. The memory does not store images ofobjects but only the qualities 
that individuate objects. According to Freud: "What we call things are residues 
which evade being judged. " [I Freud 334] This is the object =x that Deleuze finds so 
important. This is the undetermined thing that is beyond perception and memory. It 
cannot be thought because thought requires individuation and determination. Kant 
calls it an Idea of reason. Deleuze calls it "the being of the sensible. " On what basis 
can we say that there is a transcendental thing that is the locus for individuation and 
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yet remains undetermined in itselP In order to justify this thing Deleuze relies on 
concepts taken from the work of Leibniz. In particular: the Monad. Deleuze is 
fascinated with the idea of a monad as a "viewpoint" upon the world. In Proust and 
Signs he makes it the center of envelopment in which qualities can converge in one 
object: 
What is essential occurs when the sentence achieves a Viewpoint proper to 
each of the two objects, but precisely a viewpoint that we must call proper to 
the object because the object is already dislocated by it, as if the viewpoint 
were divided into a thousand various noncom mun icating viewpoints, so that, 
the same operation being performed for the other object, the viewpoints can 
be set within each other, setting up resonance among themselves... [PS 166- 
167] 
For example: the taste of tea in a past moment and the taste of tea in the present 
moment are two non-communicating qualities in the work of Proust. That is, until 
they are combined in a "viewpoint" upon the world called "Combray" that is like a 
monad insofar as it expresses a unique "region" of the world that is not reducible to 
either a subjective memory or to a perception of a subject. The "viewpoint" is the 
object =x that envelops two divergent moments in time. Moreover, these two 
moments neither converge in the present perceptions of the hero of Proust's novel, 
nor in a remembered past that actually happened, but in a phantasm of a Combray 
that never existed. If we return to the work of Leibniz for a moment we can see that 
the "Combray" example is an example of a "compossible" world. This will be made 
clear if we turn to Deleuze's comments in his book on Leibniz. In this work Deleuze 
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reproduces an example from Leibniz of "Adam. " He lists the singularities that 
individuate this monad called Adam: "Here, for example, are three singularities: to 
be the first man, to live in a garden of paradise, to have a wife created from one's 
own rib. And then a fourth: sinning. "49AII of these singularities or attributes resonate 
because they cohere in a single "viewpoint" upon the world. But what if a singularity 
appears that does not cohere? Deleuze describes this: 
But then a fifth singularity appears: resistance to temptation. It is not simply 
that it contradicts the fourth, 'sinning, ' such that a choice has to be made 
between the two. It is that the lines of prolongation that go from this fifth to 
the three others are not convergent, in other words, they do notpass through 
common values. 
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This is a "divergence" in viewpoints because the attributes "sinning" and "resistance 
to temptation" cannot cohere in one monad. But still there is this Adam =x that can 
take on both the qualities of "sinning" and "resistance to temptation. " This is the 
undetermined object =x that transcends all possible worlds and all possible 
viewpoints. It is Deleuze's contention that there are divergences of viewpoints in one 
and the same world meaning that we pass from one monad or viewpoint to another 
within time: 
Only when something is identified between divergent series or between 
incompossible worlds, an object =x appears transcending individuated 
worlds, and the Ego which thinks it transcends worldly individuals, giving 
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thereby to the world a new value in view of the new value of the subject 
which is being established. [LS 113 ] 
Resonance is defmed by the convergence of attributes in one viewpoint andforced 
movement is defined by the divergence between two viewpoints. "This convergence 
defines 'compossiblity' as the rule of a world synthesis. Where the series diverge, 
another world begins, incompossible with the first. " [LS II I] If we are to speak of a 
second "synthesis" of time it must be in terms of this "resonance" of qualities into 
one and the same object = x. It is this synthesis that is responsible for the progressive 
determinations of objects by constructing a viewpoint that is common to 
"compossible " singulailties. As the object =x becomes determined as a viewpoint 
that envelops qualities that would normally be found in two different objects, one 
loses sight of the problematic nature of the object = x. The question arises: if we only 
perceive the qualities of objects, then how do we ever conceive of the thing itselP 
Along with the progressive determination of compossible worlds there is also a 
counter-movement of Thanatos that breaks the resonant effect and exposes problems. 
As we saw above in the example of Adam who both sinned and resisted temptation, 
there are points of indecision in the progressive determination of worlds. These 
points of indecision center around Ideal Events that are expressible by the infinitive 
verb: in this case "to sin. " The neutrality of the verb is the locus of indecision in the 
Ideal Event. When two fragments or singularities fail to cohere this "verb" or Event 
remains problematic. It is at this moment that we become aware of the thing apart 
from its predicates as an "indeterminate" element. Deleuze describes this as the two 
faces of the Idea: 
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It is as though every Idea has two faces, which are like love and anger: love in 
the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of the 
ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities which, by dint 
of ideal events, defines the concentration of a 'revolutionary situation' that 
causes the Idea to explode into the actual. [DR 190] 
The first movement of Eros (love) links the fragments (qualities) into a convergent 
series that determines the object = x. The second movement of the death instinct 
(anger) counter-actualizes the object =x and causes the psyche to turn back upon 
itself and question the order of events. Deleuze gives the example of the modem 
work of art that uses divergence and decentering to create an effect: "Perhaps the 
highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, with 
their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacements and disguises, 
their divergences and decenterings... " [DR 293] Deleuze gives an example of a 
remarkable movie: "Last Year at Marienbad, which shows the particular techniques 
of repetition which cinema can deploy or invent. " [DR 294] In this movie divergent 
series are played out, the order of events are questioned and the overall effect is to 
fracture the viewpoint so that incompossibilities appear in one and the same world. 
The movie, as a modem work of art, is no longer about viewpoints or stories with 
characters; but rather, it is about thought and the ideal events that the divergences 
provoke. In short, it moves us from a focus on enveloped qualities and the 
singularities that resonate to the insistence of problems and the Ideas they expose. 
While the envelopment of qualities into convergent series belongs to the second 
synthesis of time, the divergence of singularities and the problems they actualize 
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belong to the third synthesis of time. It is this third synthesis of time that we will turn 
to next. 
2.1 Side-cathexis inhibits the 2.3 The Freudian "thing" is like 2.5 "Intentionality" is the 
connection of ideas by Kant's object = x, it is the directing of destructive energy 
inhibiting the excitation that undetermined locus for the outwards by the process of 
passes between neurons. It connection of predicates or "fusion. " It constitutes the 
stores this energy to later signal qualities. The structure of object =x as an indeterminate 
motor discharge. objectivity is the basis for unity that envelops singularities. 
reflective subjectivity. 
2.2 Reality-testing delays 2.4 The ego is divided between 2.6 Complication of qualities 
pleasure in order to integrate it "perceptual -identity" and and indeterminate object = x. 
into a "substantial" object. The "thought-identity. " The object The second is a viewpoint or 
reality of this object is x enables the object in memory monad. The modem work of art 
confirmed by feedback from all to link with the object in explores divergent possible 
the senses. perception. worlds. 
c) The Energetics of the Superego 
3.1 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze tells us: "Repetition is thus in essence 
symbolic, spiritual, and intersubjective or monado logical. " [DR 106] What is of 
particular importance to us at this point are the first and last terms: the symbolic and 
the monad. First let us ask the question: what is a monad? The monad is a strange 
concept because it has no place. We cannot identify it with a body or an embodied 
subject because monads have no body: it is a soul. Deleuze tells us that according to 
Leibniz: "the soul is not in a body in a point, but is itself a higher point and of 
another nature, which corresponds with the point of view. 
-)-)5 1 At first sight this does 
not seem so strange; after all we all have a point-of-view. However, to reduce the 
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monad down to the point-of-view of a soul or subject would be a terrible 
oversimplification of the monad. There is a double ambiguity as to what subject has 
the predicates that constitute the point-of-view. Consider the following example that 
Deleuze draws from the work of Leibniz: "On the one hand, the world in which 
Adam committed sin exists only in Adam the sinner (and in all other subjects who 
make up this world). On the other hand, God creates not only Adam the sinner but 
also the world in which Adam has committed sin. In other words, if the world is in 
the subject, the subject is no less for the world. "52 Since Leibniz clearly states that 
God produces the world before creating the souls that populate this world it seems 
that the "subject" is a secondary effect of the monad. Above all, the monad is a point- 
of-view on the world in which the "subject" is only one element in that point-of- 
view. We will come back to this "point of view" in a moment after we have 
illustrated it in the following story. Deleuze takes a special interest in Lacan's 
seminar on The Purloined Letter in which a story by Poe is recounted. This story 
consists of two series: "first series: 'king-queen-minister', second series: 'police- 
minister-Dupin"' [DR 316] or, to put it simply, each of the three characters in one 
series mirrors the three in the other series. However, they do not have fixed 
characters: each of the characters is caught up in a drama in which the "letter" that 
was purloined in the first series structures the intersubjective relation of the 
characters ma different way than in the second series. Or as Lacan says: "In so far as 
they have entered into the necessity, into the movement peculiar to the letter, they 
each become, in the course of successive scenes, functionally different in relation to 
the essential reality which it constitutes. [ ... ] ... that 
is to say that at each point in the 
symbolic circuit, each of them becomes someone else. 9953 In this story where is the 
point-of-view? In the first series the minister notices a letter that the queen has 
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written and has kept from the king by hiding it in the open. The minister notices this 
and takes the letter. In the second series Dupin notices the letter that the minister has 
stolen and is hiding from the police by hiding it in the open and Dupin takes the 
letter. There is a transposition of viewpoints: the police replace the king (letter 
hidden from x), the minister replaces the queen (y who hides the letter in the open) 
and Dupin replaces the minister (z who steals the letter). Let us suppose that each of 
the two series is a monad. and x, y and z are predicates that inhere in the three subjects 
in each monad. In each case the characters are individualized by their predicates x, y 
and z. But in the two monads each of the characters participate in a different point-of- 
view depending on their relationship to the letter. In fact, their point-of-view is 
determined by their symbolic relations with the letter. This means that subjects are 
distributed in "monads" by their symbolic relationship that is a point-of-view. The 
only object that transcends the two monads is the letter (object = x) that has no 
44 predication" and thus no individuation that would bind it to only one monad. In fact, 
the letter as object =x is the point of divergence between the two possible worlds. 
And the displacement of the letter from one series to the other (or from one monad to 
another) is what causes the actors to exchange their masks or disguises. This is why 
Deleuze says: 
It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to 
itself that it determines transformations of terms and modifications of 11 
imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and 
therefore between the two presents. [DR 105] 
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In describing divergent series and the symbolic communications between series 
Deleuze is making a radical departure from Leibniz. Whereas Leibniz postulated only 
one actual world upon which all the monads converge. Deleuze postulates a 
multiplicity of monads that resonate across a divergent series of "worlds. " Deleuze 
derives this conclusion from the work of Proust in which time is fragmented into 
closed-off vessels that occasionally communicate with one another. For Proust the 
"One and Whole... would function as effect, effect of machines, instead of 
principles. " [PS 163] We will see next how the symbolic relation produces the effects 
of resonance andforced movement. 
3.2 Freud tells us that a symbol takes the place of a thing. But what does this 
mean? A thing, in this case, is not an object. If we pay close attention to the 
mechanism of "displacement" that symbols affect we will see that "the thing" is not 
something in the consciousness of the reflective mind. First, let us consider the 
passage where Freud distinguishes between hysterical symbol-formation and normal 
symbol-formation: 
But a hysterical symbol behaves differently. The knight who fights for his 
lady's glove knows, in the first place, that the glove owes its importance to 
the lady; and, secondly, he is in no way prevented by his adoration of the 
glove from thinking of the lady and serving her in other respects. The 
hysteric, who weeps at A, is quite unaware that he is doing so on account of 
the association A-B, and B itself plays no part at all in his psychical life. The 
symbol has in this case taken the place of the thing entirely. [I Freud 349] 
149 
The particular importance of the last phrase becomes immediately apparent: there is a 
radical difference between a "thing" and a "symbol. " The "glove, " in the above 
example, is the symbol for the "lady. " But the "lady" is also a symbol for the object- 
cathexis of the man. In short, there is a displacement from one signifier to another 
signifier, but not a displacement from a "thing" to a "symbol. " In the case of 
hysterical symbol-formation we come closer to the "thing" that is symbolized: the 
thing is not an object but an "affect" that is repressed. The "thing" that is repressed is 
an excessively intense idea that has been repressed. Freud gives this excessively 
intense "affect" the ability to detach itself from one idea and displace that energy on 
to another idea: 
The term 'excessively intense' points to quantitative characteristics. [ ... ] If 
so, only the distribution has changed. Something has been added to A which 
has been subtracted from B. The pathological process is one of displacement, 
such as we have come to know in dreams-a primary process therefore. 
[IFreud 350] 
In short, displacement allows one signifier to replace another signifier. However, the 
first signifier is not the repressed "thing" but becomes repressed because it is 
associated with the unpleasant affect. The hysteric will make a fetish out of an object 
because it has become the "symbol" that replaces the repressed or forgotten signifier 
that has been "de-cathected" (has had the "affect" uncoupled from the idea). 
Therefore the thing that is signified by the symbol is not an object but the displaced 
66 affect" that has floated from one signifier to the other. This excessive "affect" 
causes the displacement-effect of the symbol (object = x). This energy that causes 
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displacement is called "forced movement" by Deleuze. Freud calls this "forced 
movement" a repetition compulsion. Freud tells us that every repetition compulsion 
is accompanied by a repressed or forgotten idea-affect: "Analysis has led to the 
surprising conclusion: that for every compulsion there is a corresponding repression, 
that for every excessive intrusion into consciousness there is a corresponding 
amnesia. " [I Freud 3 50] It is on the nature of this "amnesia" that Deleuze and Freud 
disagree. Freud believes (at first) that the disguise of repression refers to a "real" 
event in te hysteric's past. If this is the case then a simple "remembering" of the 
repressed idea would bring about a cure. However, in Freud's text of the case of 
Emma there is an ambiguity that could lead to another interpretation. Without 
recounting the whole case history it is enough to point out the major terms of the 
repression in the case of Emma. In summary there are two series in this case history: 
a) the sexual assault by the shopkeeper in the first series, b) theftight at the laughter 
of the shop assistants in the second series. First, Freud says of the second series that 
Emma experienced fright at the laughter about her clothes by the two shop assistants: 
"She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants (one of whom 
she can remember) laughing together, and ran away in some kind of affect offright. ") 
[lFreud 353] The two terms here are "laughter" and "clothes. " According to Freud 
the laughter resonated with the repressed idea of the shopkeeper in the first series: 
"In the shop the two assistants were laughing; this laughing aroused (unconsciously) 
the memory of the shopkeeper. " [I Freud 354] Now, what is strange about hysterical 
displacement is that the affect of fright should be attached to "clothes" which is a 
perfectly neutral idea. According to Freud this irrational fright is caused because 
"clothes" has become the symbol for the fright experienced during the assault: "In 
our example, however, it is noticeable precisely that the element which enters 
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consciousness is not the one that arouses interest (assault) but another one, as a 
symbol (clothes). " [I Freud 356] Now the question arises: is it the ftight that is the 
repressed "thing" or the idea of assault that is repressed? They are not identical 
because the assault is an excitation coming from external sources, whereas theftight 
is an endogenous excitation that is linked with timeless unconscious processes. This 
means that the fright at the assault can also be a fright from an earlier period. This 
has led some psychoanalysts such as Otto Rank to observe that all trauma refers back 
to "birth-trauma. " This means that all the displacements of "affect" across all 
traumatic ideas refer to one and the same event. However, neither Freud nor Deleuze 
agrees with this idea of a primal trauma. Whereas Freud continues to humor notions 
of traumatic events to some degree, Deleuze rejects placing the "origin" of forced 
movement or repressed affect to any actual occurrence in the real world. Deleuze 
completely rethinks the situation of displacement and repression. What was for Freud 
a repression of one real series by another real series becomes, for Deleuze, a 
relationship between a real series in the present and a virtual series in the past. Why? 
Because when the affect is displaced from one idea in the past to another idea in the 
present, the idea in the past becomes the mirror image of the present event. In short, 
the idea that is repressed is integrated into the present scene as a kind of ghostly 
presence even though it is absent. Freud describes this as the uncanny impression that 
the past facilitations of memory have on our actions in the present. This only 
happens, according to Freud, when we are under the influence of affects or emotions 
that disturb our sense of the present. Freud gives the following explanation for this: 
The recent pathway succumbed in the affective state: facilitation-that is, 
what was old-established-gained the upper hand. This forgetting involves 
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the disappearance of the power of selection, of efficiency and of logic in the 
passage of thought, very much as happens in dreams. Secondly, affect inhibits 
thought in that without forgetting, pathways are followed which are ordinarily 
avoided: in particular, pathways leading to discharge, such as actions 
performed in the affective state. [I Freud 35 7] 
Freud discovered this effect because of a personal experience of forgetting: "Thus, 
for instance, it happened to me during the agitation caused by a great anxiety that I 
forgot to make use of the telephone, which had been introduced into my house a 
short time before. " [I Freud 357] This forgetting is actually what Proust described as 
"involuntary memory. " It is as if we were transported back into a past, and we began 
to react to the present reality as if it were a past reality. This means that an "affect" is 
responsible for the process of involuntary memory just as this same "affect" is 
responsible for our repetition compulsions. The difference between these two 
"affects" is not a difference in kind but a difference in degree. The effect offorced- 
movement comes from an "image" or virtual object that is repressed along with the 
affect. In this case the affect has been de-cathected or de-invested from the virtual 
series and has been re-cathected or invested in an actual series. The result is that 
patterns of activity are repeated without conscious knowledge. In the case of 
resonance, or involuntary memory, the "affect" is displaced on the virtual series and 
the cathexis (or investment) in the actual series is neglected in favor of a past or 
virtual series. The result is that patterns of activity are repeated with conscious 
knowledge. 
3.3 Strong emotions can have one of two effects: they can strengthen the 
pleasure-principle or they can strengthen the reality-principle. If they strengthen the 
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pleasure principle then memory is enhanced. If they strengthen the reality principle 
then action is enhanced. This distinction is based upon a single principle: 
"'Reflecting' is a time-consuming activity of the ego's, which cannot occur when 
there are strong Qýs in the level of affect. " [lFreud 358] As we have seen, the 
activity of side-cathexis binds excess excitation so that the psyche has time to reflect 
on what action to take in reality. However, if the side-cathexis of the ego fails to do 
its job then the psyche will regress into the virtual series of mnemic-images. 
According to Freud, a sudden rush of excitation can suspend the attention to reality 
or reality principle: 
By that means the release of unpleasure was quantitatively restricted, and its 
start was precisely a signal for the ego to set normal defense in action; this 
guarded against fresh experiences of pain, with their facilitations, developing 
so easily. Nevertheless, the stronger the release of unpleasure, the harder was 
the task for the ego, which, with its side-cathexes, can after all only provide a 
counterweight to the Qýs up to a certain limit, and is thus bound to permit a 
primary passage of quantity to occur. [I Freud 35 8] 
If there is not enough side-cathexis then the passage of mnemic-images erupts into 
consciousness along with the "affect" that was repressed. However, if the side- 
cathexis is stronger, the "affect" will be repressed along with the mnemic-image and 
the repressed instance will find its expression in action. If we recall the case 
presented in the last section, where the hysteric replaces the thing with a symbol, we 
will discover the positive aspect of the death instinct. The difference between normal 
symbol-formation and hysterical symbol-formation is that the "normal" formation 
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involves a firm grasp of the "thing" being symbolized. However, in the repetition 
compulsion there is no "thing" that the psyche can remember. In this case the psyche 
is faced with a problematic symbol that cannot be reduced to a signifier in some 
virtual series of memories. If the symbol is not directed to a memory then it must 
take as its object the "actual series" that follows the reality principle. But as we have 
seen, the reality-principle normally relates the psyche to external objects in the 
world. How then can it relate to a symbol that is not real? In order to relate to the 
symbol the reality principle must constitute another reality: the reality of thought. 
This second reality is that of language. We have seen, previously, that the indication 
of reality is accompanied by a psychical discharge. In the case of "eating, " the 
discharge that signaled the reality of the food was the action of the mouth and the 
stomach. In the case of "speaking, " however, there is a physical discharge in the 
mouth of words being spoken. This is the basis of the reality of thoughts. This 
process of symbol-formation resembles the hysterical process of symbol-formation 
because, in both cases, the symbol completely replaces the thing. Words are not 
things and things are not words, but the principle of reality applies to them both as if 
words are as real as things. To sum up: if the excessive excitations of "affect" 
reinforce the real ity-princ iple (side-cathexis) then this excessive attention to reality 
can either a) find an outlet in compulsive behavior or b) find an outlet in 
symbolization and language. Deleuze confirms this afternative in the death instinct of 
compulsive repetition or selection and thought: 
It seems that the idea of a death instinct must be understood in terms of the 
three paradoxical and complementary requirements: to give repetition an 
original, positive principle, but also an autonomous disguising power; and 
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fmally, to give it an immanent meaning in which terror is closely mingled 
with the movement of selection and freedom. [DR 19] 
Deleuze explains the compulsive repetition as a symptom of the destructive drives to 
be found in the un-binding movement of the psyche. These drives are turned 
outwards by the reality principle and seek to be symbolized in either action or 
thought. The death instinct inspires the formation of thought which gives an 
immanent meaning to the terror ofendogenous excitations. In short, the "therapeutic" 
effect of the "talking-cure" discovered by Freud is to translate emotions into words 
and, ultimately, into a narrative structure that creates a meaning for them. In short, 
verbalization creates a "metaphysical" surface upon which the "affects" of the body 
are turned into thoughts in the mind. Deleuze takes this process of "verb "-alization 
seriously by making the verb the center for thought: "Speaking, in the complete sense 
of the word, presupposes the verb and passes through the verb, which projects the 
mouth onto the metaphysical surface, filling it with the ideal events of this surface. " 
[LS 241 ] If we were to describe the transformation from repetition compulsion to 
thought then we must see it in the translation of actions into pure "verbs. " Next we 
will see how these pure "verbs" function as the locus for thought in the unconscious. 
3.4 Freud defines repression as a failure in translation: "A failure of translation- 
this is what is known clinically as 'repression'. " [lFreud 235] But what is 
translation? Translation is a process whereby unconscious thing-presentations are 
linked with preconscious word-presentations. According to Freud, preconsciousness 
"is the third transcription, attached to word-presentations and corresponding to our 
official ego. " [lFreud 234-235] Why is this important? Because in the work of 
Deleuze the difference between "thought" (Thanatos) and involuntary "memory" 
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(Eros) is the difference between the second and third syntheses of time. In 
involuntary memory we discover the effect of resonance in the Freudian concept of 
the screen-memory. The screen-memory is an effect of repression that seeks a 
symbol of the past "in general" and substitutes mnemic-images for perception. 
However, with verbalization a new relationship to the unconscious is achieved: rather 
than activate mnemic-images the psyche creates word-images of the repressed drives. 
This is why "translation" is so important: rather than producing an "erotic" mask of 
memory, translation moves beyond the sexual resonance of memory and produces a 
desexualized thought-image. Deleuze establishes the difference between forced 
movement and resonance in The Logic or Sense: 
At any rate, the forced movement is not established between the basic sexual 
series, but rather between the two new infinitely larger series-eating, on the 
one hand, and thinking, on the other... [LS 240] 
The difference between the second synthesis and the third synthesis of time is to be 
found in the difference in degree ofsublimation or translation of the drives. Deleuze 
describes the synthesis of Eros as a "less successful sublimation. " [LS 224] This is 
because involuntary memory, at best, gives us a fleeting image of object-images that 
cannot be maintained. On the other hand, thought can translate these object-images 
into word-images and maintain them in consciousness. In the work of Proust we find 
the episode of the "tea and madeleine" in which highly charged images pass into 
consciousness for only a brief moment. This process involves the mechanisms of 
regression, disPiacement and screen-memory that do not fully overcome the forces of 
repression. If Deleuze suggests that Eros "allows us to penetrate this pure past in 
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itself' [DR 85] he is not speaking metaphorically. He actually means that the 
mechanisms of repression and sexuality account for the movement of memory. But 
Deleuze also tells us that the "status of sexuality accounts for repression. " [LS 243] 
When Deleuze is speaking of memory we must distinguish it from the simple 
recalling of mundane facts as I have a doctors appointment. " These are former 
presents that "may be represented beyond forgetting by active synthesis, in so far as 
forgetting is overcome. " [DR 851 Deleuze is referring, instead, to a passive synthesis 
of memory that is bound up with sexuality and repression. This is why Deleuze says, 
"it is within Forgetting, as though immemorial, that Combray reappears in the form 
of a past which was never present: the in-itself of Combray. " [DR 85] However, we 
must still consider this "forgetting" as a failed sublimation or a failed translation. The 
translation into word-images represents a triumph of the third synthesis of time over 
the second synthesis of time. It is in this synthesis that the pre-conscious can reach 
down directly into the unconscious and extract pure Events. It is at this point that 
Freud's theory of phylogenesis makes an important distinction between memory and 
thought. Freud discovered certain events or fantasies that were common amongst 
many people and yet could not be traced back to any historical fact in their personal 
memory. For example, the Oedipus complex is derived from the mythical occurrence 
of the "Totem" meal in which the children kill their father and eat him. Freud tells us 
that these pure "events" that cannot be traced back to any occurrence form the basis 
of the superego: "The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually originated 
from the experience that led to totemism. " [I lFreud 378] He reasons that this 
occurrence cannot have come from the external world because the ego mediates 
between the world and the id: "Reflection at once shows us that no external 
vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the id, except by way of the ego, 
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which is the representative of the external world to the id. " [I IFreud 378] If the 
"events" represented in the preconscious did not originate from the external world 
then they must have been preserved in the id itself However, as we have seen, the 
impulses in the id remain unconscious as long as they remain as object-images. 
Deleuze's important contribution to the theory of sublimation is his introduction of 
the verb into the superego. Of the verb Deleuze says: "It represents the event as 
expressed, brings it to exist in the elements of language, and, conversely, confers on 
these elements an expressive value and function as 'representatives' which they did 
not have themselves. " [LS 245] Again, he tells us that the "event" is expressed by a 
synthesis of elements in language that would not be possible without the infinitive 
form of the verb that gives "sense" to language. In short, it represents action in 
language that, in turn, makes fantasies such as the "totem meal" possible: to eat/to be 
eaten or to kill/to be killed. The verb represents the nucleus of the primal fantasies 
transmitted to the superego from the id. Again, the superego presents us with a pure 
image of action that never occurred in actual events. Deleuze calls this image of 
action a symbol for the whole oftime: "The whole of time is gathered in the image of 
the formidable action as this is simultaneously presented, forbidden and predicted by 
the superego: the action = x. " [DR I 10] Why is this important? The importance of 
Deleuze's theory of the verb is that it provides an alternative explanation to Freud's 
theory of phylogenesis. Whereas Freud believed that the id stores the experiences of 
our ancestors, Deleuze believes that the "events" expressed in the superego are 
actually the expressions of the destructive drives translated into word-presentations. 
This interpretation is supported by the following passage in Freud: "The struggle 
which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an end by 
rapid sublimation and identification, is now continued in a higher region... " 
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[I I Freud 379] Are not then the struggles that are waged in the unconscious now the 
objects of thought on some metaphysical surface? And is not the "verb" the 
representative of all actions and passions in the depths of bodies? Deleuze thinks so: 
"... it is the necessary result of actions and passions, although of an entirely different 
nature, and itself neither action nor passion: event, pure event, Eventum tantum (to 
kill the father and castrate the mother, to be castrated and to die). " [LS 207] To sum 
up: the effect of language is to put the inner life of the id on the same level as 
perception, so that, speech-discharge manifests our inner desires in the form of pure 
44events. " 
3.5 We should not think of the "pure" events of thought as analogous to the 
occurrences that we encounter in actual life. Events are logical entities. Because of 
this we must investigate the root of logic which is reason. Freud finds the roots of 
reason in the superego: "Reason and Necessity... arouse a suspicion that they still 
look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as a parental couple, in a mythological 
sense, and believe themselves linked to them by libidinal ties. " [I I Freud 423] It is 
not by chance that Deleuze also links the superego to reason: "... from the negative as 
a partial process of destruction endlessly reiterated, to negation as an absolute idea of 
reason. It is indeed the vicissitudes of the superego in sadism which account for this 
progression. " [CC 126] This raises the question: is reason a "natural" faculty of 
thought or is it the product of "identification" with parental figures, as Freud thinks, 
and the force of negation, as Deleuze thinks? There is certainly a history to this 
conception of reason. First, Deleuze's idea that reason as a pure negation can be 
found in Kant's conception of the "constraint" of reason. In the Critique ofPractical 
Reason Kant describes his constraint as both a pain and something elevating: 
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As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command (announcing 
constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in it no pleasure, but 
on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the other hand, however, as this 
constraint is exercised merely by the legislation of our own reason, it also 
contains something elevating, and this subjective effect on feeling... may be 
called in this respect seýflqpprobation... 54 
There is, then, a negative constraint of reason that seems to come from within. 
Second, this process of the internalization of prohibition is caused by identification 
and introjection of aspects of authority figures. According to Freud: "The super-ego 
retained essential features of the introjected persons - their strength, their severity, 
their inclination to supervise and punish. " [IlFreud 422] This process of 
internalization of prohibitions can be seen in the development of children. At first a 
child will not restrain his natural desire to satisfy his needs despite their 
consequences. However, through the process of education the child is given a sense 
of "logical" consequences of his actions; in short, he learns the logic of causality. He 
also learns that he will be rewarded if he restrains the desire for immediate 
satisfaction and considers alternatives. The child thereby delays the pleasure of 
satisfaction in favor of the intellectual pleasures of reason and constraint. However, 
reason would not have developed without the "no" of the father upon which the 
superego is based. This is why Freud claims: "Kant's Categorical Imperative is thus 
the direct heir of the Oedipus complex. " [I I Freud 422] The Oedipus complex is 
dissolved, according to Freud, when the child internalizes the prohibition of the 
father. This prohibition is the source of the "negative" function in logic. The 
categorical imperative is a logical deduction of what "events" would be logically 
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consistent. Deleuze gives the example of "lying" in his book on Kant: "For example, 
if everyone told lies, promises would destroy themselves since it would be 
,, 55 contradictory for anyone to believe them . This is a great example of a "pure" 
event: it is not reducible to an actual event; rather, it is an ideal event that is 
suspended by the activity of logic. Further, it is derived by a double negation: a lie 
would negate itself because it would contradict itself (this is a lie: I am lying. "). 
Critical reason is based upon the "sense" of the coherence of events, and as such its 
object is not the objects or subjects that predicate events; rather, it is the copula of the 
subject and object. To demonstrate the total reversibility of the subject and the 
predicate around the verb (or pure event) Deleuze cites the following examples from 
the work of Lewis Carroll: 
Hence the innumerable examples dotting Carroll's work, where one finds that 
"cats eat bats" and "bats eat cats, " "I say what I mean" and "I mean what I 
say, " I like what I get" and I get what I like, " and I breathe when I sleep" 
and I sleep when I breathe, " have one and the same sense. [LS 33] 
In each case the verbs "to-eat, " "to-say, " "to-get, " and "to-breathe" remain the same 
despite the change in the order of subject and predicate. Deleuze even tells us that 
God is' and 'God is not' must have the same sense" [LS 33] because negation does 
not change the meaning of the verb "is" in each of the two propositions. Therefore 
we can say that negation only effects the predicates of events and not the events 
themselves. However, in actual occurrences events do not exist outside of their 
subjects and predicates (for example: a cat sits on a mat, the mat and the cat 
determine the "sitting"). It is only in the domain of "reason" that the verb becomes 
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the nucleus for all logical events. Now let us return to the aspect of "constraint" in 
reason. The fact is that "constraint" or negation tries to limit propositions to a 
coherent order; that is, so that they only travel in one direction. Deleuze calls this 
constraint of reason "good sense. " Deleuze says of good sense: "It first determines 
the principle of a unique sense or direction in general, ready to show that this 
principle, once given, forces us to choose one direction over the other. " [LS 76-77] In 
other words, when we encounter paradoxes like the kind we examined above (I 
breathe when I sleep and I sleep when I breathe, or, God is and God is not) we are 
faced with a sense of uneasiness. We react with laughter or confusion; we are not 
able to take both senses at the same time. Freud explains this reaction as a biological 
rule that reason must follow in order to bring thought to an end as soon as possible: 
Stated briefly, in the non-observance of the biological rules for the passage of 
thought. These rules lay down where it is that the cathexis of attention is to be 
directed each time and when the thought-process is to come to a stop. They 
are protected by threats of unpleasure, they are derived from experience, and 
they can be transposed directly into the rules of logic-which will have to be 
proved in detail. Thus the intellectual unpleasure of contradiction, at which 
the passage of testing thought comes to a stop, is nothing other than the 
unpleasure accumulated for the protection of the biological rules, which is 
stirred up by an incorrect thought-process. [IFreud 386] 
The activity of critical reason, according to Freud, is an evolutionary development 
that allows the organism to suspend judgment long enough to consider alternatives. 
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However, it cannot do this without a certain amount of unpleasure or constraint. In 
fact, unpleasure and constraint are the same for Freud: the organism will seek to 
bring critical reflective thought to an end as soon as possible so that action can take 
the place of contemplation. If it is unpleasant to think then why do we do it? Freud's 
answer is the same as Descartes: suspension of judgment is necessary to confirm the 
reality of perceptions. Once the perception (or order of events) is confirmed to be real 
then critical thought should naturally come to an end. However, this is not always the 
case. Next we will examine the reasons for this. 
3.6 Along with the logical force of negation there is another force of negation that 
counteracts the effects of reason. This second form of negation is called 
"Verleugnung" in German and is in the English translation of the work of Freud as 
"disavowal. " This is also an important concept for Deleuze. Here is Deleuze's 
interpretation of this term: 
For if Verleugnung is a question of maintaining the image of the phallus in 
spite of the absence of a penis, in the case of women, this operation 
presupposes a desexualization as the consequence of castration, but also a 
reinvestment of the sexual object insofar as it is sexual by means of 
desexualized energy: Verleugnung is not an hallucination, but rather an 
esoteric knowledge. [LS 243] 
This operation whereby the psyche maintains the presence of an image that it, 
nevertheless, knows to be absent in perception brings about a contradiction that 
cannot be resolved by logic. The fact of the painful contradiction between the 
presence and absence of the penis leads the ego to split into two parts. 
One part 
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maintains the perception of absence, and the other part maintains the imagination of 
presence. This split maintains two agencies of the psyche in complete isolation from 
each other: the superego and the ideal ego. Deleuze tells us that disavowal is a 
reaction to the negation of intellect and maintains its independence from the superego 
by constituting an "imagination" that suspends judgment: "Disavowal is a reaction of 
the imagination, as negation is an operation of the intellect or of thought. Disavowal 
challenges the superego and entrusts the mother with the power to give birth to an 
'ideal ego' which is pure, autonomous and independent of the superego. " [CC 127] 
Much of Deleuze's book Coldness and Cruelty is devoted to the idea of an 
imagination that suspends judgment as to the reality of its objects. This 
"imagination" has its roots in Freud. In his essay "Splitting of the Ego in the Process 
of Defense" Freud explains that, "there is a conflict between the demand by the 
instinct and the prohibition by reality. " [I I Freud 461 ] In short, the heavily invested 
organ of sexuality (the phallus) comes across the question: is it possible to lack the 
phallus? This leads to a paradox within critical reason: either there is or there is not a 
lack. This contradiction leads to the unpleasure that we saw above in the "biological 
rule" of critical reflection. The solution to this "unpleasure" of logical contradiction 
is the creation of a new faculty that is completely independent from reason: the 
imagination. Reason can still turn towards the objects of "reality" while the 
imagination can maintain the mental reality of objects of "phantasy. " The result is 
that the imagination maintains pure "presentations" that are not subject to the laws of 
logic: negation, reversibility or location. It is within these pure "presentations" that 
the "Pure event" can be maintained apart from any actualization. Ideal events such as 
the totem meal, the castration complex, incest, the phallus, etc. can be maintained 
without any critical judgment or repression from the superego. However, when 
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Deleuze uses the term "imagination" in this sense, he is not referring to the conscious 
imagination that we encounter in everyday life. Rather, he is referring to what Freud 
would call the pre-conscious. The imagination, in the ordinary sense of the term, 
presents us with representations. On the other hand, the preconscious imagination 
presents us with only pure "presentations. " These presentations give "sense" or 
meaning to rational propositions, but at the same time (because they are split-off 
from the ego) they cannot enter rational thought. This is why Deleuze tells us that 
they are not reducible to any mental state: "If there is, sense, or that which is 
expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual states of affairs, 
particular image, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts. " [LS 19] To put 
it simply, in every use of language what is expressed by our "propositions" is a 
desire or a demand of something that cannot be found amongst real and representable 
objects. The suspended "presentations" of the transcendental imagination acts as a 
locus for this desire. However, this requires a closer examination. The key to this 
form of "presentation" can be found in Difference and Repetition. It is in this work 
that Deleuze poses the complex nature ofproblems. These are not problems that have 
real solutions like 2+2=4, but problems for which no "representation" in thought 
could answer. Deleuze names these problems: 
It would be naYve to think that the problems of life and death, love and the 
difference between the sexes are amenable to their scientific solutions and 
positings, even though such positings and solutions necessarily arise without 
warning, even though they must necessarily emerge at a certain moment in 
the unfolding process of the development of these problems. [DR 107] 
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If we remember that the "splitting of the ego" caused the transcendental imagination 
to become a "metaphysical surface" upon which pure events would be present, then 
it becomes clear that the "problems" that the faculty of reason poses about them are 
not solvable by logic. This is why they remain "problematic" and un-presentable in 
logical propositions, while, at the same time, they give "sense" to these propositions. 
The answer to this paradox can be found in the work of Lacan. In his essay "The 
Signification of the Phallus" Lacan defines the nature of "demand" as being different 
from any empirical "need" that could actually be satisfied: 
For the unconditional element of demand, desire substitutes the 'absolute' 
condition: this condition unties the knot of that element in the proof of love 
that is resistant to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is neither the appetite 
for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from 
the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting 
56 (Spaltung). 
A "demand" of this sort is not a demand to someone for something that they can give 
us. The demand is what the proposition expresses; however, it does not express it to 
anyone. Demand is addressed to the "metaphysical surface" or the transcendental 
imagination that is split off from the ego and acts upon the ego as an a priori Other. 
Our desires are not addressed directly towards other people, but to our "ideal ego" 
that takes the place of others. The disavowed object becomes "sublimated" and gains 
a transcendental objectivity in the imagination. It is this suspended ob ect that i 
becomes the ideal to which all demand is addressed: "Disavowal and suspense are 
thus the very essence of the imagination, and determine its specific object: the ideal. " 
167 
[CC 128] To put this simply, despite our "intentions" of what we would like to 
express to another person, the very fact of our speaking is a demand towards an ideal. 
The meaning of what we are saying (the denotation, signification and manifestation) 
may be understood as the "intention" of our speech by another, but the "sense" of 
what causes us to talk is the attempt to make the pure event present. For example: in 
poetic language, one can read the words as intending a specific meaning, but this is 
not the "sense" of the poem; rather, the sense is in what cannot be said in words. fn 
short, the poem attempts to evoke pure "presentations" in the preconscious mind. 
Now, if we return to the original point of this discussion we can see why disavowal 
creates "problems" that cannot be resolved by critical reason. We have seen that 
Freud shares Descartes theory that "doubt" serves to suspend judgment until 
perceptions can be confirmed. But this form of critical reason is only a temporary 
positing of questions that immediately receive concrete answers (Descartes and his 
clear and distinct ideas). There is, however, another form of doubt that is not 
intended to be closed down by clear and distinct ideas. According to Deleuze 
neurotics keep questions and problems open at the price of their suffering: 
"Neuropaths and psychopaths perhaps explore this original ultimate ground, at the 
cost of their suffering, the former asking how to shift the problem, the latter where to 
pose the question. " [DR 107] Freud, in the case of the Rat Man, also expresses this 
need that neurotics have of keeping doubt and questioning open at all costs: 
Another mental need... is the need for uncertainty in their life, or for doubt. 
[] The creation of uncertainty is one of the methods employed by the 
neurosis for drawing the patient away from reality and isolating him from the 
world-which is among the objects of every psychoneurotic disorder. 57 
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There is obvious displeasure in doubt, but there is also a pleasure to be gained from 
this suspension of reality. Suspension of reality is not identical to "fantasy" because 
fantasy belongs to the series of imaginary objects. According to Deleuze: 'The 
masochist experiences the symbolic order as an intermatemal order... " [CC 63] Or, 
in other words, the suspension of reality is not "daydreaming" but an esoteric 
knowledge (one knows and is not conscious of knowing). As such, there is no sense 
of "lack" in the phantasm of the phallic-mother. The whole point of disavowal was to 
maintain the presence of the phallus despite the apparent lack in reality. With this in 
mind we are in a better position to understand the "intellectual" pleasures that are to 
be gained by keeping "problernsý' and "questions" open. It is clear that Deleuze 
believes that one is led to think by an "obsessional" path: "There is nothing comical 
(or sad) in the obsessional paths by which a thinker passes. " [LS 220] But is there not 
also another dimension to thought than the psychological? Is it not the "obsessional 
path" that leads to ontological difference? Deleuze seems to think so. In Difference 
and Repetition Deleuze questions what it means to keep problems and questions 
44open": 
Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being ofthe negative; rather, 
it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. [] 
contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphenomenon, the illusion 
projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and 
of a being which coffesponds as such to that question... [DR 64] 
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As we have seen the "being of the problematic" is maintained by the process of 
disavowal that forces the question to remain "open" and doubtful. The non-being is 
the being of the pure event that remains neutral and un-representable in the 
preconscious psyche because the metaphysical surface "is not at all identical to a 
consciousness. " [LS 244] To sum up: we are led to philosophical "wonder, " in spite 
of the displeasure of doubt, by another pleasure of a "suspension" of reality and the 
affirmation of pure and neutral "events" that are entities of logic and not actual 
occurrences. The third synthesis of time is the pure event that is able to represent 
everything that can happen without being reducible to anything that has happened. 
3.1 The symbolic is 3.3 The "affect" (object = x) is 3.5 Events are logical entities. 
Monadological. The object =x either "acted out" or Negation by reason tries to give 
determines the connection represented in language by the direction to events. The pre- 
between series because it is production of sense. (The logical nature of pure events 
common to two monads. talking cure. ) suspends j udgment. 
3.2 A repressed "affect" that is 3.4 "Translation" carried out by 3.6 Disavowal forms the ideal 
displaced from one idea to the verb completes sublimation ego and is the preconscious 
another is resonance or forced and forms the basis of pure imagination that gives meaning 
movement. events. to speech and desire. 
Chapter 4: The Static Genesis of Time 
In this last chapter we will shift our attention away from the three syntheses 
of time towards what Deleuze calls the "static genesis" of time. Deleuze's discussion 
of this can be found in chapter two of Difference and Repetition and particularly in 
the section called "Note on the Three Repetitions. " [DR 91 ] In short, the static 
repetition concerns the manner in which the psyche reacts to "pure events" that are 
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presented and forbidden by the superego. The first part of this chapter deals with the 
manner in which the psyche reacts to the prohibition of these "pure events. " Freud 
discovers three types of repetition that correspond to three static dimensions of time 
or the before, during and after. In the second part we turn to Harold Rosenberg's 
book The Tradition of the New of which Deleuze makes use in his Difference and 
Repetition. Rosenberg discusses the principles of character change, dramatic mimesis 
and the unintended results of action. Each of these three things will correspond to the 
three static dimensions of time. In this section we will also briefly cover Deleuze's 
objections to cyclic history and his claim that the "eternal return" is not reducible to 
traditional conceptions of cycles in time. The last section of this chapter will cover 
the doctrine of the "eternal return. " This part will show the three static dimensions of 
time at work in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It will also conclude with a 
discussion of the eternal return as an ethical and selective doctrine. 
a) Static Repetition in Freud 
1.1 For Deleuze the transition from a dynamic synthesis of time to a static 
synthesis is determined by the "narcissistic ego. " On one hand, there are the 
empirical objects that pass in time (one displacing another), but on the side of static 
synthesis there are no objects that pass in time. Deleuze explains: "When the 
narcissistic ego takes the place of the virtual and real objects, when it assumes the 
displacement of the former and the disguise of the latter, it does not replace one 
content of time with another. " [DR II I] By eliminating all empirical content, the 
narcissistic ego presents us with what Deleuze calls the "empty form of time. " 
Postponing the question of the empty form of time for a moment we first must ask: 
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what causes the ego to become narcissistic? The answer lies in the Freudian concept 
of "Verarbeitung" or, as it is translated, "working over. " The purpose of working- 
over is to integrate excitations into the psyche by establishing associative links 
between them. In essence, its job is to displace cathexis (investment) from one idea 
to another so that one idea is disguised by another. However, if this strategy for 
dealing with excitation fails, then the ego employs another: it replaces itself for the 
lost object or the virtual object. To put it simply, the ego says to itself "I am like the 
loved object, " it thereby internalizes the loved object and also preserves it from the 
contingencies of presence and absence. Freud describes the failure of working-over 
and its replacement by megalomania: 
We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a device 
designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as 
distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind 
helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are 
incapable of discharge outwards, or for which such a discharge is for the 
moment undesirable. In the first instance, however, it is a matter of 
indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon 
real or imaginary objects. The difference does not appear till later - if the 
turning of the libido on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being 
dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal 
working-over of the libido which has returned to the ego... [I lFreud 79] 
This is a dense passage; however it can be worked out in several steps: a) distressing 
affects cause the mind to repress one idea and replace it with another (displacement), 
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b) because one cannot act upon the traumatic idea, one instead discharges the 
cathexis from that idea to another (disguise), c) real objects are replaced by 
imaginary objects so that the psyche reacts to them both alike (interiorizing the 
difference between the two), d) the ego takes the place of both the real and imagined 
objects, thereby forcing libido to return to the ego itself (narcissism), e) the ego 
undergoes delusions of grandeur believing itself to be everything (megalomania). In 
short, because the ego cannot find satisfaction in the virtual object, because it is 
always absent, it takes its place as an always-present object. According to Deleuze, 
this is the "powerful" motivation for narcissism: 
The essentially lost character of virtual objects and the essentially disguised 
character of real objects are powerful motivations of narcissism. However, it 
is by interiorising the difference between the two lines and by experiencing 
itself as perpetually displaced in the one, perpetually disguised in the other, 
that the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passive ego becomes 
entirely narcissistic. [DR 110] 
However this is not the end of the story. The question now becomes: what caused the 
displacement of the virtual object in the first place? According to Deleuze they come 
from the narcissistic wound: "The narcissistic ego is inseparable not only from a 
constitutive wound but from the disguises and displacements which are woven from 
one side to the other, and constitute its modification. " [DR I 10] The "wound" that 
Deleuze speaks of here is the threat of castration. That is, the direct threat to the 
narcissisticallY invested organ. Freud describes this as the original disturbance to the 
child's primary narcissism: 
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The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the 
reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into 
which he is forced in doing so... The most significant portion of it, however, 
can be singled out in the shape of the 'castration complex'... and treated in 
connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. [I I Freud 
86] 
It is because of this threat, according to Freud, that one compensates for the 
perceived threat (the girls' lack) by producing a fetish object that will displace the 
anxiety. As Freud says: "He created a substitute for the penis which he missed in 
females - that is to say, a fetish. In so doing, it is true that he had disavowed reality, 
but he had saved his own penis. " [II Freud 463 ] Ultimately, as we have just seen, the 
fetish object is replaced by the narcissistic ego. In short, it takes itself as a fetish so 
that the risk of foreclosure is evacuated. This does not mean that the fetish is 
overcome. Instead it means that the fetish has become internalized and is no longer 
projected onto real objects: it is projected onto the "metaphysical surface" as we have 
seen above. 
1.2 When the ego becomes narcissistic the libidinal energy that would have been 
invested in objects is instead returned to the ego itself It is this reversal of libido 
away from objects and towards the ego that Freud calls desexualization: "The 
transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place 
obviously implies an abandorument of sexual aims, a desexualization -a kind of 
sublimation, therefore. " [I lFreud 369] Concomitant to this reflux of libido there is 
also a sublimation, or a conversion of sexual energy into thought-energy. The major 
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difference between thought-libido and sexual-libido is that the latter binds the 
destructive nature of libido while the former does not. This "defusion" of the instinct 
causes thought to take on an aggressive nature in the form of a superego. Freud 
explains how this superego is formed: 
The super-ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father taken 
as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or 
even sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind 
takes place, an instinctual defusion occurs at the same time. After sublimation 
the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the 
destructiveness that was combined with it, and this is released in the form of 
an inclination to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the 
source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal 
- its dictatorial 'Thou shalt'. [I lFreud 396] 
Therefore, at the same time that the ego becomes narcissistic, the energy that is 
desexualized becomes the basis of the superego that operates upon the narcissistic 
ego as an Other. It is the very harshness and cruelty of the superego that forces the 
ego to "sublitnate" or to turn its energy towards creative activities. Freud tells us that 
the superego "prompts" the ego into sublimation, however; "sublimation remains a 
special process which may be prompted by the ideal but the execution of which is 
entirely independent of any such promptings. " [I lFreud 89] To put it simply, the 
superego prompts the ego to creative action: one only becomes capable of acting 
"heroically " because of the ideal ofthe superego. Again, the narcissistic ego may be 
passive but the thought provoking superego is active. This is why Deleuze tells us: 
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"For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be thought. This 
can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that 
the narcissistic ego passively experiences on its own account. " [DR I 10] As we shall 
soon see, this modification will be the a priori form of the present, i. e. the moment of 
action. However, for now our question is: what does it mean for a superego to think? 
This form of "thought" is a special form of unconscious or preconscious thought that 
is particular to the superego. The superego, according to Freud, is able to revive 
thoughts of former "egos" of its predecessors. Freud says, "when the ego forms its 
super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be 
bringing them to resurrection. " [I IFreud 378] To put it simply, the superego thinks 
according to mythical archetypes of quasi-historical past. For example: the "totem 
meal" would be one of the archetypes that are not reducible to a historical event. 
Why is this thought? Because when the narcissistic ego is faced with this pure 
"event" it is forced to react to it in one of three ways: forbidden, presented and 
predicted. The passive narcissistic ego "repeats" in three different ways depending on 
its relation to this pure event. 
1.3 Deleuze tells us that the "I" is fractured. What does this mean? It is directly 
related to Freud's essay "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense. " We have 
already covered the meaning of this essay in a previous chapter. Now we are ready to 
define the two halves of the ego. We have already defined the narcissistic ego. Now 
we ask the question: what is the ideal? The "ideal" (ego ideal or ideal ego) is the 
form of identity that is given to the person. The word "ideal" can be used in the 
everyday sense of having a model of someone you would like to be like. In imitating 
the ideal one naturally repeats the actions of the model. There are two ways of having 
an ideal: one, as a model for action, and two, as an idolization (as in the way some 
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men idolize a woman). In the first case there is an identification with the ideal, and in 
the second case there is an idealization of that model. The first is what one imitates; 
the second is what one contemplates. In Coldness and Cruelty Deleuze associates 
these two ideals with sadism and masochism: 
Either the ego undertakes a mythical operation of idealization, in which the 
mother-image serves as a mirror to reflect and even produce the "ideal ego" 
as a narcissistic ideal of omnipotence, or else it launches into speculative 
identification and uses the father-image to produce a superego which in turn 
appoints an "ego-ideal" as an ideal of authority which brings into play forces 
from outside the subject's narcissistic ego. [CC 130] 
Either way the narcissistic ego tends to approach its ideal, the main function of the 
idea remains the same to give a coherence to the ego. In itself the narcissistic ego is 
indeterminate. it is the fon-n of the "I" that is the ideal (or a priori Other) that gives 
determination of that ego. For example: the question "am Ia man or a woman? " can 
be only answered by the "ideal" that is chosen; in itself the narcissistic ego is 
indeterminate as to this difference. The two manners of relating to the "ideal" above 
are not mutually exclusive. According to Deleuze they form a structural whole in 
most psyches: 
Of course, the polarity of ego and superego, ideal ego and ego ideal and the 
types of desexualization corresponding to them may occur together in a 
structural whole, where they give rise not only to a great variety of forms of 
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sublimation, but equally to the most serious functional disturbances... [CC 
130] 
This means that we can both identify with one part of the ideal and idealize the other. 
However, at some time one or the other gains the upper hand depending upon our 
state of mind. "Action" tends towards identification and "contemplation" tends 
towards idealization. The first uses the defusion of the death instinct and turns it 
outwards into a form-giving drive to mastery. The second uses the defused death 
instinct against the ego itself and reduces it to a state of ideal emptiness. Either way 
the defusion of the death instinct is the basis of the "I" or ideal that operates upon 
the narcissistic ego as an Other. 
1.4 Deleuze asks the question: "What does this mean: the empty form of time or 
third synthesis? " [DR 88] We too must ask this question. Traditionally time is the 
"number of movement" [DR 88] and Deleuze plays with the meaning of number. He 
uses the word "cardo" [DR 88] from which is derived cardinal and is also the Latin 
root for a "joint" or "hinge" around which things turn. Hence, according to Deleuze, 
there are cardinal points through which things in motion pass that make a 
measurement of time. For example: "ten miles per hour" means that one will pass 
through ten mile points in that time. This vision of time presupposes that there are 
"things" that are "passed" in time. Now let us consider what the empty form of time 
would be. When the ego becomes narcissistic the object of its libido is itself 
(and the 
archetypes explored by the superego). As such, these objects do not pass in time. 
Deleuze tells us that the narcissistic ego empties time of all content: 
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We saw above that the fracture of the I was no more than the pure and empty 
form of time, separated from its content. The narcissistic ego indeed appears 
in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: the narcissistic libido, the 
reflux of the libido into the ego, abstracts from all content. The narcissistic 
ego is, rather, the phenomenon which corresponds to the empty form of time 
without filling it... [DR 110] 
This is because the unconscious is timeless and nothing passes away in it. Therefore 
the time of the narcissistic ego cannot be measured by the passing of moments. 
Further, our intuition into the a priori form of empty time must be given to the 
narcissistic ego. As Deleuze tells us: "The synthesis is necessarily static, since time is 
no longer subordinated to movement... " [DR 89] Someone might object that this is 
etemity that Deleuze is describing and not time. However here is an answer to this: 
there are still "events" in this empty form of time but they do not correspond to 
events that happen and are then passed by. Instead, the narcissistic ego relates to pure 
events in a mode of time determined by the "caesura. " We will examine this pure 
division of time next. 
1.5 In The Logic of Sense Deleuze has high praise for Freud's book Totem and 
Taboo: "Totem and Taboo is the great theory of the event... " [LS 211] The theory of 
the event that this book refers to is the "event" that marks the division in the static 
division of time into Before, During and After. Deleuze makes this clear in 
Difference and Repetition: 
The form of time in the I determines an order, a whole and a series. The 
formal static order of before, during and after marks the division of the 
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narcissistic ego in time, or the conditions of its contemplation. The whole of 
time is gathered in the image of the formidable action as this is 
simultaneously presented, forbidden and predicted by the superego: the action 
= x. The temporal series designates the confrontation of the divided 
narcissistic ego with the whole of time or the image of action. [DR I 10] 
In order to make sense of this we must first ask ourselves: what the "formidable 
action" or "image of action" is and what effect it has on the ego? Freud provides an 
interesting answer in his book Totem and Taboo. In short, he tells us that the "event" 
that is forbidden is also desired: 
Since taboos are mainly expressed in prohibitions, the underlying presence of 
apositive current of desire may occur to us as something quite obvious... For, 
after all, there is no need to prohibit something that no one desires to do, and 
a thing that is forbidden with the greatest emphasis must be a thing that is 
desired. 58 
Again we see that the "event" is both desired and feared. This conflict expresses 
itself in two forms: repression and the return of the repressed. Because it is 
contradictory the "event" in question remains unconscious. But, according to Freud, 
we know the effects of this "event" because we see its effects in the dreams of normal 
people: 
Suppose ... that we were to take 
into account the findings arrived at by 
psycho-analysis from dreams of normal people, to the effect that we ourselves 
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are subject, more strongly and more often than we suspect, to a temptation to 
kill someone and that temptation produces psychical effects even though it 
remains out of sight of our consciousneSS. 59 
This means the effect of the pure event is often felt in the lives of normal people and 
yet we are not consciously aware of it. For example: we may take an instant dislike to 
someone and immediately have hostile feelings for him for no apparent reason. 
However, the reason for this reaction can be found in the similarity they bear to some 
repressed desire. Perhaps that person reminds us of a persecuting father figure 
encountered only in our dreams. This would be an effect of the unconscious event 
that both presents us with a desire and a prohibition. It is this effect that Deleuze calls 
the "Before" or the act that "is too big for me. " The static genesis of the "Before" is 
nothing more than our indecisions and self-defeating behavior. This static form of 
time makes itself felt in what Freud described as "failure neurosis" or "fate neurosis. " 
Freud describes this neurosis as events that recur in our lifetimes and that appear to 
be the same: 
Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the 
same outcome: such as a benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time 
by each of his protigis, however much they may otherwise differ from one 
another, and who thus seems doomed to taste all the bitterness of ingratitude; 
or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; or the man who 
time after time in the course of his life raises someone else into a position of 
great private or public authority and then, after a certain interval, himself 
upsets that authority and replaces him by a new one; or, again, the lover each 
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of whose love affairs with a woman passes through the same phases and 
reaches the same conclusion. [I I Freud 292] 
This is the mode of repetition that Deleuze describes as the repetition of the static 
genesis of the "Before. " In this repetition one unique event in the unconscious plays 
itself out in actuality again and again without the person undergoing the repetition 
knowing its source. Deleuze describes this as a comic repetition because of the twin 
themes of "misrecognition" and "disguise" (a comedy of errors). Like king Oedipus 
who questions "Who killed the king? " or Hamlet's question, "Should I kill the 
king? ", both of them are struggling with an unconscious event that they do notfeel 
equal to. Because of the contradiction between desire and prohibition the pure event 
effects the fate of the person even if there is no consciousness of this event. The 
unconscious event is played out in action, according to Freud: "Suppose, again, that 
we were to recognize the compulsive observances of certain neurotics as being 
guarantees against an intensified impulse to murder or as being self-punishments on 
account of it., Yý60 In short, a repetition compulsion is the result of the "image of 
action" being "too big for me. " Deleuze makes this the first of the three repetitions in 
the static genesis of time: 
The narcissistic ego repeats once in the form of the before or lack, in the foryn 
of the Id (this action is too big for me); a second time in the form of an 
infinite becoming-equal appropriate to the ego ideal; a third time in the form 
of the after which realizes the prediction of the superego (the id and the ego, 
the condition and the agent, will themselves be annihilated)! [DRI 10-111] 
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We have examined the first "repetition" of the Before; now let us examine the 
repetition of becoming-equal. Becoming-equal is simply a matter of "identification" 
with the ego ideal. In Totem and Taboo Freud identifies "identification" with the 
totem meal: "The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied 
model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they 
accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion 
of his strength. 1-)61 What is clear from this passage is that one only gains the strength 
to carry out action by identifying with the aggressive and prohibiting father. This 
process is known in psychoanalytic terms as "identification with the aggressor. " 
Freud briefly talks about this phenomenon in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
If the doctor looks down a child's throat or carries out some small operation 
on him, we may be quite sure that these frightening experiences will be the 
subject of the next game; but we must not in that connection overlook the fact 
that there is a yield of pleasure from another source. As the child passes over 
from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the game, he hands on 
the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in this way revenges 
himself on a substitute. [I lFreud 286] 
In this example we see the repetition of the "During, " as Deleuze calls it. The 
difference between this repetition and the previous repetition of the "Before" is that 
this new repetition is both active and conscious. The pure event is no longer 
44 repressed, " but rather, realized in action. The mechanism of "play" suspends the 
prohibition by setting up a dramatic mimesis that allows the child to express 
forbidden and painful events in a neutral environment. Notice that people will gladly 
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accept all sorts of violent and repulsive acts as "entertainment" that they would not 
accept in reality. This is because mimesis allows for the suspension of all "reality" of 
the situation by placing the action within the frame of "drama. " This is why Deleuze 
tells us we must become the actor of our own events: 
Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and 
keeps from the event only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the 
actor of one's own events-a counter-actualization. [LS 150] 
This is also why Deleuze is so fascinated with sadism and masochism: because they 
take the unconscious events that are prohibited and repeat them in a dramatic setting 
of the masochistic contract or the sadistic suspension of scenes of cruelty. In short, 
they suspend the prohibition of the superego by placing them in an amoral 
framework of mimesis. This is possible because of the fracture of the "I, " in which, 
the identity of the agent is the ego ideal and not the ego itself The ego takes on the 
role of the Other, or the identity of the ideal (the father or mother, king Oedipus, 
Hamlet, etc. ). By suspending action in the repetition of a role the action takes on a 
timeless character. For example: Hamlet is a timeless character that is manifested 
each time the play is produced, and yet the action is superficial and ideal insofar as 
each performance refers to the archetype "Hamlet. " The actor feels no remorse in 
playing the part of a murderer because he is detached (as a person) from the role. 
However, as we will see next, there is a third repetition of the future that eliminates 
the previous two. 
1.6 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze makes the remarkable statement: "For 
the practical law itself signifies nothing other than that empty form of time. " [DR 
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II I] Our task is now to make sense of this. Deleuze conceives of the repetition of the 
future as being one of "annihilation. " This annihilation is carried out by the death 
instinct but not in the way that Freud thought it did. Our desire is not to die because 
this is contradictory to the death instinct's purpose as a drive of self-preservation. 
Instead Deleuze identifies the function of the death instinct and the superego (the 
moral law) as eliminating introjection or projection. In short, they seek to make us a 
"body without organs. " Deleuze explains that the purpose of the body without organs 
is to be complete by eliminating all introjection or projection: "What is opposed is 
rather an organism without parts, a body without organs, with neither mouth nor 
anus, having given up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this 
price. " [LS 188] This is not a completely unfounded proposition. The psychoanalyst 
Andre Green makes a similar observation in his book Life Narcissism Death 
Narcissism: 
This is the quest of non-desire for the Other, of non-existence, non-being; 
another way of acceding to immortality. The ego is never more immortal than 
when it claims that it no longer has any organs or body. Such is the case of 
the anorexic who refuses to be dependent on his (or her) bodily needs and 
reduces these appetites by means of a drastic inhibition, letting himself die, as 
one says so aptly. 
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Green's observations about the anorexic are not incidental. They are essential 
(although exaggerated) aims of the superego: namely, to reduce our desire for objects 
to zero. In effect, the superego does not seek the physical death of the organism 
but 
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only the psychical death of the desiring subject. Andre Green explains this negative 
narcissism as a desire to make oneself free from sexual desires: 
Instead of sustaining the aim of unifying the ego through the activity of the 
sexual drives, negative narcissism, under the influence of the Nirvana 
principle, representing the death drives, tends towards lowering all libido to 
63 the level zero, aspiring for psychical death . 
In short, if the organism eliminates tension it will not have to seek out objects to 
satisfy it. It will be wholly independent from sensual needs. It will neither project its 
sexual desires into others nor feel the need to introject the object of desire (such as 
food) into itself. In part, Freud recognizes this effect of the superego as a pure 
culture of the death instinct: "What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it 
were, a pure culture of the death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in 
driving the ego into death... " [I I Freud 394] The repetition of the "future" seeks to 
eliminate any need of an ego and any impulses fi7om the id. Thus Deleuze can say: 
"(the id and the ego, the condition and the agent, will themselves be annihilated)! " 
[DR I 10- 111] What does this have to do with the practical or moral law? In the 
Critique of Practical Reason Kant describes one of the effects of the moral law as 
being a desire for moral perfection. This quest for moral perfection - or a desire to 
free oneself from sensible inclinations so that one can adhere to the demands of the 
categorical imperative - requires an endless duration that extends even beyond our 
life. In Kant's own words: 
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All that can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this 
participation would be the consciousness of his tried character, by which, 
from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, 
and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he 
may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however long his 
existence may last, even beyond this life, and thus he may hope, not indeed 
here, nor in any imaginable point of his future existence, but only in the 
endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey) to be perfectly 
adequate to his will ... 
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This "endless duration" is the straight line of time according to Deleuze. 
Commenting on this text by Kant, Deleuze explains how this infinite quest for moral 
perfection is an "infinite debt" that one owes to the superego: 
from the viewpoint of a progress that continues to infinity in its ever 
increasing conformity with the law (sanctification as the consciousness of 
perseverance in moral progress). This path, which exceeds the limits of our 
life and requires the soul's immortality, follows the straight line of time, 
inexorable and incessant, upon which we remain in constant contact with the 
law. When time is out ofjoint, we have to renounce the ancient cycle of 
faults and expiations in order to follow the infinite route of slow death, the 
deferred judgment, or the infinite debt. 65 
As we will see, the cycles of time in traditional cultures acted as a payment 
for 
('sins, " in which, a sacrifice could be made and the gods would be appeased and grant 
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reprieve. But with the vision of an infinite straight line of time there is only the ideal 
of total death of the ego, that end of the line that never arrives. As such, it is the pure 
"event" of the future. The repetitions of self-denial and continued adherence to 
rational "law" have the pure event of death as its goal. Notice, that this is not 
physical death as Freud believed, but an "impersonal death" that never happens to 
anyone. Deleuze distinguishes between two types of "events" called death in 
Difference and Repetition: 
One is personal, concerned with I or the ego, something which I can confront 
in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which 
causes everything to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, with no relation 
to 'me', neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an 
incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question... [DR 112] 
I can think of my physical death as a disappearance of my animated body from the 
world. I can have anxiety about it, or I can think of a world in which others will see 
me dead. But what is not thinkable is the radical absence of the psychical desires and 
impulses that make up the ego. This radical impossibility led Kant to postulate an 
infinite progress beyond life in which this "impersonal" death of non-desire can 
forever be postponed. Like the "false" ending of The Trial by Kalka, that Deleuze 
and Guattari protest, does not do justice to "indefinite postponement" because it tries 
to make impersonal death coincide with personal death. 66 We must imagine Joseph 
K. as continuing the trial even after his death. The infinite straight line of time 
demands that there be an "ideal" event of death that motivates the repetition of death 
in the unconscious. This "death" that is repeated in life is recognized by Freud as 
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forming the basis of the reality principle. He explains that the repetition of our 
renunciat on of pleasure in the present is centered around a mythical future event: 
A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order 
to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time. But the 
endopsychic impression made by this substitution has been so powerful that it 
is reflected in a special religious myth. The doctrine of reward in the after-life 
for the - voluntary or enforced - renunciation of earthly pleasures is nothing 
other than a mythical projection of this revolution in the mind. [I I Freud 41] 
What is heaven if not the extinction of all desire and the concomitant sense of 
completeness that comes with it? Psychical death is the impersonal death as a pure 
event that inspires the repetition of renunciation in the present. More astonishingly, it 
is "the source of problems and questions" [DR 112] because the reality principle 
allows us to postpone the immediate satisfaction of immediate solutions and allows 
us to keep questions andproblems open. If there were no ideal death (heaven), then 
we would not think! Myth and religion are also forms of repetition the "repetition of 
faith. " Deleuze is quite humorous about this in Difference and Repetition. There he 
will allow "faith" only on the condition that it does not limit the infinite straight line 
of time by placing a redeeming end to time that would give all of existence a 
44meaning. " Instead, he proposes the eternal return as "the truth of faith" [DR 95] 
because it maintains the idea of indefinite postponement without setting limits on the 
line of time. He tells us that the idea of "grace" still motivates the atheist and the 
believer who still has the atheist's pessimism about the possibility of grace ever 
arriving: 
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We have too often been invited to judge the atheist from the viewpoint of the 
belief or faith that we suppose still drives him - in short, from the viewpoint 
of grace; not to be tempted by the inverse operation -to judge the believer by 
the violent atheist by which he is inhabited, the Antichrist eternally given 
ýonce and for all' within grace. [DR 96] 
If we are to call the repetition of the future a "faith in the future" it must be on 
account of the pure event of "grace" (non-desire) that will never arrive in the 
44present. " Instead, this pure event of the future inspires the repetition of our 
questioning, that is, of leaving questions etemally open. (Not even in our physical 
death will the question be closed. ) 
1.1 The ego becomes 1.3 The "ideal" comes from the 1.5 The repetition of the 
narcissistic when it takes itself deftision of the instincts. Two "before" (failure neurosis) in an 
for a fetish that compensates for forms: identification (sadism) or image of prohibited action. The 
castration anxieties. idealization (masochism). repetition of the "'during" 
(sadism) in identification with 
the aggressor. 
1.2 When the ego becomes 1.4 Two types of time: 1.6 The body without organs is 
narcissistic the desexualized empirical time in which events non-desire not death. This 
libido defuses and becomes the pass and unconscious time in requires an infinite time to 
superego. This motivates which events are static. achieve the moral law. This is 
sublimation and thought. the third repetition of self- 
annihilation. 
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b) Static Repetition in Rosenberg and Cyclic History 
2.1 We must keep in mind that in the "static" genesis of time the "before" is not 
the past. The "before" is defmed by the ego's relation to the event and not its place in 
time. In short, if one has notyet acted, then - even though we always empirically live 
in the present - we are living in the a priofi past. Deleuze makes this clear: 
In effect, there is always a time at which the imagined act is supposed 'too 
big for me'. This defines a priori the past or the before. It matters little 
whether or not the event itself occurs, or whether the act has been performed 
or not: past, present and future are not distributed according to this empirical 
criterion. Oedipus has already carried out the act, Hamlet has not yet done so, 
but in either case the first part of the symbol is lived in the past, they are in 
the past and live themselves as such so long as they experience the image of 
the act as too big for them. [DR 89] 
He uses the examples of Hamlet and Oedipus in an astute way: Hamlet has not yet 
had the nerve to kill the king in the fwst part of the play so he is living in the "before" 
moment, and even though Oedipus had already killed his father, he had not Yet 
realized it. So the distinguishing factor of the "before" is not just accomplishing the 
action; it is also being equal to it or being able to realize it. In order to understand 
why Hamlet was not able to act we must turn to the book by Harold Rosenberg The 
Tradition of the New just as Deleuze did. In the chapter "Character change and the 
drama" Harold Rosenberg considers the process by which a "character" changes his 
"identity" in a drama, not by a slow progress towards enlightenment, but all at once. 
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To investigate how this happens Rosenberg turns to the example of the law and how 
it recognizes individuals: 
The law is not a recognizer of persons; its judgments are applied at the end of 
a series of acts. With regard to individuals the law thus creates a fiction, that 
of a person who is identified by the coherence of his acts with a fact in which 
they have terminated (the crime or the contract) and by nothing else. [TN 
136] 
An "individual" is not a "person" but rather, the individual is a drama or series of 
actions that leads to ajudgment of character. In short, the law converts persons into 
"symbols" that represent the whole of their lifetime and the coherence of the actions 
within that life. Rosenberg tells us that the difference between the person and the 
individual is the difference between action and being: 
So that dealing with identities rather than with personalities, the law is 
enabled to do so only by willfully converting persons with histories into 
emblems of unified actions of a given order. In other words, the law, like its 
victims, suffers from the discrepancy between being and action, the failure of 
the individual to confonn in every respect to his role. [TN 138] 
The "person" is a concrete thing full of contradictory impulses that is not at all 
unified. The "individual" is an abstraction that has an ideal "unity" before the 
judgment of the law. These two aspects of person and individual are the same as the 
ftacture in the "I. " On the one side is the ego with its contradictory impulses; on the 
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other side is the ego-ideal with its idealized image of unity. Now, if we consider how 
a character in a drama can undergo identity change, it is clear that the "person" does 
not change but only the "ego-ideal" or the means by which judgment identifies the 
character. Rosenberg gives the example of a criminal who is suddenly found 
innocent: 
To begin with the legal instance: the fact of the crime organized... the acts of 
the criminal and interpreted them. For the law he lived by that fact alone. 
Were it suddenly discovered that no crime had been committed, the coherence 
of his actions would collapse and the prisoner, having been converted in an 
instant into the hypothetical and undefined figure of an innocent man, would 
no longer exist under the eye of the court. [TN 143] 
The criminal is now divided into before and after. The change is a "caesura" or 
sudden reversal that divides time by changing the identity of the character in one 
blow. We have seen how identities change according to a static order oftime; now let 
us apply this to the character of Hamlet. The play "Hamlet" is divided into two 
distinct sections: before the sea voyage (a Hamlet in self doubt) and after the sea 
voyage (a Hamlet who is capable of acting). What happens to make him capable of 
action? The Hamlet of the "before" is self-doubting because he lacks an identity 
structure: he is not equal to the "event" that he is called upon to accomplish. 
Rosenberg argues that Hamlet does not think because he is an intellectual, rather he 
thinks too much because he lacks an identity: 
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The argumentative, self-analytical Hamlet of "non-action, " describing himself 
in every speech, and using speech as a substitute for deed, is very much the 
figure of a personality, of a being insufficient for, because irrelevant to, the 
dramatic role offered to him. Hamlet has all the qualities required for action; 
what he lacks is the identity structure which would fit him to be a character in 
a drama, a one-ness with his role originating in and responding to the laws of 
his dramatic world. [TN 146-147] 
Hamlet, in short, is incapable of saying I am... " or he is not able to see himself as 
having an identity. His persistent question is "am IT or "to be or not to be? " Because 
he does not know his "role" in the order of things he questions why he was bom. 
This is a typical neurotic reaction: "who am 17' All the person who is not defined by 
an identity structure knows is that he is filled with conflicting impulses such as "I 
desire this and yet I fear it. " Moral clarity only comes to Hamlet when he forsakes 
the conflicting impulses of his personality and fully gives himself over to his role. 
Hamlet's hesitation can be described as a repetition because he replays the act over 
and over in his speech because he cannot repeat it in action. Deleuze describes this 
kind of repetition as the repetition of the "Before": 
At a first level, the repetition of the Before is defined by default or in a 
negative manner: one repeats because one does not know, because one does 
not remember, etc: or because one is not capable of performing the action 
(whether this action remains to be performed or is already performed). [DR 
295] 
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But where is this repetition coming from? It is not Hamlet's will that repeats because 
his repetition is involuntary or obsessive. According to Deleuze it is the Id that 
repeats: ... One' therefore signifies here the unconscious of the Id as the first power of 
repetition. " [DR 295] This obsession of the Id causes the whole scene of the play to 
become "haunted" with the image of action to be accomplished. The theme of death 
and murder keep appearing because Hamlet is unable to make the "event " conscious. 
As Deleuze tells us: "this unknown knowledge must be represented as bathing the 
whole scene, impregnating all the elements of the play... at the same time the hero 
cannot represent it to himsetf - on the contrary, he must enact it, play it and repeat it 
until the acute moment that Aristotle called 'recognition'. " [DR 15] The whole play 
is full of disguises and false starts. For example, the murder of Polonius is mistaken 
for the murder of the king. This is described as a "comic" repetition by Deleuze 
because repetition with a lack of knowledge can only result in mistaken identity: "At 
another level, the hero repeats the first, that of the Before, as though in a dream and 
in a bare, mechanical and stereotypical manner which constitutes the comic... " [DR 
296] When he murders the wrong person Hamlet is in a "dream" state, totally 
unaware of what he is doing: he is under the influence of a repetition compulsion (or 
a fate neurosis). His identity is too weak to overcome the repetition compulsions 
from the Id. Therefore he is not yet equal to the event. 
2.2 To become equal to the event means to engage in a dramatic mimesis. As we 
saw above, Hamlet is unequal to the act because he lacks an identity. In order to 
become equal to the action he must succumb to a sudden change of identity. Deleuze 
calls this sudden change of identity that takes place in the present of 
64 metamorphosis" the caesura: 
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The second time, which relates to the caesura itself, is thus the present of 
metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and 
the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act (this is marked by 
Hamlet's sea voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus's enquiry: the hero 
becomes 'capable' of the act). [DR 89] 
In the play Hamlet becomes equal to the event by facing death at sea. It is realizing 
his own mortality that makes him aware of himself as an identity. Deleuze uses this 
quote from Henry Miller: ... I realized that I was free, that the death I had gone 
through had liberated me. "' [DR 19] This "caesura" also has its roots in religious 
rituals. Rosenberg talks about religious rituals like "baptism and eucharist" [TN 144] 
that involve a symbolic death and rebirth with a different identity. These rituals are 
rather mundane today but their original meaning of death and sacrifice were very 
real. Rosenberg also finds these themes operating in character change in drama: 
To present identity-replacement in a credible manner the dramatist must 
imitate the experience of religion and subject his character to the ordeal of 
death. [ ... ] In a word, dramatic death and regeneration need not 
be involved 
in faith; there is the death-laden incident; then occurs a transfer of identities 
within the single figure, a change of faces behind the mask. [TN 145] 
In the play, Hamlet is invested with "this 'dangerous' new ability to act" [TN 148] 
that is signified by his words: "Yet have I in me something dangerous, which let thy 
wisdom fear. " [Act 5, scene 1] In short, Hamlet is no longer acting according to his 
own desires; instead he has exchanged his will for a dramatic role. Next we will 
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investigate this "something dangerous" that Hamlet spoke of To understand 
"becoming capable of action" in Deleuze's sense of the term it is necessary to turn to 
the chapter in Harold Rosenberg's Book entitled "The Resurrected Romans. " In this 
chapter he examines the nature of the French Revolution, particularly the manner in 
which the bourgeoisie used the myths of the Roman Revolution to carry out their 
own revolution. The question that Rosenberg's theory answers: why do revolutions 
break out when they do? Often the social conditions for revolution are there long 
before the moment of its outbreak. What are the essential conditions that make 
people capable of heroic actions? Rosenberg's answer is that, whether they know it 
or not, the historical actors are replaying themes of history. Rosenberg says of the 
actors in the French revolution: 
They imagined they were performing the part set down for them by events of 
their own lives-their action became a spontaneous repetition of an old role. 
They imagined they were playing themselves-they were but mimicking the 
engraving of a hero on one of history's old playbills. [TN 155] 
This is the repetition of the "During" according to Deleuze: 
The repetition of the During is defined by a becoming-similar or a becoming- 
equal: one becomes capable of performing the action, one becomes equal to 
the image of the action, the 'one' now signifying the unconscious of the Ego, 
its metamorphosis, its projection in an I or ego ideal in the form of the second 
power of repetition. [DR 295] 
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For the bourgeois in the French revolution the "ego ideal" that they preconsciously 
were identifying with was the "heroic" ideal of the Romans. They saw the Romans as 
embodying strength and courage in a timeless fashion. Neither Rosenberg nor 
Deleuze is suggesting that the bourgeois were consciously planning to imitate the 
Romans; rather the imitation was "spontaneous" and not planned. Deleuze even says 
that, "Repetition is a condition for action before it is a concept of reflection. " [DR 
90] This means that historians may afterwards draw comparisons with the French 
and the Romans, but at the time of the revolution there was no intended imitation. 
The Roman revolution was an unconscious archetype for those who imitated it. It 
provided an image of action that would give meaning to their actions in the present. 
However there is a problem with this: it appears as if "identification" with the past is 
Platonic in inspiration. Mimesis is the means by which "identity" is imposed on 
historical actions. Rosenberg's theory is similar to Platonic reminiscence in this 
respect. Deleuze makes the following criticism of the nature of this identification 
with the originary identity: 
However, since to become similar or equal is always to become similar or 
equal to something that is supposed to be identical in itself, or is supposed to 
enjoy the privilege of an originary identity, it appears that the image of the 
action to which one becomes similar or equal stands here only for the identity 
of the concept in general, or of the 1. [DR 295-296] 
Rosenberg is not adverse to this interpretation of mimesis as imposing identity upon 
persons and actions. In fact, what makes action possible is the certainty and 
curtailment of ambiguity that the imposition of identity provides the historical actors. 
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According to Rosenberg the "hero" is dead even before he mounts the historical 
stage. His actions appear as already accomplished in the eternal ideal: 
That the hero is "dead" means that he moves entirely in the completed, that 
the contingencies of his existence were ended before he mounted the stage. 
Hence he is totally defined and at one with his deed-unlike the living with 
their vacillations of desire and their dilemmas. Men recognize in him not 
themselves but the embodiment of a part which they shall have to play as if 
they were wholly given to it. [TN 157] 
The whole point of mimesis is to stop "becoming" and to freeze action in an eternal 
instant that becomes the symbol for the whole of time. Defeuze uses these words 
(equal to the whole of time) to signify that the historical actor is not just repeating 
something in his own personal memory, but rather something that he never 
personally lived through. The actor is in touch with a "cosmic" memory that purports 
to gather all of time together in a single heroic act. When he does this he is forsaking 
his own will for a historical will, or what he believes to be a destiny. This is why 
Deleuze says that the repetition of the "during" is a repetition of the whole of history 
in a single act: 
This second repetition of the During is one in which the hero himself 
embraces disguise and assumes the metamorphosis which re-places him on a 
tragic plane, with his own identity, the inner depths of his memory and that of 
the whole world, in order that, having become capable of action, he purports 
to be equal to the whole of time. [DR 296] 
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This means that when the historical actor is actually undergoing the action he is not 
aware of anything actually happening. He is aware of the eternal drama that he is 
participating in only in an abstract manner. We must consider this state as the kind of 
state the Mircea Eliade described as a reenactment of mythical archetypes: 
For traditional man, the imitation of an archetypical model is a reactualization 
of the mythical moment when the archetype was revealed for the first time. 
Consequently, these ceremonies too... suspend the flow of profane time, of 
duration, and project the celebrant into a mythical time, in No tempore. 67 
If we consider the historical actor caught up in the enthusiasm of mimesis as a 
celebrant in a ritual, we can then easily understand Deleuze's insistence that this 
44event" is a symbol of the whole of time. Even Rosenberg recognized that the 
revolutionaries appealed to an "absolute" in order to throw themselves outside of 
time: 
Action required the absolute ("ideals and art forms") and passion, and these 
came from the past. To make their revolution the bourgeoisie had to throw 
themselves out of their actual historical situation. This they did through 
spontaneous repetition that caused two segments of time to coalesce and the 
present to vanish in the eternal. [TN 165-166] 
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Indeed this mimesis is a "repetition, " but it is a repetition of a model. Because of this, 
it cannot for Deleuze be the ultimate form of repetition. Next we will see how this 
repetition o the "identical" has an unexpected result. 
2.3 In the third "repetition of the future" Deleuze tells us that the self and its 
identity are swept away by a resurgence of multiplicity. In the tragic or heroic 
mimesis the ego found an image of itself (its equal) but in the course of undergoing 
metamorphosis the ego loses the very identity that it sought. Deleuze explains: 
As for the third time in which the future appears, this signifies that the act 
possesses a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn 
back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as 
though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the 
shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become 
equal to is the unequal in itself In this manner, the I which is fractured 
according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the 
temporal series corresponding and finds a common descent in the man 
without name, without family, without qualities, without self or 1, the 
'plebeian' guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered 
members gravitate around the sublime image. [DR 89-90] 
What is significant in this passage is that Deleuze tells us that it is as if the ego, that 
is "the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the 
multiplicity to which it gives birth. " In short, it is as if the hero who went through 
tragic metamorphosis is confronted with a result that is not identical to the one that 
he intended. The whole point of mimesis is to "reverse" the order of time so that an 
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4coriginal" state of things can be brought about. This is true of traditional cultures that 
perform rituals to "renew time" and to bring about the return to a perfect beginning. 
They have a cyclical conception of time and see the ritual as the means to bring about 
a reversal of misfortune. However, the "tragic" metamorphosis is now confronted 
with a "straight line of time" in which nothing can be reversed. Harold Rosenberg 
recognizes that something has changed from the ancient Greek notion of "static" 
dialectics and that, from the attempt to "reverse" time, springs an entirely new event: 
Operating through the tragic mechanics of mistake and recognition, the 
historical drama of "the resurrected Romans" does not break down into a 
Reversal but results in the creation of "something entirely new, " bourgeois 
society. Into the static dialectics of Greek tragedy has entered the principle of 
evolution with its "leap" of the emergent event. [TN 160] 
Along with the caesura between the non-action of the first repetition and the mimesis 
of the second repetition, we must recognize the existence of that which is repeated: 
the absolutely "new" emergent event. Deleuze tells us that the "new" is the product 
of all repetition: 
We produce something new only on condition that we repeat - once in the 
mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of 
metamorphosis. Moreover, what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in 
turn nothing but repetition: the third repetition, this time by excess, the 
repetition of the future as eternal return. [DR 90] 
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The third repetition is the excessive or the unintended result of repetition. In this case 
it is no longer the "subject" or the ego that repeats; rather, it is now time itsetf that 
repeats. Rosenberg argues that there is no true repetition in time itself, that repetition 
only appears in the imagination of the hero that thinks he is repeating a past event: 
Through the effect of time, represented in action by the continuity of class 
struggle, upon the historical plot, the hero's repetition of the past becomes a 
repetition in appearance only; the permanent operation of change permits no 
true repetition, as it permits no Reversal. [TN 160-16 1] 
However, Deleuze's sense of the term "repetition" necessarily includes difference. 
For Deleuze the so-called repetition of an archetype in platonic mimesis is only 
repetition in appearance only because "identity" does not allow for repetition. For 
example: if something is exactly identical how can we say that it can reoccur a 
second time? Archetypes take place "once and for all" or one time only, and all 
apparent repetition is false because something "identical" can never leave itself to be 
repeated. Another example: if everyday we awoke and all the events of the previous 
day and the day before were repeated identically, how would we know that we were 
experiencing it a second or third time? We would have no basis to say that there was 
a "second" time because there is no difference that would allow us to make that 
judgment. Therefore repetition necessarily implies difference. This is why the 
mimesis only exists in the mind of the actor. The historical actor intends the identical 
object, but enacts the repetition of difference. This is necessary because of the nature 
of time. According to Rosenberg: 
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While the heroes keep repeating the past as if they were acting out an eternal 
plot, time has entered into their drama in the form of a continual modification 
of the situation. And this subterranean change in the historical situation 
determines what the outcome of the action and its meaning shall be. [TN 160] 
This means that the intention of the historical actor does not determine the form or 
meaning of the resulting action. It is this irruption of multiplicity of becoming, which 
is inherent in time itseýf which shatters the image of the action that the ego identified 
itself with. Deleuze notices this same phenomenon in The Logic ofSense in the series 
"Good Intentions are Inevitably Punished. " It is here that he describes the Oedipus 
impulse or complex as a well-intentioned action that has unexpected results. It is in 
this series that Deleuze marks the split between the becoming of the depth and the 
"intention" as being a surface projection: "It is in this sense that Oedipus can be 
understood as the tragedy of Semblance... Far from being an agency of the depths, 
intention is the phenomenon of the entire surface, or the phenomenon which 
adequately corresponds to the coordination of the physical surfaces. " [LS 207] So, 
action takes place on two screens: one on the surface where the ego of the depths 
identifies with an "ideal" action that will unify its fragmentary existence and the 
becoming of actions that have unexpected results in the depths. From this we must 
conclude that the "third" repetition of static genesis must destroy the surface of 
"good" intentions. Deleuze has told us that this third repetition implies "the man 
without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, " [DR 90] and the 
surface of the ego-ideal must give way to the force of the unintended result. What 
replaces the denial of reality in the ego-ideal is the pure event in its fmal form: "the 
result of actions and passions, the surface effect or the event. " [LS 213] Between the 
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second and third static genesis of time there is always a tension between the intention 
and the result. The result opens up the world without subjects, where actions appear 
to produce themselves despite our intentions. Deleuze describes this as, "the 
movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, 
impersonal, and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned. " [LS 213] 
Mimesis is proved to be ineffective in the straight line of time because the 
irreversible nature of time always intrudes upon the intentionality of the ego. The ego 
is confronted by its actions as if they were alienated labors: all products of the will 
take on a life of their own. It is when we are confronted with the uncanny nature of 
the product that we tend to see them as "signs" or symptoms instead of products of 
the will. It is at that moment that time itself usurps the role of creator of the new: no 
longer is it the "artist" that is expressed but only the independence of artwork itself. 
2.4 Deleuze criticizes the notions of temporal repetition that are found in cyclic 
theories of history. The first of the cyclic repetitions that he critiques in Difference 
and Repetition is the intracyclic: "An intracyclic repetition, which involves the 
manner in which the first two ages repeat one another - or rather, repeat one and the 
same 'thing', act or event yet to come. " [DR 93] This form of cycle implies that in 
each of the series of repetitions there is some "thing" that is repeated. This form of 
cycle is based upon a series of correspondences between an event in one cycle and 
another event in another cycle. The theory of "past lives" belongs to this type of 
cycle. Kannic debt is a belief that a "sin" in a past life is repaid in another life by a 
punishment or a repetition of the event where one is the victim rather than the one 
who commits the act. This notion of repetition presupposes a universe in which 
everything is "just, " meaning that debts are partial and can be repaid by a repetition 
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of the same. This form of traditional repetition gives meaning to suffering and 
thereby transforms the meaning of history. According to Mircea Eliade: 
The sufferings of one's present life are not only deserved-since they are in 
fact the fatal effect of crimes and faults committed in previous lives-they are 
also welcome, for it is only in this way that it is possible to absorb and 
liquidate part of the karmic debt that burdens the individual and determines 
the cycle of his future existenceS. 68 
In this vision of cyclic history, pain is meaningful because everything is equal; in this 
way nothing is pointless in existence, and guilt is unnecessary. However, all of this is 
based upon analogy. The "payment" of debt is never a personal repayment to the 
person wronged, but only an abstract form of payment to an abstract metaphysical 
system. In conclusion, the cycle of debt and the cycle of payment remain external to 
one another. Only the "idea" of payment establishes a resemblance between the first 
time (of contracting the debt) and the second time. Furthermore this "first time" 
remains hypothetical since it is based upon the idea that for every pain there is a debt: 
in short, every pain is a motivation to find a repetition. This is not, in fact, a 
repetition at all but a projection of the pain in the present cycle into an imagined debt 
in a previous cycle. The resemblance, therefore, remains ideal and abstract. There is 
no memory of the previous cycle. The idea of punishment and debt is repeated 
because there is no knowledge or no consciousness of fault in a previous cycle. This 
form of cycle corresponds to the first repetition that Deleuze spoke of- the repetition 
of the before. The image of debts haunts the believer in karma because there is no 
recollection of the previous cycle. 
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2.5 The second type of cycle that Deleuze examines is the cycle of historý 
discovered by Vico: "A cyclic repetition in which it is supposed that, at the end of the 
third age and at the end of a process of dissolution, everything recommences with the 
first age: here, the analogies are drawn between two cycles (Vico). " [DR 93] Vico's 
conception of history is based upon a detailed analysis of the ascents of civilizations 
and their downfalls. In this case there is a historical record of the previous cycles. 
According to Vico there are three ages: the age of gods, the age of heroes and the age 
of men. Ultimately, after the last age the civilization would destroy itself (or be 
destroyed) and the cycle would start again. The trouble with Vico's theory, from 
Deleuze's standpoint, is that in the search to supply order to history Vico neglects the 
differences between civilizations. Therefore, all of his "cycles" are based upon 
analogies drawn only in the mind of Vico about the course of history. It is easy to set 
up a structure and to make history conform to it; it is another thing altogether to say 
that history itselffollows a pattern or a law. According to Deleuze the repetitions that 
historians notice are those repetitions that do not actually belong to history itself- 
The first time being regarded as the Same, the question is asked whether the 
second displays sufficient resemblance with the first to be identified as the 
Same again: a question which can be answered only by the establishment of 
relations of analogy within judgment, taking into account the variations in 
empirical circumstances (is Luther the analogue of Paul, the French 
Revolution the analogue of the Roman republic? ). [DR 294-295] 
Who decides if one event is sufficiently "similar" to another event to determine if 
there is an actual repetition? There is a clear difference between the historical actor's 
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conception of his own actions and the historian's conception. The historical actor is 
unaware of the repetition as being identical; it is only the historian that places the 
judgment of identity upon it. What the historical actor is aware of is the "heroic" 
symbols and archetypes that haunt his imagination. It is not history that repeats. It is 
the judgment of historians that draw resemblances between historical events. There is 
a difference between mimesis and historical resemblance. In mimesis the "once and 
for all" nature of the heroic symbol is not reducible to some event that happened in 
the past; rather, it is a timeless image that haunts the scene of action. The historian, 
however, looks at two separate actual occurrences and draws analogies. This is why 
Deleuze says: "The question whether the first time escapes repetition (in which case 
it is referred to as 'once and for all'), or, on the contrary, is repeated within a cycle or 
from one cycle to another, depends entirely upon the reflection of an observer. " [DR 
294] If the observer is within the action, then it will appear differently than if it is 
observed from the historian's armchair. To conclude, the cyclic repetition of Vico 
corresponds to the "tragic" repetition of the "during. " It differs from it insofar as 
reflection differs from action. History is never written from the point of view of those 
undergoing the action; rather, history is an afterthought. 
2.6 Nietzsche's conception of the eternal return cannot be reduced to either of 
the above cyclic conceptions of history. First, the karmic conception of cycles 
presupposes that when all karmic debt is paid, then history will come to an end and 
vanish into a state of "Nirvana" or nothingness. This means that a final state of 
equilibrium would be achieved. Nietzsche expressly denied this possibility: 
That a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible. But 
in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached. Likewise in a 
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spherical space. The shape of space must be the cause of etemal movement, 
and ultimately of all "imperfection. " [WP # 1064] 
The karmic notion of the repayment of debts is a notion that presupposes a process 
whereby the world is made perfect or balanced. Then when the reactionary 
conception of "justice" is placed within a cyclic history it seeks to bring an end to 
suffering at some future point of equilibrium. Nietzsche's conception of the eternal 
return excludes the possibility of moral progress or a "moral" purpose. In fact 
Nietzsche tells us that, in order to endure the thought of the eternal return, we need 
"freedom from morality" [WP # 1060] and an "abolition of the 'will"' [WP # 1060] so 
that all notions of personal fault and expiation must be eliminated. As for Vico's 
conception of history, it presupposes the eternal recurrence of the "same" or 
"similar" occurrences within tiume. Vico is attempting to impose a "law of nature" 
upon the becoming of history. He is imposing the character of "being" on becoming. 
Moreover, he is proposing to evaluate two different occurrences in history and 
impose an "equivalence" upon them. In the following passage Nietzsche shows how 
his idea of the etemal return is opposed to this type of thinking: 
To impose upon becoming the character of being-that is the supreme will to 
power. Twofold falsification, on the part of the senses and of the spirit, to 
preserve a world of that which is, which abides, which is equivalent, etc. That 
everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a 
world of being: --high Point of the mediation. From the values attributed to 
being proceed the condemnation of and discontent with becoming, after such 
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a world of being had first been invented. The metamorphosis of what has 
being (body, God, ideas, laws of nature, formulas, etc. ) [WP #617] 
Vico's conception of cyclical history has the character of placing "being" or identity 
upon becoming. First of all, it is a formula of analogy between cycles. Second, it is 
postulated as a law of nature, and third, it stabilizes the nature of things by 
postulating an identity of that which retums. Nietzsche's vision of eternal return, on 
the other hand, is the closest approximation that we have to this world of becoming. 
Why? First of all the eternal return is not a historical proposition: Nietzsche never 
tries to prove his hypothesis by appealing to "similar" recurrences in the history of 
mankind. His is a cosmological theory about the tendency of energies to re-form 
themselves in a series of combinations: "The law of the conservation of energy 
demands eternal recurrence. " [WP #1063] Since it is based upon "conservation of 
energy" his theory wholly concerns the ability of that energy to re-create 
"combinations" [WP # 1066] that will recur again and again. Therefore it is not based 
upon "similarities" between occurrences in the mind of any historian. Nor is it 
theories of "equilibrium" in which differences cancel each other out (karma). He 
specifically calls it "the great dice game of existence" [WP # 1066] in order to 
illustrate its difference from the classical notions of cyclic history. Deleuze 
specifically tells us that these two cyclic hypotheses of recurrence do not return in the 
eternal return: 
This superior repetition, understood as an eternal return in the third state, is 
precisely what is needed both to correct the intracyclic hypothesis and to 
contradict the cyclical hypothesis. In effect, on the one hand, the repetition in 
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the first two moments no longer expresses analogies of reflection, but the 
conditions under which eternal return is effectively produced by means of 
some action or other; on the other hand, these first two moments do not 
return, ) being on the contrary eliminated by the reproduction of the eternal 
return in the third. [DR 93] 
To make this clear we must distinguish the two different levels that the divergent 
conceptions of eternal return and cyclic history are on. Cyclic history presupposes 
two things: analogy in judgment (the recognition of identical occurrences) and the 
concept of a personal "will" (the notion that ill will is balanced by punishment in 
another cycle). On the other hand, the etemal retum, as Deleuze conceives of it, does 
not include the return of "judgment" or the "will. " For Deleuze, the eternal return is 
an "energetic" hypothesis about the return of "differences" or the pre-individual 
conditions for perceptions. If I may use an example drawn from Leibniz: the sound of 
a wave is made up of many little sounds of each drop of water. Now, according to 
Deleuze's hypothesis, what returns in the eternal return is the sound of each little 
drop of water and not the sound of the wave itself In us, what returns is all the little 
contradictory impulses in the organism and not the "will" of the person. What returns 
in the mind is all the contradictory "presentations" in the preconscious and not the 
negation of "judgment. " In short, what returns is the "molecular" and imperceptible 
differences that make up our world and not the "molar" or recognizable forms of 
things. This is what "returns. " The eternal return is a series of islands of order in a 
sea of chaos: the combinations return, not the thing. 
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2.1 The difference between the 2.3 Mimesis only exists in the 2.5 The cycle of Vico is based 
"before" and the "during": mind of the actor. His actions upon the analogies ofjudgment. 
having an identity rather than a take on an unintended meaning. This is based upon the mimesis 
personal ity. This is the autonomy of the of the "during. " 
result. 
2.2 The "during" is dramatic 2.4 The cycle of finite debt is 2.6 The eternal return opposes 
mimesis in which the actor based upon the idea of justice. It both a final state ofjustice and 
plays an "eternal" role. remains an abstract repetition of the identities of analogy. Only 
the "before. " the petite perceptions return. 
c) Static Repetition and The Eternal Return 
3.1 Deleuze also finds examples of these three static repetitions of time in 
Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The static genesis of the before, during and 
after can be seen in Zarathustra's reaction to the doctrine of the eternal return of the 
same. Let us start by considering the first reaction. Deleuze tells us that Zarathustra's 
first reaction to the news of the eternal return is one of disgust and loathing and that 
this constitutes the static "repetition" of the before: 
The largest part of the book is taken up with the before, in the mode of a 
defect of the past: this act is too big for me (compare the idea of 'criminal 
blame', or the whole comic story of the death of God, or Zarathustra's fear 
before the revelation of the eternal return - 'your fruits are ripe but you are 
not ripe for your fruits'). [DR 92] 
This is the reaction of someone who is not ready to hear the news. Such was the case 
in the story of the madman who announced the death of God. Nietzsche says that the 
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news has come too early even though the event of the death of God has already 
happened: 
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, 
were silent and stared at him in astonishment... I have come too early... my 
time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it 
has not yet reached the ears of men. 69 
The news of a terrifying event that implies a complete nihilism (or the destruction of 
all meaning) is either greeted with laughter or anger. The "eternal return" deserves 
the title of tremendous "event" because it is always shocking to those who first 
consider it seriously. Because Zarathustra takes the news seriously he has problems 
coming to grips with the news. At first he misconceives of the eternal return as a 
return of the "same" things. This is his "most abysmal thought": the idea that all the 
things that annoy him, all the petty and stupid frustrations of existence will come 
again. Deleuze explains this first conception of the eternal return as being one of the 
46same')') or the "similar": 
As he explains later in interpreting his nightmare: he fears that eternal return 
means the return of Everything, of the Same and the Similar, including the 
dwarf and including the smallest of men... He particularly fears that 
repetition will only be negative and will occur only by default: that one 
repeats only because one is deaf, lame and a dwarf, perched on the shoulders 
of others; or because one is incapable of an act (the death of God), even 
though the act has already occurred. [DR 298] 
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In short, Zarathustra conceives of the eternal return in "moral" terms. All the bad 
things that happened in his life will happen again and again for an infinite number of 
times. Who could affwm this? Even if one wanted to affirm this, one's biological 
principle that seeks only pleasure would revolt against this. One could only half- 
heartily affirm such a "return. " This is Zarathustra's reaction: "'Eternally recurs the 
man of whom you are weary, the small man'-thus yawned my sadness and dragged 
its feet and could not go to sleep. " [Z 219] He is haunted by the possibility of the 
"small man" and the petty annoyances of life returning (he could not go to sleep). It 
weighs upon him like a nightmare: repeating "the small man will return... the small 
man will return... " and he makes himself sick by his inability to accept this. Deleuze 
notices that when Zarathustra is confronted with the problem of the eternal return 
again, he denies that it is a circle: 
That is why Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies to the dwarf- 
'Spirit of Gravity, do not simplify matters too much! '. By contrast he holds 
that time is a straight line in two opposing directions. [DR 298] 
This is a surprising fact that few people have noticed. Zarathustra actually describes 
time as two paths that go off in two different directions and only meet at the present. 
In "On the Vision and the Riddle" Zarathustra speaks of two different eternities of 
the past and the future (as a straight line of time) and not a circle of time: 
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Behold the gateway, dwarP [ ... ] It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no 
one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for 
eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another etemity. [Z 157] 
It is at this point that the dwarf interjects "all that is straight lies... All truth is 
crooked; time itself is a circle. " [Z 158] It is at this point that Zarathustra gets angry 
with the dwarf and accuses him of making things too simple. Why does Zarathustra 
get angry at the statement that time is a circle? Is it because he fears the return of the 
"same thingT No. Because he goes on to say that "whatever can walk-in this long 
lane out there too, it must walk once more. " [Z 158] It is because he is beginning to 
understand the eternal return as the return of the "path" and not the return of the 
dwarf who "cannot" walk because he is lame. Therefore the path returns, but only 
that which can walk (that is, affirm the retum) will retum. 
3.2 Deleuze defines the moment when Zarathustra becomes capable: "Then 
comes the moment of the caesura or the metamorphosis, 'The Sign', when 
Zarathustra becomes capable. " [DR 92] At the end of the book Zarathustra looks up 
at a star (an ego ideal) and realizes that this ideal is for him alone and that others are 
sleeping (they do not realize the ideal): "You great star... you deep eye of happiness, 
what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine? And if they 
stayed in their chambers even after you had awakened and come and given and 
distributed, how angry would you be! " [Z 324-235] He sees this as a "sign" that he 
can follow in order to "go to his work. " This means that all of Zarathustra's previous 
hesitations are at an end. He ascends the mountain again after wasting his time with 
the people below. He realizes that they are not his true companions and that he must 
strive to overcome himself by taking action: "Well then, they still sleep, these 
higher 
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men, while I am awake: these are not my proper companions. [ ... ]I want to go to my 
work, to my day: but they do not understand the signs Of MY morning; my stride is 
for them no summons to awaken. " V 325] Deleuze compares this moment to 
Hamlet's sea voyage. Zarathustra forsakes the "comic" misunderstandings of his 
encounters with different characters in a drama of misrecognition and takes on a 
heroic role. This is why Zarathustra is like Hamlet according to Deleuze: 
"Zarathustra is like Hamlet; the sea voyage has made him capable, he has reached 
the becoming-similar or the becoming-equal of the heroic metamorphosis; yet he 
feels that the hour has not come... " [DR 298] The heroic metamorphosis is only the 
beginning. Zarathustra feels that he must struggle and that his struggles have not yet 
come to an end. He speaks of his "most abysmal thought, " namely the eternal return, 
that he does not have yet the strength to summon: 
Alas, abysmal thought that is my thought... Your gravity was always terrible 
enough for me; but one day I shall yet find the strength and the lion's voice to 
summon you. And once I have overcome myself that far, then I also want to 
overcome myself in what is still greater; and victory shall seal my perfection. 
[] As yet the hour of my fmal struggle has not come to me--or is it coming 
just now? Verily, with treacherous beauty sea and life look at me. [Z 162- 
163] 
But what does it mean to overcome oneselP In order to answer this question we must 
turn to his notes in The Will to Power where he lists what can make us endure the 
thought of the etemal retum: 
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To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from morality; new 
means against the fact of pain (pain conceived as a tool, as the father of 
pleasure; there is no cumulative consciousness of displeasure); the enjoyment 
of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism, as a counterweight to this 
extreme fatalism; abolition of the concept of necessity; abolition of the "will"; 
abolition of "knowledge-in-itself " The elevation of the consciousness of 
strength in man, as he creates the overman. [WP # 1060] 
This is the answer to "what would give us the strength to think the eternal return? " 
First, eliminate the idea that "events" are good and bad: this means that we must 
reevaluate pain and pleasure, thereby making pain an affirmation of life. Second, we 
must not seek to plan our lives according to a set and intended path: we should have 
no idea what our life will turn out to be, no goal or aim. Third, we must abandon our 
faith in the "identity" of things: this means that all logic of identity and abstract 
conceptions of reality must be replaced by a concrete synthesis of differences. Recall 
the quote above: "Verily, with treacherous beauty sea and life look at me. " [Z 163] 
Life is the treacherous beauty of the sea: it is under no control of the will. It is 
indifferent to our pleasure or pain, and it is unknowable in itself If we can accept the 
treacherous beauty of the sea (like the multiplicity of drops of water) then by that 
means we can have the strength to affirm the thought of the etemal retum. But this 
means a shift from the stage of "heroic struggle" in which we seek to overcome our 
own weakness to a stage where these weaknesses are already dissolved. At the stage 
of the "during" or the becoming-equal the "overman" becomes an ego-idea that we 
seek to copy. But this is a paradox: the "overman" is the one who is dissolved, but by 
being an ideal for the heroic mimesis, it is mistaken for an identity. This is why 
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Deleuze says: "Nevertheless, the becoming-equal or becoming-capable of the 
metamorphosis has only brought him to supposed originary identity: he has not yet 
banished the apparent positivity of the identical. " [DR 298] In order to overcome 
oneself one must also overcome the "overman" as an aim to be achieved. For as long 
as the heroic metamorphosis takes place in the repetition of the "during, " it will 
always have an aim that is "identical" in itself The paradox is: the aim of 
metamorphosis must be to overcome the "aim. " 
3.3 Deleuze tells us that the "third moment" of the "after" is missing from Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra because Nietzsche did not finish this work. Looking at 
Nietzsche's outlines for the work Deleuze concludes that he planned it but never 
actually wrote it: "The third moment remains absent: this is the moment of the 
revelation and affirmation of eternal return, and implies the death of Zarathustra. " 
[DR 92] We have seen, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the moment of the "before" when 
he has nightmares about the return of the small man and the second moment of the 
"during" when he affirms the straight line of time where not everything returns, but 
what is lacking is the "after" where the eternal return is presented as a "selective" 
doctrine. What do we mean by calling the eternal return a "selective" doctrine? On 
one level, we mean that only those who have gained the strength to affirm it, by 
eliminating the weaknesses that we have seen above, can be selected as the 
46overmen.,, On another level, we must see the process of "combinations" as a 
selection in itself. the repetition of combinations "select" which elements return. This 
is why Deleuze says: "The highest test is to understand the eternal return as a 
selective thought, and repetition in the eternal return as selective being. " [DR 298] It 
is both a selective thought and a selective being. To move into the third repetition of 
the "after" the thought of the etemal return must be replaced by the selective being of 
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the eternal return. In short, it is no longer a question of having the strength to affirm 
the "thought"' of the eternal return. Now that one has the strength the thought is no 
longer important. What is important is the experience of the return as an impersonal 
process. It is in the moment of the afTirmation of the "return" that the whole thought 
of the eternal return is rendered useless and absurd. This is why Deleuze says "it is 
not a doctrine but the simulacrum of every doctrine... " [DR 95] Having a belief or a 
faith in a doctrine only makes sense if one has an "aim, " as one does in a heroic 
metamorphosis. In this "third" stage all doctrines are treated superficially and are not 
taken seriously. In this last stage there is a realization that all doctrines and beliefs 
are only symptoms of weakness and that only the "great dice game of existence" 
[WP # 1066] has any importance. This is why Deleuze describes the "comedy" of the 
Overman as joyfully nihilistic: "The eternal return is only for the third time: the time 
of the drama, after the comic and after the tragic (the drama is defined when the 
tragic becomes joyful and the comic becomes the comedy of the Overman). " [DR 
298-299] The "tragic" man of metamorphosis treats his idols very seriously. They are 
the means by which he is able to take action and transform himself But Nietzsche 
lists him as among those who must perish and "go under. " The "small man" or "last 
man" is the one who repeats because he is incapable of action (the repetition of the 
before); the great heroic and active man or the "one who wants to perish" is the one 
who repeats in order to become-equal to the action (the repetition of the during) and 
yet both of these must perish in the third time. Deleuze tells us that they 
do not 
survive the "selective" test of the eternal return: "(Nietzsche carefully 
indicates the 
two distinct types who do not survive the test: the passive small man or last man, and 
the great heroic active man, the one who has become the man 'who wants to 
perish'). " [DR 299] This is perfectly in keeping with Nietzsche's sentiment 
that man 
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is something to be overcome: "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an 
end: what can be ioved in man is that he is an overture and a going under. "' [Z 15] 
The heroic man of metamorphosis is just a stage on the way to the overman. But 
what keeps "man" from achieving the stage of the overman is his vanity. The heroic 
metamorphosis demands that the ego maintain an "ideal" of itself by which it unifies 
its "identity" in the image of action. The hero is like Narcissus who falls in love with 
a mirror image and what he sees in the mirror is the sublime image of himself In the 
chapter "On those who are Sublime", Nietzsche tells us what the "soul's secret" is: 
Indeed, you that are sublime shall yet become beautiful one day and hold up a 
mirror to your own beauty. Then your soul will shutter with godlike desires, 
and there will be adoration even in your vanity. For this is the soul's secret: 
only when the hero has abandoned her, she is approached in a dream by the 
overhero. [Z 118-119] 
The secret is: only when one has abandoned her (the sublime image) will the image 
be opposed by the "overhero. " In short, Nietzsche is telling us that heroic mimesis 
and idol worship are liabilities that will keep us from being "selected" by the eternal 
retum. To put it simply, the ideal image of ourselves does not return because it is a 
fiction of our imagination. Only the "real" returns, only the multiplicities of 
singularities that make up sensations return, not the "image ... .. form, " or 
"idea" of a 
thing. Deleuze tells us that this new repetition of the future (or "the after") is not a 
repetition of "someone" but an impersonal repetition: "For 'one' repeats eternally, 
but 'one' now refers to the world of impersonal individualities and pre-individual 
singularities. " [DR 299] This world of impersonal individualities is the world of the 
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44unequal" or the dice game of existence that has no final aim. There are no images of 
this "dice game" only a continuous metamorphosis of energy. The heroic 
metamorphosis was mistaken as to what its aim was. It sought to be equal to an 
image; instead what Deleuze tells us is that we must become-equal to the "unequal. " 
This is what Deleuze says must happen to Zarathustra: "Zarathustra-hero became 
equal, but what he became equal to was the unequal, at the cost of losing the sham 
identity of the hero. " [DR 299] Essentially, this involves a replacing of the "idol" of 
mimesis with the "being of the sensible. " What does this mean? According to 
Nietzsche it is a "monster of energy" [VvT # 1067] that is "a sea of forces flowing and 
rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years 
of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms... " [WP 41067] and this is also 
the world that Deleuze calls the innocence of becoming upon which no blame can be 
cast and no guilt accrued. Becoming-equal to the unequal means that we make 
ourselves strong enough to affirm chaos. But this first requires our giving up our ego- 
ideal. 
3.4 The repetition of the "before" is essentially a triumph of "reactive forces" as 
Deleuze uses this term in Nietzsche and Philosophy. What are the "reactive" forces? 
They are the forces that seek to preserve the self and its organism at the price of 
forsaking all will to overcome the self In The Will to Power Nietzsche questions the 
supremacy of the self-preservative instincts: 
E. g., that which is useful for the long life of the individual might be 
unfavorable to its strength and splendor; that which preserves the individual 
might at the same time arrest and halt its evolution. On the other hand, a 
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deficiency, a degeneration, can be of the highest utility in so far as it acts as a 
stimulant to other organs. [WP #647] 
The drive for self-preservation is an "incomplete nihilism" because it seeks only to 
eliminate those things that threaten the survival of the organism and the self This is 
why the repetition of the "before" must be considered as a reactive force of self- 
preservation. For example: the repetitions of king Oedipus's questioning is due to the 
drive to preserve himself from the "traumatic" realization that he is the murderer he 
seeks. Another example: Hamlet questions the meaning of his existence because he is 
unwilling to risk his life to kill the king. These two examples are "reactive" because 
they turn the energy that should be used for action against the will to power and 
instead seek to silence the will so that the action will become unnecessary. In short, 
Hamlet seeks to "talk" himself out of action and thereby turns his active forces (those 
that seek to kill the king) into reactive forces (those that contemplate suicide). As a 
result Hamlet is trapped in a hesitant repetition of the "before" that seeks the 
discharge of action but at the same time turns that impulse to action into a reactive 
obsessional thought. Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all! According to 
Deleuze what Nietzsche hates above all is this hesitant obsessional thought: 
One thing in the world disheartens Nietzsche: the little compensations, the 
little pleasures, the little joys and everything that one is granted once, only 
once. Everything that can be done again the next day only on the condition 
that it be said the day before: tomorrow I will give it up - the whole 
ceremonial of the obsessed. And we are like those old women who permit 
themselves an excess only once, we act and think like them. [NP 68-69] 
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Hamlet keeps saying to himself- I will do the deed tomorrow but he never does. The 
"test" of eternal return is a means by which this obsessional hesitation is put to an 
end. Deleuze sees the test of the eternal return as a reformulation of the categorical 
imperative: "what ever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal 
retum. " [NP 68] An obsessive thinker who hesitates to act, when he asks himself the 
question whether he would like to live that moment of indecision an infinite number 
of times, brings his self doubt to a point of crisis. Given the choice of an eternity of 
self doubt or an eternity of action, the obsessive person will choose action (even if it 
risks his life) rather than bear the burden of an eternity of hesitation. The test of the 
"eternal return" gives him an image of his own action under the light of eternity, and 
thereby promotes the vision of an ego-ideal upon which he can become-equal. In 
short, by envisioning his action as an "eternal" action, a Hamlet can become-equal to 
the role that destiny has set out for him. He would have exchanged the "no" of 
judgment that has kept him from action for the "no" of the deed that drives him to 
action. For Nietzsche this is a transition from passive nihilism to an active nihilism. 
He says: "It is the condition of strong spirits and wills, and those do not find it 
possible to stop with the No of Judgment': their nature demands the No of the deed. " 
[WP #24] When this happens the negation of the will to act has another negation that 
negates the "negation" of hesitation. Deleuze describes this as a "self-destruction" of 
the reactive forces that keep us from acting: "Only the eternal return can complete 
nihilism because it makes negation a negation of reactiveforces themselves. 
By and 
in the eternal return nihilism no longer expresses itself as the conservation and 
victory of the weak but as their destruction, their self-destruction. 
" [NP 70] In short, 
a weak and hesitating Hamlet is destroyed and is replaced 
by an active and 
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determined Hamlet. Hamlet's words: "My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth! " 
[Act 4, scene 4] According to Nietzsche all attempts to escape the passive nihilism of 
weak values cannot be achieved without the active and nihilistic destruction of those 
values that make us weak: "Attempts to escape nihilism without reevaluating our 
values so far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute. " [WP #28] 
Deleuze believes that the answer to incomplete or passive nihilism is the complete or 
active nihilism of the eternal return: 
And if the eternal return is the most extreme form of nihilism, nihilism itself 
(separated or abstracted from the eternal return) is always an "incomplete 
nihilism"... however far it goes, however powerful it is. Only the eternal 
return makes the nihilistic will whole and complete. [NP 69] 
An incomplete nihilism is "incomplete" because it tries to compensate for the 
aimlessness of existence by placing ideals, aims, and justifications upon it. For 
example: Hamlet hesitates to kill the king because of the fears of "hell" and "false 
spirits" and the prohibition against killing a king. These values are the "source" of his 
relative and incomplete nihilism of hesitation. However, if someone like Hamlet 
were to think of the "eternal recurrence" of that doubt and hesitation, he would turn 
away from those weak values that keep him from action and instead follow the 
image 
of the action that he would will to "return" an infinite number of times. 
When 
existence is denuded of all aim and meaning those "prohibitions" of values are 
suspended. According to Nietzsche this is the main function of the thought of 
the 
eternal return: "Let us think this thought in its most teffible 
form: existence as it is, 
without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any 
finale of nothing: 'the 
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eternal recurrence. "' [WP #55] In this phase of the thought of the etemal retum, only 
the image of an "action" being accomplished for an "infinite" number of times 
remains. This is a powerful motivation for the second static repetition that Deleuze 
describes: the repetition of the "during. " 
3.5 The essential point of transition from the repetition of the "before" to the 
repetition of the "during" is the displacement of the negative and destructive forces 
away from the self and towards an external object. The becoming-active of forces 
means that the forces that were turned against the ego are now transmuted into the 
will to mastery and the will to power. Freud was clearly inspired by Nietzsche when 
he wrote the following lines: 
The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it 
fulfills the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards - soon 
with the help of a special organic system, the muscular apparatus - towards 
objects in the external world. The instinct is then called the destructive 
instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power. [I I Freud 418] 
Freud's interpretation of the "will to power' corresponds with Deleuze's conception 
of the repetition of the "during. " The second moment of repetition is the moment in 
which self-destructive forces that were manifested in neurotic symptoms are 
transmuted into a kind of "acting-out" in which the external object takes the place of 
the ego. (Hamlet kills the king instead of slowly killing himself with doubt. ) Freud 
identifies this movement with sadism: "This is sadism proper. " [I lFreud 418] This 
sadism is the process whereby negation is affirmed as an "absolute. " One rejoices in 
the destruction of objects as an affirmation of one's own power over the world. In the 
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eternal return one "affirms" the eternal return of one's sense of mastery over things 
through active negation. The thought of the eternal return intensifies this experience 
of mastery: not only does one master the object, but one also thinks of oneself 
mastering the object an infinite number of times. This constitutes the "repetition" of 
the during. According to Deleuze this is the affirmation of negation itself. "In and 
through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes itself 
into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of 
affirming, an affirmative power. " [NP 71] What is striking in this repetition of the 
during is that all thought of the previous repetition of the "before" is eliminated. 
When mastering the object in a negating action, the whole thought of hesitation, 
which haunted the conscience before, is completelyforgotten. It is as if there were no 
"before" or no hesitation before the act: the affirmation of one's mastery becomes the 
only repetition that is affirmed in the thought of the eternal return. (One imagines 
oneself accomplishing the "image of action" an infinite number of times at the same 
time that one forgets that one ever hesitated to act. ) This is why Deleuze claims that 
the "reactive forces" of self-doubt and self-destruction do not return: "The second 
selection in the eternal return is thus the following: the eternal return produces 
becoming-active. It is sufficient to relate the will to nothingness to the eternal return 
in order to realize that reactive forces do not return. " [NP 71 ] Essentially, when the 
ego turns its destructive forces outwards it takes all the things that it hated about 
itself before and projects them onto the object to be destroyed. In Coldness and 
Cruelty Deleuze tells us that the superego projects the ego onto its victims: "the 
sadistic superego expels the ego and projects it into its victims, it is always faced 
with the task of destroying something outside itself again and again... " [CC 126] In 
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Difference and Repetition Deleuze describes the confrontation with "stupidity" that 
reaches a point of crisis: 
madness arises at the point at which the individual contemplates itself in 
this free ground - and, as a result, stupidity in stupidity and cruelty in cruelty 
- to the point that it can no longer stand itself. 'A pitiful facility then emerges 
in their minds, that of being able to see stupidity and no longer tolerate 
[DR 152] 
It is the test of the eternal return that throws a light on our stupidity, so that we come 
to a point at which we can no longer stand it. At that point we project our own 
stupidity onto the other and destroy them at the same time that we destroy stupidity 
in ourselves. This is why Deleuze tells us that: "Laziness, stupidity, baseness, 
cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal return would no longer be 
the same laziness, stupidity etc. " [NP 69] When the thought of these despised things 
returning an infinite number of times haunts us (like it did Zarathustra) we expel 
these things from our "ego" and actively destroy them in an other. This "stupidity" 
does not return as "affirmed. " What returns as affirmed is the feeling of mastery that 
we have when we are "negating" these stupidities. In The Gay Science Nietzsche 
champions Socrates and his sermon against stupidity over the Christian sermon 
against selfishness. They are diametrically opposed: the sermon against selfishness 
says that "everyone must be equal" and no one should strive to go beyond the 
44 ground" of the normal; while the sermon against stupidity taught that our 
misfortunes come from our mindlessly accepting the "equality" of opinions with our 
neighbor. The first sermon is one of "weak" values that belongs to the repetition of 
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the "before" in which we cannot act because of our conscience which is really the 
mindless acceptance of the values of others. The second sermon of Socrates against 
stupi ty as the source of our misfortunes belongs to the repetition of the "during" in 
which stupidity becomes something shameful (the acceptance of "common" values is 
shameful) and we are enjoined to overcome these stupid values. This is the 
opposition of philosophy to common sense. Nietzsche tells us that philosophy does 
harm to stupidity: "What is certain, however, is that it deprived stupidity of its good 
conscience; these philosophers hanned stupidity.,, 70 This is what Deleuze tells us is 
at the basis of becoming-active: we turn against the "reactive" forces of stupidity and 
bring shame to them. We turn our negative and destructive energies towards 
destroying or doing hann to these "stupid" values. The activity of thought is, 
therefore, essentially destructive and negative for Deleuze. Deleuze describes this 
stupidity as the "transcendent element" that cannot be thought. He takes up 
Heidegger's proclamation that what I most thought provoking is that we are not yet 
thinking: this is the essence of stupidity. Deleuze says that, "this unthought has 
become the necessary empirical form in which... thought at last thinks the 
cogitandum; in other words, the transcendent element which can only be thought 
('the act that we do not yet think' or 'What is stupidity? '). " [DR 153] In short, 
stupidity does not return. 
3.6 The destruction of "stupidity" or the revaluation of all values lead to the third 
repetition of the "after. " What is essentially destroyed in the static repetition of the 
"during" is the ego-ideal. The common herd values of "equality" and universal 
"truths" support the idea of the "self. " Having common values is the means by which 
people recognize one another. An example: human rights are the means 
by which 
each person gives up some of his own power to act (such as the prohibition against 
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stealing) in exchange for being recognized as having "rights" as a person. These 
44values" are laws of exchange: one person "contracts" a debt to another if they 
violate the other's "rights" and this debt must be paid by a punishment. These are the 
prohibitions that serve as a basis of "neurosis" in the field of sexuality in which 
human "rights" and individualities are ill defmed. If this were the case, then one 
would spend most of one's life worrying about the "debts" that one has contracted 
against others. In the first half of Shakespeare's play, Hamlet worries about the debts 
that he owes to his dead father and the debts that he owes to his new king. The 
second repetition of the "during" suspends these worries about debts to others and 
acts in an unequal and unjust manner: sadism. Sadism is not the "law" but the 
suspension of the law and the values that it implies. For Deleuze the becoming-active 
of thought implies sadistic suspension of the law. In an "ironic" twist, the powers of 
thought take on the aggressive features of the law and turn it against the "law" itself 
Thought is essentially unjust, aggressive, and unequal. From the point of view of the 
"herd instinct" thought must appear evil. But the aim of this "thought" is to constitute 
a new innocence: the innocence of becoming. The sadist or thinker is not at all 
concerned with "evil" nor does he delight in transgression because this would re- 
affirm the values that he seeks to destroy. Instead he contemplates the "energy of 
destruction" and its impersonal nature. In Coldness and Cruelty Deleuze says of one 
of Sade's characters Saint-Fond, that he delights not in transgression 
but in the 
destructive molecules: "Again, in Saint-Fond's system, the value of punishment 
lies 
solely in its capacity for infinite reproduction through the agency of 
destructive 
molecules. " [CC 119] Moreover, he also says that the 
law must be transcended 
towards a pure vision of anarchy: "Sade often stresses the fact that the 
law can only 
be transcended towards an intuitional model of anarchy. " [CC 87] Such a vision 
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excludes the roles of a punisher and someone who is punished, just as it excludes the 
Law as a payment of debts. It mirrors the activity of nature insofar as, in nature, there 
are no debts and payments but only perpetual destruction and reformation. This is the 
vision that pure thought tends towards: a purely mechanical or molecular conception 
of transformations. The repetition of the "after" is then a purely cosmological 
conception of the eternal return. For Nietzsche, the cosmological vision of the eternal 
return is essential to understanding why it is a repetition of differences or 
"combinations. " It is worthwhile to reproduce here the whole passage in which 
Nietzsche compares the cosmological doctrine of the eternal return to a game of dice: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a 
certain definite number of centers of force-and every other representation 
remains indefinite and therefore useless-it follows that, in the great dice 
game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. 
In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be 
realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since 
between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible 
combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations 
conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular 
movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a 
circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays 
its game in infinitum. [WP # 1066] 
To summarize the important aspects of this passage: the universe is an absolute chaos 
of forces; however, there are a limited number of combinations that this force can 
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take on; therefore, there must be some instances of "repetition" in this chaos. Further. 
every possible combination must at some time have been actual: this means that all 
&vergent series of possible outcomes of each action must have been actualized. This 
is why the eternal return is not a determinism the way Leibniz's theory of monads 
appears to be. There is no God that orders the world into the "best"" possible world; 
instead, every world is simultaneously actual. The determination as to which world 
will become actual in the present series is determined by the chance throw of the 
dice. Chance does not negate chaos the way Leibniz's God negates incompossible 
worlds. Leibniz's "world" or monad is one in which everything is balanced and there 
is a "justice" to the fmal order of things. (Small injustices are necessary for the 
overall good of the compossable world. ) Nietzsche's vision of chaos eliminates all 
notion of justice from the start: only anarchy reigns in the eternal return. This is why 
Deleuze says that the etemal return is the system of the future in which all possible 
outcomes are affirmed simultaneously: 
The system of the future, by contrast, must be called a divine game, since 
there is no pre-existing rule, since the game bears already upon its own rules 
and since the child-player can only win, all of chance being affirmed each 
time and for all times. Not restrictive or limiting affirmations, but 
affirmations coextensive with the questions posed and with the decisions 
from which they emanate: such a game entails the repetition of the necessary 
winnmg move, since it wins by embracing all possible combinations and rules 
in the system of its own return. [DR 116] 
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This is why the repetition of the future or the 44after" cannot be expressed as an 
44 anticipation of the future. " To anticipate the future is to place limits upon chance: to 
envision, in advance, what would count as a winning move. The phenomenological 
explanation of the structure of "expectation" has no place in Deleuze's conception of 
the future as a static repetition of time. The repetition of the future or the "after" is 
always the affirmation of all possible outcomes and the vision of chaos or injustice. 
Thought of the future embraces injustice as a principle. That is why political 
philosophy is antagonistic to this form of "thought. " The vision of the eternal return 
as a cosmological doctrine eliminates all conceptions of human rights, values of 
humanity, the dignity of persons, and the sanctity of doctrines. This is why the 
institution of active thought, according to Deleuze, involves a "complete" nihilism. 
3.1 Zarathustra's first reaction: 3.3 The "third" stage is the 3.5 In "becoming active" 
disgust at the thought that the eternal return as a selective destructive (sadistic) forces are 
"same" things return (all the doctrine. It is "being" that turned outwards towards 
petty annoyances). But he soon selects by chance, therefore one stupidity. Stupidity is a 
realizes that only the affirming must give up the power of symptom of common values of 
returns. (Not the dwarf) judgment to realize it. equality. 
3.2 Zarathustra's second 3.4 The repetition of the 3.6 In the"afterwards" of the 
reaction: The courage to "before" are the reactive forces overman there is a vision of 
struggle to affirm the idea. This of incomplete nihilism. The test pure anarchy. This is the 
"heroic" struggle of the of the eternal return brings the cosmological doctrine of the 
overtnan must itself be reactive forces to a crisis point, eternal return that eliminates 
overcome. eliminates values. "human" values. 
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Conclusion 
How is one to conclude a thesis such as this? There is no sense of a central 
point. There can be no proper conclusion to a thesis that does not seek to solve a 
problem. This thesis offered no final solutions. Instead it sought to expose the full 
complexity of the three syntheses of time. As such, it must raise more problems than 
it solves. In short, this thesis sought to make a systematic and full study of the details 
of the three syntheses of time. Because of the detailed nature of this study it is not 
possible to summarize it in a conclusion. Instead, at the end of this work we must 
instead ask ourselves a series of pointed questions about the importance of the topic 
of time. It is best to end such a "problematic" thesis by asking what the significance 
is of the major problems that it raises. The proper place of such a conclusion is to 
give the readers a sense of the importance of a work they have just read. Further, 
because each section ends with a table that summarizes the main points of that 
section, there is no need to give an overall summary here. This work has progressed 
by addressing problems as they arose in each section. As such it may appear to be 
fragmented into a series of unrelated theories. However, if the main problematic is 
kept in mind at each step, the reader may then see a pattern and a progression from 
one problem to the next. I hope this ending will instill this sense of a pattern or 
progression in this work for the reader. 
Deleuze devotes much of his work to the problem of time. But why should 
we be concerned with the problem of time? Often people do not see the immediate 
significance of time in other problems that philosophy faces. Here is my sense of the 
problems that the theory of time in the work of Deleuze raises. First, there is the 
problem of "recognition. " This is one of the major themes of epistemology, ethics 
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and other branches of philosophy that seek to ground knowledge and establish a 
system of truth. For Deleuze the problems of "representation" are addressed in his 
theory of memory. Much of what we saw in this thesis was Deleuze's attempt to 
redefine memory in such a way that it would not be reducible to recognition. To do 
this he found an alternative to the Platonic system of reminiscences. Therefore, his 
main object of attack is the notion that memory reproduces actual events that took 
place in the past. Because of this he seeks to expose those instances of "false" 
memory, not as mistakes of memory, but as essential components of memory itself. 
Here is the problem: if memory is merely "recognition, " then the active faculties of 
the intelligence would synthesize time. But, the rational intellect has no motivation 
to recall any images from the past. Therefore, what makes us remember? There must 
be some involuntary force that cannot be explained by the faculty of recognition. 
Deleuze's answer. ) as we have seen, is that there is an "erotic99 component to memory 
that essentially disguises the past and brings the "false" images into the heart of 
memory itself Second, there is the problem of "perception. " Many philosophers take 
objects in the world as a given and reduce our complex relationship to these objects 
as one of recognition. However, Deleuze does not simply reduce our object relations 
to this over simPlifled version of recognition. Instead, his theory of duration takes 
into account all the complex and psychological complexities of object relations. He 
addresses "need" on a biological or organic level of which we are not fully 
conscious. Our duration is not "expectation" in a simple sense of a self that waits 
for 
a desired object; rather, there are tiny syntheses of need in every cell of the 
body. The 
result is that there is not "one" duration but many durations 
from which our sense of 
time is derived- These micro-durations are the very material of signs: the organism 
perceives signs that never are registered in consciousness. 
These are the signs of the 
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present. As a result, our duration is not fully subjective as Kant thought; but rather, it 
is organic or pre-personal. Time is composed step by step as a synthesis of many 
organic rhythms of need and satisfaction. Third, there is the problem of "ideas. " For 
traditional philosophers "ideas" are the entities of reason. Not so for Deleuze. For 
him ideas are essentially problems. What does he mean by a problem? He means the 
system of pure events that have neither subject nor object, nor a sense of order or a 
place in time. Such ideas are never the products of reason. Instead, they give rise to 
reason that seeks to negate contrary possibilities. Leibnitz's God was such a 
contemplator of ideas (in Deleuze's sense) when he sought to eliminate the 
incompossible divergent series from the best possible world. Our own attempts at 
reason are also a denial of problems and ideas. For Deleuze ideas as problems are the 
system of the future because the future is "open" and positive just as are the 
problems. What Deleuze challenges by this conception of the idea is the rival 
conception of "clear and distinct ideas. " Clear and distinct ideas are the ultimate 
expression of the denial of chance in the universe: it expresses the will to order and 
mastery over chaos. However, Deleuze corrects this vision of the idea by exposing 
the prior condition of chance and chaos before there are any clear conceptions. In 
short, clear and distinct ideas only come after the negation of divergent possibilities 
just as Leibniz's God created a clear and coherent world by negating other possible 
worlds. Deleuze's discussion of the future as a dimension of time is also an attack on 
the ground of clear and distinct ideas. Because of the above, Deleuze's conception of 
time is also implicated in his overall critique of the history of philosophy. If we are 
concerned about the foundations of philosophical thought, we must also consider the 
importance of the theory of time in each of these foundations. Deleuze's theory of 
time seeks also to expose the weaknesses of his predecessors. 
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